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INTRODUCTION
The five-year statute of limitation on an “action, suit or proceeding
for the enforcement of any civil fine, penalty or forfeiture, pecuniary
or otherwise,” which now appears at 28 U.S.C. § 2462, was adopted in
its current form as part of the 1948 revision and reenactment of Title
28 of the United States Code, concerning the “Judicial Code and
Judiciary” (the “1948 Act”).1 The 1948 Act made only non-substantive
changes in “phraseology” to a provision adopted in 1839, as part of a
statute concerning the “Judicial System of the United States,” which
stated “no suit or prosecution shall be maintained, for any penalty or
forfeiture, pecuniary or otherwise, accruing under the laws of the
United States” unless the suit or prosecution “shall be commenced
within five years from the time when the penalty or forfeiture
accrued.”2 The 1839 statute, in turn, was based on a criminal statute
adopted by the First Congress in 1790.3
As discussed in this Article, until at least the late nineteenth
century, what we now would call regulatory statutes commonly
prescribed the forfeiture of a specific sum of money or specific
property as the mandatory consequence for a violation.4
All
1. Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 869 (revising, codifying, and enacting
Title 28 into law).
2. Act of Feb. 28, 1839, ch. 36, § 4, 5 Stat. 322. As discussed in Part I.B.3, minor
changes in the wording of the 1839 Act were made in 1874, but they were nonsubstantive and the provision has remained essentially unchanged since 1839. See
Appendix A (providing texts of current § 2462, the 1874 version, and the 1839
version).
3. As discussed in Part I.B.3, the original ancestor of the 1839 Act was the Act of
April 30, 1790, ch. 9, § 32, 1 Stat. 119.
4. See, e.g., Act of June 30, 1834, ch. 161, § 11, 4 Stat. 730 (codified as amended
at 25 U.S.C. § 180 (1994)) (providing that a person who makes a settlement on land
owned by any Indian tribe “shall forfeit and pay the sum of one thousand dollars”).
Until the twentieth century, all “public wrongs” were grouped together as criminal
offenses. See 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 1 (1769). “Civil matters” were
“private wrongs” to individuals. See 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 1 (1768).
See generally Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657, 667-68 (1892) (describing historical
differences between public and private actions). The modern concept of civil
regulatory violations had not yet been developed. The Supreme Court’s decision in
Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391 (1938), is generally regarded as having created the
concept of a “civil” penalty. See Harvey J. Goldschmid, An Evaluation of the Present and
Potential Use of Civil Money Penalties as a Sanction by Federal Administrative Agencies, in
2 RECOMMENDATIONS AND REPORTS OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED
STATES 896, 913-14 (1972) (citing Helvering as “the leading case” on when monetary
penalties may be characterized as “civil” in nature); United States v. Eureka Pipeline
Co., 401 F. Supp. 934, 939 (N.D.W. Va. 1975) (citing Helvering in discussing the
difference between civil and criminal penalties imposed by Congress). Before
Helvering, any form of “penalty” had been viewed by the Court as a form of criminal
punishment, even if the penalty could be recovered in a civil proceeding. See, e.g.,
Lees v. United States, 150 U.S. 476, 479 (1893) (“[T]he recovery of a penalty is a
proceeding criminal in its nature, yet . . . it may be enforced in a civil action.”).
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infractions of such “penal statutes” were considered to be criminal in
nature. A criminal proceeding, however, was not the only way to
collect the prescribed penalty.
Pecuniary penalties could be
recovered in a civil debt action and forfeitures of property could be
recovered in a libel proceeding in admiralty or similar proceeding.
Under most penal statutes, the penalties could be collected in a qui
tam action by a private citizen—a “common informer”—who, by
statute, received part or all of the penalty or forfeiture. As
demonstrated in this Article, Congress intended to time-limit debt
actions and libel or similar proceedings when it enacted the 1839
statute. Congress intended no change in meaning when it made
revisions in language in the 1948 Act, and there is no basis for
applying the limitation to proceedings other than those to which it
applied in 1839.
In 3M Co. v. Browner,5 the District of Columbia Circuit decided that
§ 2462 of Title 28 barred an administrative proceeding initiated by
the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) more than five years
after the conduct at issue6 to determine whether the 3M Company
had violated the Toxic Substances Control Act (“TSCA”),7 and if so,
whether civil monetary penalties should be assessed against the
company, and the amount of any penalties up to a statutory
maximum.8 The TSCA set no time limit on the initiation of the
administrative proceeding, nor did the TSCA set any time limit on
the civil action it authorized to be brought in court to “recover” the
penalty if it was not paid voluntarily. The 3M court, purporting to
survey the history and background of § 2462, held that the time
limitation applies “to the entire federal government in all civil
penalty cases” and concluded that the initiation of the EPA
5. 17 F.3d 1453 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (applying § 2462’s five-year statute of limitation
to administrative proceeding to assess civil penalties).
6. See id. at 1455.
7. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2629 (1994). The overall purpose of the TSCA was to set
measures to “protect humans and the environment from the dangers of toxic
substances.” Rollins Envtl. Servs., Inc. v. Parish of St. James, 775 F.2d 627, 632
(5th Cir. 1985).
8. See 3M, 17 F.3d at 1455 (describing the scope of the EPA administrative
proceeding). The TSCA provides that a violator “shall be liable to the United States
for a civil penalty in an amount not to exceed $25,000 for each violation.” 15 U.S.C.
§ 2615(a)(1) (1994). The alleged violator has a right to a hearing before the EPA
Administrator assesses the penalty. See id. § 2615(a)(2)(A). The Administrator has
broad discretion as to the penalty amount and may find that no violation occurred or
may “mitigate” the penalty in its entirety in appropriate circumstances, even if there
was a violation. See id. § 2615(a)(2)(C). The Administrator’s decision is subject only
to limited review in the federal courts of appeals. See id. § 2615(a)(3). If the violator
fails to pay a penalty assessment that has become final, the EPA may refer the case to
the Justice Department, which may bring an action in federal district court to collect
the penalty. See id. § 2615(a)(4).
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administrative proceeding was untimely.9
In dicta, the court
suggested that § 2462 might also apply to the court action the TSCA
authorized to be brought by the Justice Department to collect an
unpaid penalty.10
Since the 3M decision, federal agencies, with one exception, have
failed to challenge the interpretation that § 2462 applies to the
initiation of administrative proceedings. In Johnson v. SEC,11 the
Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC” or “Commission”) did
not dispute that § 2462 applied to administrative proceedings, but
instead argued that the statute did not apply to that particular
proceeding because the sanctions imposed were not “penalties.”
Johnson involved violations by a securities industry professional of
professional standards under the Securities Exchange Act of 193412
(“Exchange Act”).13 The SEC had imposed a censure and a sixmonth suspension from supervisory functions on the violator (two of
several sanctions the agency could have chosen) and argued that
these remedial sanctions served to protect the public from harm,
were not punitive, and did not constitute “penalties” within the
meaning of § 2462.14 The D.C. Circuit rejected this argument, stating
that the suspension met the “common” definition of “penalty”—that
is, “the suffering in person, rights or property which is annexed by
law or judicial decision to the commission of a crime or public
offense.”15 In several subsequent cases, federal agencies have failed to
dispute the 3M holding that § 2462 applies to the initiation of
administrative proceedings.16 In one of those cases, however, a
9. See 3M, 17 F.3d at 1461.
10. See id. at 1459 & n.8 (citing support for applying time limitation to collection
of penalties).
11. 87 F.3d 484, 492 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (subjecting SEC sanctions to § 2462 statute
of limitation).
12. See 15 U.S.C. § 78a-78mm (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
13. See Johnson, 87 F.3d at 485-86.
14. See id. at 490. The SEC proceeding was brought under section 15(b) of the
Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b), which is part of the regulatory scheme under the
securities laws that the Supreme Court has recognized as designed to protect the
investing public by ensuring that “the highest ethical standards prevail in every facet
of the securities industry.” SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180,
186-87 (1963) (internal quotations omitted). Section 15(b) provides for disciplinary
proceedings against broker-dealers and persons associated with broker-dealers who
commit misconduct, see Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(6)(A)(i), including
committing any violation of the securities laws, see id. § 78o(b)(4)(D), and failing
“reasonably to supervise” a subordinate “with a view to preventing violations” of the
securities laws. See id. § 78o(b)(4)(E).
15. See Johnson, 87 F.3d at 487 (internal quotation omitted) (quoting WEBSTER’S
THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1668 (1976)).
16. In Proffitt v. FDIC, 200 F.3d 855 (D.C. Cir. 2000), the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”) did not challenge the application of § 2462 to the
agency’s administrative proceedings. Instead, the FDIC argued unsuccessfully that
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federal agency appearing as amicus curiae argued that § 2462 does not
apply to administrative proceedings and urged the D.C. Circuit to
reconsider its holding in 3M.17 The court declined to consider the
argument.18
the sanction it imposed on the petitioner for his misconduct while he was a director
of a banka permanent prohibition on participation in the banking industrywas
not a “penalty” within the meaning of § 2462. See id. at 861-62. The FDIC prevailed
in the case, however, successfully arguing that the proceeding was timely even
though it was commenced more than five years after the misconduct occurred
because under the statute authorizing imposition of the sanction, see Section 8(e) of
the Federal Insurance Deposit Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1818(e) (1994), the five-year period
did not automatically begin to run when the misconduct occurred, but rather when
an additional factor was satisfied, i.e., when the “effect” of the misconductthe
bank’s financial losswas manifested. See Proffitt, 200 F.3d at 862-65.
In Interamericas Investments, Ltd. v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System,
111 F.3d 376, 382 (5th Cir. 1997), the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System assumed, for the purposes of the appeal, that § 2462 applied to a proceeding
before it in which the Board had imposed civil monetary penalties pursuant to the
Bank Holding Company Act. The agency successfully argued more narrowly that
§ 2462 did not bar the particular proceeding there because continuing violations
were involved, and the last violations had occurred less than five years before the
administrative proceeding commenced. See id. at 382-83. In Arch Mineral Corp. v.
Babbitt, 104 F.3d 660, 669 (4th Cir. 1997), the Office of Surface Mining Reclamation
and Enforcement (“OSM”) argued that the action it proposed to take did not
constitute a penalty and, therefore, § 2462 did not apply. OSM sought to list a
corporation in a database as the successor to a bankrupt business, which would have
resulted in the corporation being held responsible for unpaid civil penalties imposed
more than five years earlier on the predecessor business under the Surface Mining
Control and Reclamation Act. See id. at 663. OSM argued that its action was a
determination of ownership or control, not a penalty within the meaning of § 2462.
See id. at 669. The court relied on both the 3M and Johnson decisions when it held
that because the result of the action would be to impose civil monetary penalties on
the company, the action was barred by § 2462. See id.
17. In Proffitt, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (“OCC”) filed an
amicus brief in which it argued that administrative proceedings under the FDI Act are
not governed by the time limitation in § 2462 because the plain language of § 2462 is
inconsistent with its application to administrative proceedings in general and to FDI
Act proceedings, specifically. See Brief for the OCC, Proffitt v. FDIC, 200 F.3d 855
(D.C. Cir. 2000) (No. 98-1534). The OCC brief referred to the statutory context of
§ 2462, id. at 17-19, and to its historic background, id. at 19-20 & n.18, but did not
rely on many of the authorities and subsidiary arguments made in this Article. The
OCC urged that, to the extent its argument regarding the nonapplicability of § 2462
to administrative proceedings could not be reconciled with the D.C. Circuit’s
previous holdings in the 3M and Johnson cases, the court should reconsider those
holdings. The OCC contended that two Supreme Court cases decided after 3M and
Johnson called into question the reasoning the D.C. Circuit had applied in its analysis
of § 2462. See OCC Brief at 22-24. Those cases were Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S.
93, 95-96 (1997) (overruling the reasoning of United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435
(1989), which had held that a civil sanction might constitute punishment and so bar
a subsequent criminal prosecution under double jeopardy principles), and Beach v.
Ocwen Federal Bank, 118 S. Ct. 1408 (1998) (reaffirming the distinction between
statutes of limitation, which bar access to the courts, and other statutes that withdraw
agency authority after the passage of time).
18. In its decision in Proffitt, the D.C. Circuit did not discuss all of the OCC’s
arguments but, in a footnote, the court rejected the OCC’s contention that the
decision in Hudson, concerning double jeopardy principles, warranted
reconsideration of the analysis the court had applied in Johnson to determine the
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This Article argues that 3M and subsequent decisions improperly
have applied the time limitation of § 2462 to the initiation of
administrative proceedings.19
This Article demonstrates that,
interpreted under established principles of statutory construction,
§ 2462 does not apply to proceedings before federal administrative
agencies at all, whatever the meaning of the word “penalty,” but only
to proceedings before the federal courts.20 Judicial proceedings are
the only proceedings to which the plain language of the statute
applies.21 Moreover, when the 1839 version was enacted and well into
the twentieth century, the amount of fines, penalties and forfeitures
were almost always fixed by statute, and the courts determined
liability in “suits for penalties and forfeitures.”22
Even when
administrative officers had a role in imposing penalties, court
involvement almost always was required, as it is now, to compel
payment.23
meaning of the word “penalty” in § 2462. See Proffitt, 200 F.3d at 860 n.5.
19. As discussed in Part I.B.5 of this Article, the 3M decision is inconsistent with a
considerable body of earlier case law. Five different federal courts of appeals had
held that it is the administrative assessment or imposition of civil penalties that
triggers the running of the five-year period in § 2462, a holding that supports the
interpretation that § 2462 does not apply to the initiation of administrative
proceedings. See infra Part I.B.5 and accompanying notes.
20. See infra Part II.B. The fact that several agencies have, in the circumstances of
particular cases, conceded that § 2462 applies to administrative proceedings should
not preclude the government from making the arguments outlined in this Article in
a subsequent case. Nonmutual collateral estoppel is not available against the
government. See United States v. Mendoza, 464 U.S. 154, 160 (1984) (noting that
nonmutual collateral estoppel against the government would “thwart the
development of important questions of law by freezing the first final decision
rendered on a particular legal issue”); cf. Office of Personnel Management v.
Richmond, 496 U.S. 414, 419-21 (1990) (holding that equitable estoppel does not lie
against the government unless government officials commit some kind of
“affirmative misconduct,” the nature of which is not clear because the Court has
never found such misconduct to be present in a case). Further, one agency has filed
an amicus brief arguing that § 2462 applies only to judicial, not administrative,
proceedings. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
21. See infra Part I.B.2.
22. See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 34, 1 Stat. 73 (giving federal district courts
exclusive jurisdiction of “suits for penalties and forfeitures”); see also infra Part I.B.3.
23. Exceptions to the courts’ ultimate authority to collect penalties have always
existed in certain statutes that authorize the government to determine liability for
and to collect penalties in summary procedures without any involvement of the
courts. These usually are tax and revenue statutes that give the executive the
authority summarily to determine liability for, and take possession of, monies owed
to the government. For example, in Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement
Co., 59 U.S. 272, 278-86 (1855), the Court discussed the “warrant of distress,” a
summary means available to the government to secure monies due from tax and
customs collectors without any court involvement. The power of “distraint” is
available in some tax provisions that authorize the IRS to seize taxes due from
citizens without a court determination of liability. See, e.g., Helvering v. Mitchell,
303 U.S. 391, 401-02 (1938) (noting that under the 1928 tax code provision at issue
“collection of the 50 per centum addition, like that of the primary tax itself, may be
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Further, this Article demonstrates that the Johnson decision is
wrong in concluding that the term “penalty,” as used in § 2462,
extends to sanctions other than the payment of money and
property.24 As discussed below, other provisions in the 1948 statute
use the phrase “fine, penalty or forfeiture, pecuniary or otherwise” to
refer to money and property.25 Moreover, a well-known meaning of
“penalty” in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was a forfeiture
of money or property set by statute as the consequence for a violation
of law.26 Together, these indications compel the conclusion that the
term “penalty” in § 2462 refers to a monetary penalty or forfeiture of
property.
Finally, Part III of this Article urges that § 2462 should not be
applied to all court actions that could result in a judgment for a civil
monetary penalty. Construed in context, § 2462 should apply only to
a narrow class of proceedings and actions in the federal courts to
recover fines, penalties and forfeitures specifically set by statute or
assessed by an administrative agency.27
The extent to which § 2462’s time limitation applies to proceedings
brought by federal regulators before agencies and in the federal
courts is important. Agencies must conduct investigations before
they may initiate administrative or judicial proceedings against
alleged violators. It may require years to uncover the evidence
made ‘by distraint’ as well as ‘by a proceeding in court’”) (quoting Revenue Act of
1928, ch. 852, §§ 276, 293, 45 Stat. 791, 857-58). There may be other examples,
particularly in the customs and immigration areas, where an administrative officer
can compel payment of penalties without the need for court involvement because
the officer has physical possession of property of the person assertedly liable for the
penalty and can withhold the property until payment is made. In Oceanic Steam
Navigation Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U.S. 320, 342 (1909), the Court upheld a provision of
the Alien Immigration Act of 1903 that imposed a penalty for transporting to the
United States immigrants afflicted with certain diseases. The Alien Immigration Act
prohibited the customs collector from granting clearance to the ship until the
penalty for that particular infraction was paid, although other penalties imposed in
the Act could be collected only by bringing a court action. See id. at 321-22.
24. See infra Part I.B.2-3; Part II.B.
25. See infra Part I.B.2.
26. See infra Part I.B.3; Part II.B.
27. This conclusion calls into question the holdings in some decisions that,
relying on the 3M decision, have applied § 2462 to bar the imposition of some or all
relief sought by a federal agency in a civil action in court, including discretionary
civil monetary penalties and injunctive relief. See FEC v. Williams, 104 F.3d 237, 23940 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that § 2462 applied to a district court action by the
Federal Election Commission against violators of the Federal Election Campaign Act,
whether the agency sought as a remedy a civil monetary penalty or an injunction
against future violations), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1015 (1997); United States v. Banks,
115 F.3d 916, 918-19 (11th Cir. 1997) (holding, without analysis, that in an action
under the Clean Water Act, § 2462 applied to the imposition of civil penalties on a
violator but that § 2462 did not apply insofar as the action sought injunctive relief),
cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1075, reh’g denied, 523 U.S. 1041 (1998).
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needed to support the charges in a case.28 If, as the 3M court held,
the five-year limitation applies “to the entire federal government in
all civil penalty cases”all civil cases, before an administrative agency
or in a federal court, in which a monetary penalty or other sanction
deemed to be a “penalty,” as construed in the Johnson decision, might
be imposed by the court or agency—then § 2462 requires federal
agencies to bring charges within the period, irrespective of the
completeness of their investigations, or not at all. If, as held in 3M,
the five-year period is triggered by the underlying regulatory
violation,29 without regard to whether the agency knew or should have
known of the violation, the entire period may expire before
regulators even have the opportunity to investigate. The foregoing
results may conflict with Congress’s intent to impose sanctions on
violators of particular regulatory statutes—statutes in which Congress
did not set time limits on the initiation of proceedings.30 Such results
should not be lightly assumed or imposed without careful
consideration of the context and history of § 2462 that is explored in
this Article. As discussed below, most of the context and history of
the statute has not been considered by courts that have construed
§ 2462,31 including the 3M court.32
28. For example, it has been recognized that investigations of federal securities
law violations may be complex and lengthy. In determining that no statute of
limitation applies to SEC enforcement actions, at least to those seeking the equitable
remedy of disgorgement, in SEC v. Rind, 991 F.2d 1486 (9th Cir. 1993), the Ninth
Circuit noted that “securities fraud may involve multiple parties and transactions of
mind-boggling complexity,” and that “[p]lacing strict time limits on [the initiation
of] Commission enforcement actions would ‘frustrate or interfere with the
implementation of national policies.’” Id. at 1492 (citation omitted). The
investigation necessary to uncover evidence to support bringing an administrative
proceeding against a regulated securities professional, such as the proceeding at
issue in the Johnson case, may be just as complex and time-consuming. Similarly,
courts recognize that violations of environmental laws may not be discovered at the
time they occur—the consequences (such as the effects of the dumping of toxic
substances) do not necessarily manifest themselves immediately. Cf. Riehl v.
Travelers Ins. Co., 772 F.2d 19, 23 (3d Cir. 1985) (noting that the event that might
“trigger liability in a toxic wastes case” might be the dumping of the waste, the
leaching of the wastes into the environment, or the discovery of the pollution).
29. See 3M Co. v. Browner, 17 F.3d 1453, 1460-63 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
30. The question of § 2462’s applicability arises only when Congress has not
provided a limitation period in the statute that creates or authorizes the fine,
penalty, or forfeiture. See 28 U.S.C. § 2462 (1994) (“Except as otherwise provided by
Act of Congress . . . .”).
31. To the author’s knowledge, the Supreme Court has never considered
whether § 2462 applies to the initiation of administrative proceedings, nor has the
Supreme Court ever determined when the five-year limitation period in the statute is
triggered.
32. Further, none of the following articles, all of which have either advocated,
discussed, or assumed the application of § 2462 to various government actions, have
considered the language, context, and history of § 2462 that is developed in this
Article. See generally Edward Brodsky, Statute of Limitations and Civil Enforcement,
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SECTION 2462 APPLIES ONLY TO PROCEEDINGS IN THE FEDERAL
COURTS
A. Section 2462 Applies Only to Proceedings Congress Clearly Intended to
Limit

Statutes of limitation do not apply to proceedings initiated by the
federal government when acting in its sovereign capacity to vindicate
a public right or interest “in the absence of congressional enactment
clearly imposing it.”33 This principle was well established in the
common law long before the Constitution was adopted. As the
Supreme Court explained in an 1878 case, United States v. Thompson:34
The common law fixed no time as to the bringing of actions.
Limitations derive their authority from statutes. The king was held
never to be included, unless expressly named. No laches was
imputable to him. . . . [W]hen the national Constitution was
adopted, [these prerogatives] were imparted to the new

210 N.Y. L.J. 3, 6, 7 (1993) (stating that without clear congressional guidance to the
contrary, the SEC should be limited by the five-year statute of limitation of 28 U.S.C.
§ 2462); Christopher R. Dollase, The Appeal of Rind: Limitations of Actions in Securities
and Exchange Commission Civil Enforcement Actions, BUS. LAW., Aug. 1994, at 1793, 1821
(supporting the Ninth Circuit’s holding that no time limitation applies to SEC civil
enforcement actions and recommending that when Congress wishes to limit such
actions it enact specific legislation); Jonathan Eisenberg & Benjamin Haskin, Statute
of Limitations Made Applicable to SEC Actions, 8 INSIGHTS, July 1994, at No. 7 (analyzing
§ 2462’s application in the 3M decision and suggesting that the limitation should
apply to administrative proceedings); Arthur B. Laby & W. Hardy Callcott, Patterns of
SEC Enforcement Under the 1990 Remedies Act: Civil Money Penalties, 58 ALB. L. REV. 5, 52
& n.310 (1994) (evaluating the effect of the SEC’s civil money penalty authority
under the Remedies Act of 1990 and assuming, without discussion, that § 2462
applies to any proceeding seeking a money penalty); Gary P. Naftalis & Mark J.
Headley, SEC Actions Seeking to Bar Securities Professionals, 213 N.Y. L.J. 1, 4, 5 (1995)
(discussing application of § 2462 and concluding that the SEC’s avoidance of the
statutory limitation is “neither good law nor good policy”); John F.X. Peloso & Stuart
M. Sarnoff, The Statute of Limitations for Actions Brought by the SEC, 213 N.Y. L.J. 1, 3, 4
(1995) (examining the statute of limitation for SEC actions and asserting that such
limitations and other safeguards are needed to protect alleged violators of securities
regulations); Richard L. Stone & Aron Jaroslawicz, Statute of Limitations of Actions
Brought by SEC, 212 N.Y. L.J. 1, 4 (1994) (looking at the application of § 2462 and
believing the SEC falls within the time limitation imposed by § 2462 in both court
and administrative settings); Teresa A. Holderer, Note, Enforcement of TSCA and the
Federal Five-Year Statute of Limitations for Penalty Actions, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1023 (1993)
(examining the statute of limitation of § 2462 and concluding that its application is
appropriate in TSCA administrative penalty proceedings and federal court collection
actions); Catherine E. Maxson, Note, The Applicability of Section 2462’s Statute of
Limitations to SEC Enforcement Suits in Light of the Remedies Act of 1990, 94 MICH. L. REV.
512 (1995) (arguing that § 2462 applies to all SEC civil suits for monetary fines, but
does not apply to SEC proceedings for equitable relief).
33. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Davis, 264 U.S. 456, 462 (1924) (emphasis
added).
34. 98 U.S. 486 (1878).
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government as incidents of [its] sovereignty thus created.
36

The principle was recognized by Blackstone, who wrote that “no
time runs against the king,” and has been reiterated by the Supreme
Court numerous times.37
As the Court further explained in Costello v. United States,38 the
reason for this rule is “‘to be found in the great public policy of
preserving the public rights, revenues, and property from injury and
loss, by the negligence of public officers.’”39 Thus, the fact that some
public officials have not yet discovered violations, or have failed to
enforce the law, should not bar others from doing so later. This
principle does not apply when the government is acting to vindicate
private interests,40 but there is no reason to suspend the principle in
35. Id. at 489-90.
36. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 247 (1765).
37. See Block v. North Dakota, 461 U.S. 273, 290 (1983) (explaining that a
sovereign is generally exempt from statutes of limitation in order to protect the
public against negligent state officials who fail to comply with such time limitations);
Costello v. United States, 365 U.S. 265, 281 (1961) (adhering to the policy that laches
is not a defense against sovereign action because of public policy reasons); United
States v. Summerlin, 310 U.S. 414, 416 (1940) (restating the well-settled rule that
“the United States is not bound by state statutes of limitation” nor “subject to the
defense of laches in enforcing its rights”); Guaranty Trust Co. v. United States,
304 U.S. 126, 132 (1938) (observing that “where the royal privilege no longer exists”
to justify sovereign exemption from statutes of limitation, “continuing vitality” is now
found “in the public policy”); United States v. Verdier, 164 U.S. 213, 218-19 (1896)
(emphasizing that public policy demands that the sovereign occupies a “favored
position” over individuals, and therefore, the statute of limitation could not be plead
against the sovereign); United States v. Beebe, 127 U.S. 338, 344 (1888) (holding
that the sovereign is not bound by statutes of limitation in an action brought by it to
protect public interests and that that this policy “is established past all controversy or
doubt”); United States v. Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. Co., 118 U.S. 120, 125 (1886)
(stating the “great principle of public policy” that the United States “[is] not bound
by any statute of limitations unless Congress has clearly manifested its intention that
they should be so bound”).
A well-known law review article advocated that this principle be abandoned as outdated. See Developments in the Law: Statutes of Limitations, 63 HARV. L. REV. 1177, 125253 (1950) (asserting “little justification for the sovereign exemption”). That article,
however, failed to consider the important policy reasons for the rule and, in any
event, the Supreme Court has not taken its advice.
38. 365 U.S. 265 (1961) (quoting United States v. Hoar, 26 F. Cas. 329 (C.C.D.
Mass. 1821) (No. 15,373) (Story, J.)).
39. Id. at 281 (quoting Hoar, 26 F. Cas. at 329-30). The government is treated
differently than private litigants in other respects for similar reasons. It is well settled
that “equitable estoppel will not lie against the Government as it lies against private
litigants.” Office of Personnel Management v. Richmond, 496 U.S. 414, 419 (1990).
Similarly, nonmutual collateral estoppel is not available against the government. See
United States v. Alaska, 521 U.S. 1 (1997); United States v. Mendoza, 464 U.S. 154,
160-63 (1984) (believing that the development of important legal questions would
otherwise be thwarted).
40. See Beebe, 127 U.S. at 344 (holding that the relevant statute of limitation
applied against the government where the government, “although a nominal
complainant party, has no real interest in the litigation, but has allowed its name to
be used therein for the sole benefit of a private person”); accord United States v.
Banks, 115 F.3d 916, 919 (11th Cir. 1997) (holding that absent clear intent a statute
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government-initiated actions seeking civil penalties.41 The courts
have held that many actions by the federal government are not time
limited and, therefore, may be brought at any time.42
The
inapplicability of any limitation period to an action brought by the
government does not necessarily result in fundamental unfairness. If
the defendant can demonstrate that sufficient prejudice results from
the passage of time, due process principles presumably will preclude
government prosecution.43
A rule of statutory construction related to the principle that no
limitation period binds the government absent clear congressional
intent is that “‘[s]tatutes of limitation sought to be applied to bar
rights of the Government, must receive a strict construction in favor
of the Government.’”44 Thus, even when there is a statute of
of limitation applies against the government only when the government acts for
private interests).
41. Indeed, under modern statutes, civil penalties are imposed only in regulatory
actions brought to enforce public rights. Two important studies on the use of civil
penalties have noted that such penalties are authorized in hundreds of federal
statutes to secure compliance with regulatory requirements designed to protect the
public interest, including public safety. Professor Colin S. Diver of Boston University
Law School states in his 1979 study that at that time 348 statutes administered by 27
different departments and administrative agencies authorized civil penalties for
violations of laws dealing with subjects such as safety standards for consumer
products, prohibitions against fraud, liquidity requirements for banks, and pollution
abatement. See Colin S. Diver, The Assessment and Mitigation of Civil Money Penalties by
Federal Administrative Agencies, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1435, 1438 (1979).
A similar study in 1972 by Professor Harvey J. Goldschmid of Columbia University
Law School, see supra note 4, at 902-03, noted that civil penalties were at that time
being imposed by seven executive departments and eight independent agencies
under federal statutes concerning, among other things, marketing quotas for crops,
health and safety standards for coal mines and other work sites, and consumeroriented “safety, service and health” standards for businesses such as railroads,
airlines, motor carriers and broadcasters.
42. See Costello, 365 U.S. at 281 (allowing denaturalization proceeding after lapse
of 27 years); SEC v. Rind, 991 F.2d 1486, 1491 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that no
limitation period applies to actions brought by the SEC to enforce the securities laws
and collecting court of appeals cases holding that no time limit applies to other
governmental actions in the public interest); Dole v. Local 427, Int’l Union of Elec.,
894 F.2d 607, 612-13 (3d Cir. 1990) (holding that no statute of limitation applies to
action by the Secretary of Labor under sections 104 and 210 of the LaborManagement Reporting and Disclosure Act to enforce a union member’s right to
access to union records).
43. In Costello, the Court considered whether the doctrine of laches might bar a
denaturalization proceeding brought 27 years after the events at issue. See Costello,
365 U.S. at 282-83. The Court declined to decide whether laches might apply to
denaturalization proceedings, finding that even if it did any harm from the delay in
bringing the action was to the government’s case rather than to the defense. The
Court implied, however, that if a defendant or respondent could demonstrate
prejudice resulting from the passage of time, due process principles might preclude
the action. See id. at 282-84.
44. Badaracco v. United States, 464 U.S. 386, 391 (1984) (quoting E.I. Dupont de
Nemours & Co. v. Davis, 264 U.S. 456, 462 (1924)). See United States v. Alvarado,
5 F.3d 1425, 1428 (11th Cir. 1993) (stating that “any statute of limitations sought to
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limitation that applies to the government, it must be construed
narrowly. Any ambiguity as to whether the limitation period applies
to a particular governmental action must be resolved against applying
the limitation.
Accordingly, when the government acts to protect public rights, as
it does in all federal regulatory proceedings, the party seeking to
apply the limitation period has the burden to identify an affirmative
congressional intent to apply the time limit to that action. Because
§ 2462 applies only to actions and proceedings involving civil fines,
penalties, and forfeitures, which are imposed only under federal
regulatory statutes that protect public rights,45 the five-year limitation
period should be construed to apply only to actions and proceedings
that Congress “clearly” intended to limit.46 As discussed infra in Part
II, the 3M court failed to consider this fundamental principle when it
decided that § 2462 applied to administrative proceedings and,
instead, placed the burden on the government to demonstrate that
§ 2462 did not apply to administrative proceedings.47 In the next
section, this Article demonstrates that in § 2462, Congress “clearly”
intended to limit only proceedings in federal court, not
administrative proceedings.

be applied against the United States must receive a strict construction in favor of the
Government”) (quotation omitted); United States v. Weaver, 207 F.2d 796, 798
(5th Cir. 1953) (holding that § 2462 did not apply to an action under the Surplus
Property Act because no federal statute specifically made the statute of limitation
applicable to the action at bar).
45. See supra note 41 (citing two studies that examined civil penalty statutes in
regulatory actions).
46. This Article assumes that § 2462 applies to at least some actions and
proceedings initiated in federal court by the federal government. It should be
noted, however, that an article co-authored by Professor William Wirt Blume of the
University of Michigan Law School, published shortly after the 1948 Act was adopted,
interpreted § 2462 to apply only to “[c]auses of action . . . created for the recovery of
fines, penalties and forfeitures by a private individual aggrieved because of violations
of federal law.” William Wirt Blume & B.J. George, Jr., Limitations and the Federal
Courts, 49 MICH. L. REV. 937, 985 (1951). The 1951 article also stated that “relatively
few non-criminal actions by the United States are subject to limitations” and
described those time limitations the authors believed applied to civil actions brought
by the federal government. See id. at 984. Section 2462 is not among them.
47. See 3M Co. v. Browner, 17 F.3d 1453, 1456-57 (D.C. Cir. 1994). The 3M court
seemed to believe that if the government action involved a civil penalty there was a
presumption that some limitation period must apply. See id. at 1457. This belief,
however, was incorrect. See infra Part II.A.2.
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B. Congress Did Not “Clearly” Intend § 2462 to Limit Administrative
Proceedings—to the Contrary, Every Indication Is That the Provision Was
Intended to Limit Only Court Proceedings
1.

A statute must be construed as a whole
The 3M court also failed to adhere to another fundamental
principle of statutory construction—that a statute must be construed
as a whole, not as a collection of isolated provisions. The Supreme
Court has emphasized repeatedly that courts must “‘follow the
cardinal rule that a statute is to be read as a whole . . . since the
meaning of statutory language, plain or not, depends on context.’”48
This well-established rule of statutory interpretation was expressed by
the Supreme Court in 1804 when it held that “every part of an act is
to be taken into view for the purpose of discovering the mind of the
legislature.”49 Moreover, in Blackstone’s time, this approach to
statutory interpretation was axiomatic.50 Accordingly, the meaning of
§ 2462 can be understood only by reading the section in conjunction
with the rest of the statute of which it is a part, namely the 1948
revision of the judicial code.
2.

Nothing in the 1948 statute suggests that Congress intended § 2462 to
apply to administrative proceedings or to anything other than “particular
proceedings” in the federal courts
a.

Overview of the 1948 Act

The current version of § 2462 is part of the comprehensive revision
of the judicial code enacted as a single statute in 1948. The plain
language, the context of other sections of the 1948 Act, as well as the
purpose of the 1948 Act, all compel the conclusion that § 2462
48. Conroy v. Aniskoff, 507 U.S. 511, 515 (1993) (quoting King v. St. Vincent’s
Hosp., 502 U.S. 215, 221 (1991)) (citation omitted). Accord Robinson v. Shell Oil
Co., 519 U.S. 337, 341 (1997) (“The plainness or ambiguity of statutory language is
determined by reference to the language itself, the specific context in which that
language is used, and the broader context of the statute as a whole.”); McCarthy v.
Bronson, 500 U.S. 136, 139 (1991) (“‘In ascertaining the plain meaning of [a]
statute, the court must look to the particular statutory language at issue, as well as the
language and design of the statute as a whole.’”) (quoting K Mart Corp. v. Cartier,
Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 291 (1988)); Crandon v. United States, 494 U.S. 152, 158 (1990)
(“In determining the meaning of the statute, we look not only to the particular
statutory language, but to the design of the statute as a whole and to its object and
policy.”).
49. Pennington v. Coxe, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 33, 52 (1804) (proffering that “a law
is the best expositor of itself”).
50. See 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 59-61 (1765) (stating that a statute
is to be construed based on its plain language, as a whole, in context, and with
reference to its subject matter and purpose).
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pertains only to actions and proceedings in federal courts. As
enacted in 1948, Title 28 includes three provisions other than § 2462
that pertain to actions and proceedings to recover “fines, penalties
and forfeitures.”51 When these three provisions are read together, it
is clear that they refer to federal court actions and proceedings to
obtain court judgments for pecuniary fines, penalties, and forfeitures
of property. The addition of the word “proceeding” in the 1948 Act
was not meant to broaden the scope of § 2462 to apply to
administrative adjudicatory proceedings. In 1948, Congress did not
intend to change the meaning of § 2462.52
The plain language of the 1948 Act demonstrates that, except
where specified otherwise, its provisions apply to the federal courts
and the federal judiciary. Section 1 of the 1948 Act states that “title
28 of the United States Code, entitled ‘Judicial Code and Judiciary’ is
hereby revised, codified, and enacted into law, and may be cited as
‘Title 28, United States Code, section —.’”53 Thereafter, the 1948 Act
contains the verbatim text of Title 28, from § 1 through § 2680.54 The
purpose of the 1948 Act was to “codify and revise the laws relating to
the Federal judiciary and judicial procedure.”55
The House Judiciary Committee Report that recommended the
adoption of the 1948 Act emphasized that, far from being a random
collection of provisions, the organization of the Act into six major
parts, including the placement of § 2462 in Part VI, entitled
“Particular Proceedings,” was deliberate.56 Thus, the overall structure
51. As discussed infra, the three provisions are 28 U.S.C. § 2461, § 1355, and
§ 1395, as adopted in 1948 at 62 Stat. 974, 934, and 936, respectively.
52. When § 2462 is read with other provisions of the 1948 Act, it seems apparent
that Congress used the word “proceeding” in § 2462 to cover matters that are
technically not “actions,” such as a “libel in admiralty” or a “proceeding by libel,”
(proceedings used to recover property) to which predecessors of § 2462 had always
applied. See 28 U.S.C. § 2461(b), as adopted in 1948 at 62 Stat. 974.
53. 62 Stat. 869. Section 1 of the 1948 Act was not codified but, in post-1948
codifications of Title 28, the text of the section is included in a note titled
“Enactment Into Law; Citation” that appears after tabular materials and before
28 U.S.C. § 1 (1994).
54. See Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, § 1, 62 Stat. 869-985 (codified as amended at
28 U.S.C. §§ 1-2680 (1994)).
55. S. REP. NO. 80-1559, at 1 (1948).
56. See H.R. REP. NO. 80-308, at 5 (1947). The House report states under the
heading “Classification and Numbering”:
The first step in revision was the preparation of a preliminary analysis—the
framework upon which to build the new title. In drafting this outline the old
system of classification was discarded and modern subject matter arrangement
was substituted. The material was divided into six major categories. Part I
provides for organization of courts; part II treats of the attorneys and
marshals; part III covers court officers and employees; part IV sets forth the
provisions on jurisdiction and venue; part V deals with procedure; and part
VI takes up particular proceedings.
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of the 1948 Act and the internal placement of a particular section in
a specified part of the Act are significant in interpreting the language
of the Act. Furthermore, as the Supreme Court has recognized, “‘the
title of a statute and the heading of a section’ are ‘tools available for
the resolution of a doubt’ about the meaning of a statute.”57 Section
33 of the 1948 Act, which was not codified, but is referred to in post1948 editions of the United States Code in a note titled “Legislative
Construction,” provides58 that neither the “catchlines”59 nor the
particular chapter to which a section was assigned should be given
significance in construing the 1948 Act.60 There is no basis, however,
for broadening this provision to override either the general rule that
a statute should be read as a whole61 or the principle that titles and
the parts into which a statute is divided are tools to aid in its
interpretation.62
As discussed below, the 1948 Act, read as a whole, indicates that its
references to “actions or proceedings” for “fines, penalties and
forfeitures” in § 2462 and elsewhere are references to actions and
proceedings in federal courts.63 Nothing in the 1948 Act suggests that
§ 2462 was intended to apply to matters outside the federal courts,
such as administrative proceedings.64

Id. (emphasis added).
57. Alamendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 234 (1998) (quoting
Trainmen v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 331 U.S. 519, 528-29 (1947)). The Court in
Almendarez-Torres used these tools of statutory interpretation to discern the enacting
Congress’s intent. See id.
58. 62 Stat. 991. Section 33 states: “No inference of a legislative construction is to
be drawn by reason of the chapter in Title 28, Judiciary and Judicial Procedure, as set
out in section 1 of the Act, in which any any [sic] section is placed, nor by reason of
the catchlines used in such title.” 28 U.S.C. “Legislative Construction,” note
preceding § 1 (1994).
59. Id. The term “catchlines” is not defined. Presumably, the term refers to the
headings given to the various subdivisions of the title.
60. See id.
61. See supra note 48 and accompanying text; see also WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR.,
DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 323-25 (1994) (listing the Rehnquist Court’s
cannons of statutory interpretation, including the provision that “[e]ach statutory
provision should be read by reference to the whole act”).
62. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
63. See, e.g., 62 Stat. 934 (adopting 28 U.S.C. § 1355). Section 1355, entitled
“Fine, penalty or forfeiture,” provides that “[t]he district courts shall have original
jurisdiction, exclusive of the courts of the States, of any action or proceeding for the
recovery or enforcement of any fine, penalty or forfeiture, pecuniary or otherwise,
incurred under any Act of Congress.” Id. (emphasis added); see also, e.g., 62 Stat. 974
(adopting 28 U.S.C. §§ 2461-2464) (providing guidelines for the recovery of civil
fines or penalties imposed for violating an Act of Congress).
64. See generally 28 U.S.C. §§ 1-2680, as adopted in 1948, 62 Stat. 869-992 (1948).
Nowhere in the statute is there an indication that any force other than federal courts
have jurisdiction of proceedings for the enforcement of civil fines or penalties
imposed for violations of Acts of Congress. See id.
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Specific provisions of the 1948 Act

Part VI of Title 28, as enacted in 1948, is entitled “Particular
Proceedings,” and in Chapter 163, “Fines, Penalties and Forfeitures,”
provides:
§ 2461. Mode of Recovery
(a) Whenever a civil fine, penalty or pecuniary forfeiture is prescribed
for the violation of an Act of Congress without specifying the mode of
recovery or enforcement thereof, it may be recovered in a civil action.
(b) Unless otherwise provided by Act of Congress, whenever a
forfeiture of property is prescribed as a penalty for a violation of an Act of
Congress and the seizure takes place on the high seas . . . , such
forfeiture may be enforced by libel in admiralty but in cases of seizures on
land the forfeiture may be enforced by a proceeding by libel which shall
65
conform as near as may be to proceedings in admiralty.

The language of § 2461 demonstrates that in subsection (a)
Congress recognized and authorized a special form of civil action in
federal court to “recover” a civil fine, penalty, or pecuniary forfeiture,
and in subsection (b) Congress specified that forfeitures of property
may be recovered in a libel proceeding in federal court.66 Further,
the plain language is consistent only with the interpretation that the
“penalty” referred to in § 2461(a) is a monetary penalty. Subsection
(a) refers to a penalty that can be “recovered.” Because money and
property are the only penalties that can be “recovered,” any penalty
65. 62 Stat. 974 (emphasis added).
66. See id. The Reviser’s Notes to § 2461, U.S.C., Cong. Serv. 1919 (1948), state
that subsection (a) was added
to clarify a serious ambiguity in existing law and is based on rulings of the
Supreme Court. Numerous sections in the United States Code prescribe
civil fines, penalties, and pecuniary forfeitures for violation of certain
sections without specifying the mode of recovery or enforcement thereof.
See, for example, section 567 of Title 12, U.S.C., 1940 ed., Banks and
Banking, section 64 of Title 14, U.S.C., 1940 ed., Coast Guard, and section
180 of Title 25, U.S.C., 1940 ed., Indians. Compare section 1(21) of Title 49,
U.S.C., 1940 ed., Transportation.
Id., reprinted in “Historical and Revision Notes” following 28 U.S.C. § 2461 (1994).
The examples given are all statutes that impose a mandatory monetary penalty for
proscribed conduct. For example, 25 U.S.C. § 180 (1940) states that “[e]very person
who makes a settlement on any lands belonging . . . to any Indian tribe [or surveys or
marks off any such lands] is liable to a penalty of $1,000.” Id.
The Notes go on to state that “[a] civil fine, penalty, or pecuniary forfeiture is
recoverable in a civil action,” citing two Supreme Court cases that had so held:
Hepner v. United States, 213 U.S. 103 (1909), which discusses the practice of both
American and English courts in the eighteenth century (and earlier) of
“recogniz[ing] the right of the government, by a civil action of debt, to recover a
statutory penalty, although such penalty arises from the commission of a public
offense” and might also be recovered in a criminal action initiated by information,
and United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537 (1943), which included a similar
discussion of the government right. Id.
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obtained under § 2461(a) must take one of these two forms and
could not include other sanctions, such as the revocation or
suspension of a license.67 Because subsection (b) specifies that when
the “penalty” is a “forfeiture of property,” a libel proceeding is the
procedural means to obtain the recovery, the “penalty” referred to in
subsection (a) must be a monetary one, the only form of penalty
other than property that can be “recovered.”
Special jurisdiction and venue provisions, separate from other civil
jurisdiction and venue provisions, are made for proceedings “for the
recovery or enforcement” of a “fine, penalty or forfeiture” and
confirm that the “proceedings” referred to are proceedings in the
federal courts. Part IV of enacted Title 28, “Jurisdiction and Venue,”
Chapter 85, “District Courts; Jurisdiction,” provides:
§ 1355. Fine, penalty or forfeiture
(a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction, exclusive
of the courts of the States, of any action or proceeding for the recovery or
enforcement of any fine, penalty, or forfeiture, pecuniary or otherwise,
incurred under any Act of Congress, except matters within the
jurisdiction of the Court of International Trade under section 1582
68
of this title.

Subsections (b), (c), and (d) of § 1355, respectively, specify details
regarding jurisdiction of “[a] forfeiture action or proceeding,” “an
action or proceeding for forfeiture,” “a civil forfeiture action or
proceeding,” and “a forfeiture action.”69
In addition, Part IV of the enacted Title 28, “Jurisdiction and
Venue,” Chapter 87, “District Courts; Venue[,]” provides:
§ 1395. Fine, penalty or forfeiture
(a) A civil proceeding for the recovery of a pecuniary fine, penalty or
forfeiture may be prosecuted in the district where it accrues or the
defendant is found.
(b) A civil proceeding for the forfeiture of property may be prosecuted
70
in any district where such property is found.

Subsections (c), (d), and (e) of § 1395, respectively, pertain to
“proceedings” for the forfeiture of property seized outside any
judicial district, the enforcement of a fine, penalty, or forfeiture
67. Cf. S & S Realty Corp. v. Kleer-Vu Indus., Inc., 575 F.2d 1040, 1043-44 (2d Cir.
1978) (“The word ‘recoverable’ implies the existence of a tangible asset or a fund.”).
68. 62 Stat. 934 (emphasis added).
69. Id. The Reviser’s Notes to the 1948 Act state that the “[w]ords ‘pecuniary or
otherwise’ were added to make this section expressly applicable to both pecuniary and
property forfeitures.” U.S.C., Cong. Serv. 1844 (1948), reprinted in “Historical and
Revision Notes” following 28 U.S.C. § 1355 (1994).
70. 62 Stat. 936 (emphasis added).
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against a vessel, and for the forfeiture of vessels, vehicles, or cargo.71
Section 2462, like § 2461, is included in Part VI, entitled “Particular
Proceedings[,]” and states:
§ 2462. Time for commencing proceedings
Except as otherwise provided by Act of Congress, an action, suit or
proceeding for the enforcement of any civil fine, penalty, or forfeiture,
pecuniary or otherwise, shall not be entertained unless commenced
within five years from the date when the claim first accrued if,
within the same period, the offender or the property is found
within the United States in order that proper service may be made
72
thereon.

Read in the context of the 1948 Act as a whole, it is clear that the
kinds of actions, suits, and proceedings to which § 2462 applies are
those referred to in §§ 2461, 1355, and 1395—that is, proceedings in
the federal courts to recover, by reducing to a court judgment,
penalties, and forfeitures of money and property.73 Nothing in the
1948 Act suggests that the § 2462 limitation period applies to
proceedings before administrative agencies.74 Certainly, it cannot be
71. See id. (noting the circumstances under which such proceedings would be
permissible).
72. 62 Stat. 974 (emphasis added).
73. See supra notes 65-70 and accompanying text (discussing indications in the
1948 Act that §§ 2461, 1355, and 1395 apply to proceedings in federal court and to
penalties composed of money and property); see also Blume & George, supra note 46,
at 985-86 (opining that §§ 2461 and 2462 should “be construed as coextensive”
because, among other reasons, “the descriptive language is identical in both
sections”); Brief for the OCC, at 17-18, Proffitt v. FDIC, 200 F.3d 855 (D.C. Cir. 2000)
(No. 98-1534) (arguing that § 2462 limits the judicial actions and proceedings to
recover money and property that are provided for in § 2461).
74. See generally 28 U.S.C. §§ 1-2680, as adopted in 1948, 62 Stat. 869-992 (1948).
The only sections of the 1948 Act that do not directly pertain to the judicial system
and the judiciary (sections 2 through 32, which were not codified) are executing
provisions and amendments to sections in other titles of the Code to make those
titles consistent with the new Title 28 adopted in the 1948 Act. See Act of June 25,
1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 985-91. The inclusion of these provisions does not affect the
basic purpose of the 1948 Act, which is to clarify and organize statutory provisions
applicable to the federal courts and the judiciary. The only references in the 1948
Act to administrative agencies are 28 U.S.C. §§ 601-610, 62 Stat. 913-915, which
creates the Administrative Office of the United States Courts, and 28 U.S.C. §§ 22312325, 62 Stat. 969, which prescribes procedures for federal district court review of
orders of the Interstate Commerce Commission. These references do not support an
inference that in other sections general language refers to both agency and court
proceedings.
Nothing cited in the 3M decision demonstrates that Congress intended any
provision of the 1948 Act to apply to proceedings before administrative agencies. See
3M Co. v. Browner, 17 F.3d 1453, 1456 (D.C. Cir. 1994). Two sections of Title 28 of
the U.S.C. referred to in the 3M decision, § 2344(1) and § 2347, pertain to court
review of agency proceedings and, in any event, were added in 1966 and not
included in the 1948 Act. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2344(1), 2347 (1994) (noting that these
provisions were added by Pub. L. No. 89-554, § 4(e), 80 Stat. 622, 623 (1966)). A
section of Title 31 of the United States Code referred to by the 3M court, which
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said that Congress “clearly” expressed in the language of the 1948 Act
an intent that the § 2462 time limitation apply to administrative
proceedings.
An analysis of the plain language of the 1948 Act supports the
position that § 2462 applies only to proceedings in federal court and,
as the Supreme Court has emphasized, “we do not resort to legislative
history to cloud a statutory text that is clear.”75 Nevertheless, as
demonstrated infra in Part I.B.3, the legislative history and historic
context of § 2462 further support the interpretation that § 2462
applies only to federal court proceedings to recover fines, forfeitures,
and penalties consisting of money and property.
3.

Construing § 2462 to apply only to federal court proceedings is consistent
with both the legislative history and historic context of § 2462
a.

The context of the Administrative Procedure Act

It would be anomalous if any provision of the 1948 Act revising
Title 28 applied to proceedings before administrative agencies
because only two years before its enactment, in 1946, Congress
adopted the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”).76 The APA is a
comprehensive statute designed to “prescribe uniform standards for
the conduct of formal rule making . . . and adjudicatory proceedings”
before federal agencies.77 It seems more likely that Congress would
have placed a uniform statue of limitation on agency proceedings to
determine and assess penalties in the APA than in the 1948 revision
of the judicial code. At the very least, it seems that had Congress
believed that 28 U.S.C. § 791 (1940), the last pre-APA codification of
old R.S. § 1047, the five-year statute of limitation on actions for a
“penalty or forfeiture,” applied to administrative adjudications of
penalties Congress would have referred to the limitation period in
the APA or its history.
Yet, neither the Attorney General’s Manual on the APA, published

pertains to False Claims Act suits, is an indirect reference to administrative
proceedings and was adopted in 1982. See 3M, 17 F.3d at 1456; see also 28 U.S.C.
§ 3730(e)(3) (1994) (noting that this provision was adopted by Pub. L. No. 97-258,
96 Stat. 978 (1982)).
75. Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 147-48 (1994).
76. Pub. L. No. 106-73, ch. 324, 60 Stat. 237-44 (1946) (codified in scattered
sections of 15 U.S.C.). See ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., FEDERAL
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE SOURCEBOOK 1 (2d ed. 1992) [hereinafter
ADMINISTRATIVE SOURCEBOOK].
77. See ATTORNEY GENERAL’S MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT 9
(1947) (explaining basic purposes of the APA), reprinted in ADMINISTRATIVE
SOURCEBOOK, supra note 76, at 75.
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in 1947, nor the text of the APA, mentions § 791 as applying to
agency adjudicatory proceedings seeking penalties. Further, in the
early 1940s, in preparation for the drafting of the APA, the Attorney
General’s Committee on Administrative Procedure studied existing
procedures in all federal agencies, but reports issued by the
Committee do not mention § 791 or any requirement that agency
penalty assessments be commenced within five years of alleged
statutory violations.78
b.

The legislative history and other historic context of § 2462

The legislative history of the 1948 Act contains no discussion of
§ 2462, other than a cryptic statement referring to § 2462’s
immediate predecessor in the 1874 Revised Statutes and stating that
“‘[c]hanges were made in phraseology.’”79 When the notes
accompanying a revision in a statute “describe the alterations as
changes in phraseology, the well-established canon of construction is
that the revised statute means only what it meant before [the
revision].”80 Thus, as the 3M court correctly ruled, the controlling
language to interpret when construing § 2462 is that of its 1839
predecessor81 because the slight changes in the 1874 version that
appeared in the Revised Statutes were also non-substantive changes.82
78. See infra note 164 and accompanying text.
79. 3M, 17 F.3d at 1458 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 80-308, at A191 (1947)).
80. Id. (citing Keene Corp. v. United States, 508 U.S. 200, 209 (1993)).
81. Id. at 1461-62; cf. id. at 1458 n.7 (noting that the 1874 version was “slightly
different” from the 1839 version).
82. The version included in the 1874 and 1878 editions of the Revised Statutes,
R.S. § 1047, was a nonsubstantive revision of the 1839 Act. See id. at 1458 n.7
(reprinting both versions); See Appendix A (quoting 1874 and 1839 versions). The
1874 version moved the phrase “shall be maintained,” which in the 1839 version
immediately followed the first use of the word “prosecution,” to later in the sentence,
added the phrase “except in cases where it is otherwise specially provided,” and
edited the clause beginning with “unless” by deleting the words “suit or prosecution.”
See id. As explained by Hicks, the 1874 edition of the Revised Statutes was the work
of a commission appointed in 1867 to revise all the laws of the United States by
eliminating those that were obsolete or “of merely private interest,” and “by
arranging the general and permanent laws under headings by which related subjects
were brought together.” F. HICKS, LEGAL RESEARCH 87 (3d ed. 1942). When it was
discovered that some unauthorized substantive changes had been made in 1874, a
second edition, published in 1878, corrected those changes. See id. R.S. § 1047 was
not among those provisions that had been substantively changed in 1874 and the
1874 and 1878 versions are identical. Section 1047 was grouped in the Revised
Statutes with other provisions of the judicial code, and stated:
No suit or prosecution for any penalty or forfeiture, pecuniary or otherwise,
accruing under the laws of the United States, shall be maintained, except in
cases where it is otherwise specially provided, unless the same is commenced
within five years from the time when the penalty or forfeiture accrued:
Provided, That the person of the offender, or the property liable for such
penalty or forfeiture, shall, within the same period, be found within the
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The plain language of the 1839 version of the statute83 compels the
conclusion that § 2462’s statute of limitation applies only to actions in
the federal courts. The 1839 version is one of eight sections in an act
entitled “An Act in amendment of the acts respecting the Judicial
System of the United States,” (the “1839 Act”) adopted on Feb. 28,
1839.84 Section 1 provides for diversity jurisdiction in the federal
courts.85 Section 2 authorizes federal courts to appoint their own
clerks.86 Section 3 of the 1839 Act provides:
[A]ll pecuniary penalties and forfeitures accruing under the laws of
the United States may be sued for and recovered in any court of competent
jurisdiction in the State or district where such penalties or
forfeitures have accrued, or in which the offender or offenders may
87
be found.

Section 4 of the 1839 Act then provides:
[N]o suit or prosecution shall be maintained, for any penalty or
forfeiture, pecuniary or otherwise, accruing under the laws of the
United States, unless the same suit or prosecution shall be
commenced within five years from the time when the penalty or forfeiture
accrued; Provided The person of the offender or the property liable
for such penalty or forfeiture shall, within the same period, be found
within the United States; so that the proper process may be instituted
88
and served against such person or property therefor.

In an 1855 decision, a federal court interpreted the 1839 Act and
held that it “first enacts that [actions for pecuniary penalties and
forfeitures] may be brought, and then limits the time within which
they may be brought.”89 The court stated that the third and fourth
sections “must be taken together, as much as if the fourth was merely
a proviso to the third.”90 The court further observed that “in effect,
they declare the will of the legislature that these actions may be
brought, in the competent court, within five years.”91 In 1870, another
United States; so the proper process therefor may be instituted and served
against such person or property.
Id.
83. See Act of Feb. 28, 1839, ch. 36, §§ 1-4, 5 Stat. 321-22.
84. Id.
85. See id. § 1.
86. See id. § 2.
87. Id. § 3.
88. Id. § 4 (emphasis added, except in the word “Provided,” where emphasis is in
original).
89. Stimpson v. Pond, 23 F. Cas. 101, 102 (C.C.D. Mass. 1855) (No. 13,455)
(holding that in an action to recover penalties for falsely marking an item
“patented,” the 1839 Act controlled and established the statute of limitation, which
ran for five years from the time the penalty “accrue[d]”).
90. Id. at 102.
91. Id. (emphasis added).

2000]

STATUTORY MISINTERPRETATION

681

federal court interpreted the 1839 Act,92 stating:
Section 3 confers jurisdiction upon the state courts, concurrent with
the federal courts, of suits for the recovery of ‘all pecuniary penalties
and forfeitures accruing under the laws of the United States’. . . .
No suit or prosecution can be brought . . . under section 3 in a
state court for the recovery of a forfeiture in rem; and yet all suits
93
or prosecutions are clearly covered by section 4.

Other references in the 1839 version of what became 28 U.S.C.
§ 2462, and in the 1874 non-substantive revision of the statute,
confirm that both versions pertained to proceedings in the courts.
Both provided that “process” must be “instituted” and “served” on the
person or property against whom the action was brought.94 Each
version provided that the action to which the time limitation applied
was one in which a “penalty or forfeiture” had already “accrued” and
for which a specific person or persons, or property, was “liable.”95
Taken together, these references further support the interpretation
that the 1839 version of § 2462 was directed at two kinds of court
proceedings to collect a penalty or forfeiture—a debt action, which
presupposed a specific or calculable pecuniary penalty or forfeiture,
and an in rem forfeiture proceeding.96
Furthermore, as discussed infra, all the forebears of the 1839 Act
imposed limitations on court actions to recover fines, penalties, and
forfeitures. The original ancestor of the 1839 statute was § 32 of the
Act of Apr. 30, 1790, entitled “An Act for the Punishment of Certain
Crimes Against the United States,” (the “1790 Act”)97—a criminal
statute that provided for prosecution of offenses in court. Although
the 3M court stated that “[i]t is unclear, and unimportant, whether
the ancestor of the Act of 1839 was the [1790 Act] . . . , or a 1799
92. See In re Landsberg, 14 F. Cas. 1065, 1067-68 (C.C.E.D. Mich. 1870) (No.
8,041) (applying the five-year statute of limitation established in the 1839 Act to
prohibit a prosecution for whiskey smuggling).
93. Id. at 1067-68 (emphasis added). Later, the concurrent jurisdiction of state
courts was eliminated. See 28 U.S.C. § 1355 (1994).
94. See Act of Feb. 28, 1839, ch. 36, § 4, 5 Stat. 322; Act of June 22, 1874, ch. 19,
§ 1047, 18 Stat. 193.
95. See Act of Feb. 28, 1839, ch. 36, § 4, 5 Stat. 322; Act of June 22, 1874, ch. 19,
§ 1047, 18 Stat. 193.
96. See Hepner v. United States, 213 U.S. 103, 105-09 (1909) (noting that “actions
for penalties” were considered debt actions because they were actions to recover a sum
certain or a sum that could be calculated; this was true because the statute usually
specified the amount of the penalty, or the means of calculating it); accord Tull v.
United States, 481 U.S. 412, 426 (1987) (“[I]n the United States, the action to
recover civil penalties usually seeks the amount fixed by Congress.”); see also 14 Op.
Att’y Gen. 81, 83 (1872) (interpreting the 1839 version of § 2462 then in effect to
apply to “all proceedings for the recovery of fines, penalties, and forfeitures” under the
revenue laws and others) (emphasis added).
97. Act of Apr. 30, 1790, ch. 9, § 32, 1 Stat. 112, 119.
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statute pertaining to the collection of duties on imports and
tonnage,”98 the court also observed that “[e]arly cases gave the nod to
the 1790 law” as the ancestor.99 The 1872 Revisers’ Notes to the
Revised Statutes appear to be dispositive on this point, as they
establish the 1790 Act as the ancestor of the 1839 statute. In
describing the 1839 statute, the Revisers’ Notes refer to the 1790 Act
and state that the 1839 statute “applied a new limitation” of five years
to the same prosecutions for “any fine or forfeiture under any penal
statute” to which the 1790 Act had applied a two-year limitation.100
The 1790 Act, after providing a limitation of three years on
prosecutions for “treason or other capital offence,” except murder or
forgery, also specified that no person be “prosecuted, tried or punished
for any offence, not capital, nor for any fine or forfeiture under any penal
statute, unless the indictment or information for the same shall be
found or instituted within two years from the time of committing the
offence, or incurring the fine or forfeiture aforesaid . . . .”101 By its
terms, this limitation applied only to criminal proceedings initiated
by indictment or information,102 which, of course, could be brought
only in court.
When Congress adopted the 1790 Act, however, a civil debt action
had long been an alternative means to collect a monetary penalty
prescribed for a violation of a “penal statute,”103 and the 1790 Act
applied to these debt actions as well as to criminal proceedings.104
98. 3M Co. v. Browner, 17 F.3d 1453, 1458 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
99. See id. (citing Stimpson v. Pond, 23 F. Cas. 101, 101-02 (C.C.D. Mass. 1855)
(No. 13,455) (supporting the 1790 Act as the ancestor)); United States v. Platt, 27 F.
Cas. 546, 550 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1840) (No. 16,054) (same); 14 Op. Att’y Gen. 81 (1872)
(same).
100. See 1 REVISION OF THE UNITED STATES STATUTES AS DRAFTED BY THE
COMMISSIONERS APPOINTED FOR THAT PURPOSE 546-47 (1872) [hereinafter DRAFT]; see
also JOHN M. GOULD & GEORGE F. TUCKER, NOTES ON THE REVISED STATUTES 349
(1889) (quoting a phrase from the Draft and discussing the effect of the 1839 Act
amendment to the 1790 Act).
101. Act of Apr. 30, 1790, ch. 9, § 32, 1 Stat. 112, 119 (emphasis added).
102. See id.
103. The term “penal statute” is used here in the same sense in which Blackstone
used the term. See 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 159 (1768) (defining
penal statute as a statute “whereby a forfeiture is inflicted for transgressing the
provisions therein enacted”). Debt actions for penalties have a long history under
English law. See id. at 159-60. In 1768, Blackstone explained that an “[a]ction of
debt for penalties” could be maintained to collect a “forfeiture” due under “all penal
statutes, that is, such acts of parliament whereby a forfeiture is inflicted for
transgressing the provisions therein enacted.” Id. at 159. This was because by virtue
of “an implied original contract to submit to the rules of the community, whereof we
are members,” such a provision for a forfeiture was deemed to “immediately create a
debt in the eye of the law.” Id. See generally 2 WILLIAM S. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF
ENGLISH LAW 349, 425 (1923).
104. See Adams, qui tam v. Woods, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 336 (1805).
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Debt actions to recover penalties under federal penal statutes were
civil actions brought in court. The Judiciary Act of September 24,
1789 (the “1789 Judiciary Act”),105 had given the federal district courts
“exclusive original cognizance . . . of all suits for penalties and forfeitures
incurred, under the laws of the United States.”106 At that time, penal
statutes usually included a qui tam107 provision that authorized any
private citizen or “common informer” who brought suit to receive all
or part of the penalty or forfeiture.108 These qui tam provisions were
105. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 76-77.
106. See id. (emphasis added); see also United States v. Mooney, 116 U.S. 104, 10708 (1885) (holding that a circuit court lacked jurisdiction of an action for a penalty
under the customs laws because the 1789 Judiciary Act “conferred exclusive
jurisdiction on the district courts of suits for penalties and forfeitures incurred under
the laws of the United States”).
107. “Qui tam” is shorthand for “qui tam pro domino rege quam pro se imposo sequitur,”
which means in essence “who brings the action for the king as well as himself.” See
Evan Caminker, The Constitutionality of Qui Tam Actions, 99 YALE L.J. 341, 341 n.1
(1989) (defining qui tam).
A leading eighteenth century law dictionary lists eight major topics under the word
“action,” one of which is “[a]ctions popular, or actions qui tam.” See CUNNINGHAM’S
LAW DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1771) (unpaginated). Such qui tam actions are defined as
follows:
Actions qui tam are such as are given by act of parliament, which give a
penalty and create a forfeiture for the neglect of some duty or commission of
some crime, to be recovered by action or information, at the suit of him who
prosecutes as well in the King’s name as in his own. It is sometimes called a
popular action, when the penalty or part of it is given to any one who will sue
for the same.
Id.
108. See 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 159-60 (1768). Blackstone stated
that these forfeitures were often given to the person “aggrieved” by the offense, but
that “more usually, these forfeitures created by [penal] statute are given at large, to
any common informer; or, in other words, to any such person or persons as will sue
for the same: and hence such actions are called popular actions.” Id. at 160.
“Sometimes one part is given to the king, to the poor, or to some public use, and the
other part to the informer or prosecutor; and then the suit is called a qui tam action.”
Id. “If the king . . . himself commences this suit, he shall have the whole forfeiture.”
Id.
Blackstone further explained that qui tam criminal prosecutions, as well as debt
actions, could be initiated by common informers to collect the same penalties. See
4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 303-04 (1769). A statute enacted under
Elizabeth I in 1588 set a very short limitation period for any prosecution, civil or
criminal, on any penal statute—if the statute gave part of the penalty to a common
informer and part to the king, the informer had only one year from the “commission
of the offense”; suit could be brought to recover the penalty for the king within an
additional two years from the expiration of that year; if the penalty went only to the
king, prosecution could be brought within two years from the commission of the
offense. See id. The 1588 statute is entitled “An Act Concerning Informers” (the
“1588 Act”) and appears to be concerned primarily with protecting citizens from
nonmeritorious suits by “common informers.” See 31 Eliz., ch. 5 (1588), reprinted in
4 STATUTES OF THE REALM 801-02 (1993). The 1588 Act states that it was enacted
“[f]or that diverse of the Queen’s Majesty’s subjects be daily unjustly vexed and
disquieted by diverse common informers upon penal statutes.” Id. (spelling
modified). The 1588 Act also states that it does not apply to “any such officer of
record as have in respect of their offices heretofore lawfully used to exhibit
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common because prior to the twentieth-century development of a
strong executive branch, the government relied primarily on private
citizens, rather than government officials, to enforce public rights
through both criminal prosecutions and debt actions for penalties.109
In Adams, qui tam v. Woods,110 the Supreme Court expressly construed
the 1790 Act, ancestor to § 2462, to limit not only a criminal
proceeding but also an action for debtan action in
court111brought qui tam by an informer to collect a statutorily
prescribed monetary penalty.112 By statute, the informer would
receive one-half of the penalty as a sort of “bounty” for bringing the
action.113
information or sue upon penal laws” and that such officers may continue to “inform
and pursue” on penal laws “as they might have done before the making of this act.”
See id. (spelling modified). Thus, it appears that the statute of limitation in the 1588
Act did not apply to prosecutions brought by government officials.
109. See Harold J. Krent, Executive Control Over Criminal Law Enforcement: Some
Lessons From History, 38 AM. U. L. REV. 275, 291-303 (1989) (explaining the role of qui
tam actions both in eighteenth-century England and in the United States, up until
the early twentieth century, as a common means by which private individuals were
empowered to enforce the criminal laws); see also Caminker, supra note 107, at 388
(noting that “prior to the growth of the modern executive, the responsibility for
enforcing legal obligations necessarily fell to private citizens [through qui tam
actions] rather than public officers”).
The “informer” could initiate either a criminal proceeding or a civil debt action
and would collect his “statutory bounty” portion of the penalty either way. See Krent,
supra, at 297 (citing as an early example of a statute under which Congress
authorized private individuals “to sue under criminal statutes to help enforce the
law” a 1791 act that made criminal the willful failure to pay required duties on liquor,
and under which the informer was to collect one-half of “all penalties and forfeitures
incurred” by the violator; the penalties could be collected either through civil or
criminal procedures—i.e., “by action of debt” or “by information”) (citing Imported
Spirits Tax Repeal Act of March 3, 1791, ch. 15 § 4, 1 Stat. 199, 209); see also
McCullough v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 321-22 (1819) (noting that
penalties imposed by a Maryland statute on any bank that operated without state
authorization were “to be recovered by indictment, or action of debt, in the county
court . . . where the offence [was] committed, one-half to the informer, and the
other half to . . . the state”).
110. 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 336, 340-41 (1805) (holding that the words “nor shall any
person be prosecuted” related to both criminal actions and actions for debt).
111. See Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 418 (1987) (noting that in the
eighteenth century, “[a] civil penalty was a type of remedy at common law that could
only be enforced in courts of law,” as opposed to courts of equity).
112. See Adams, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) at 340-41 (applying the statute of limitation to
bar an action for debt).
113. See Krent, supra note 109, at 297 (discussing the “bounty” aspect of qui tam
actions, under which an informer may collect a portion of the statutory penalty).
There can be no serious question that the 1790 Act and other forbears of § 2462
pertained only to penalties of money and property. It is immaterial that some
predecessors of § 2462 used the phrase “any fine or forfeiture,” e.g., the 1790 Act
version of § 2462, while others used “any penalty or forfeiture,” e.g., the 1839 version
of § 2462. The terms “fine,” “penalty” and “forfeiture” have long been used
interchangeably to refer to the payment of a sum of money for an infraction of law.
See Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 614 & n.7 (1993) (noting that “forfeit” was
the word used for “fine” in a 1789 statute and that “[d]ictionaries of the time
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In 1839, terms like “action for a penalty” or “suit for penalties and
forfeitures” were still understood to refer to these substantively
criminal, but procedurally civil, penalty actions in the federal courts,
often brought by a private party to collect part or all of the penalty
for himself.114 Thus, Congress can be said to have “clearly” intended
the 1839 version of § 2462 to limit only those kinds of proceedings—
judicial proceedings of the same type the 1790 statute had limited.
Like the 1790 Act, all other predecessors of § 2462 set limitations
on actions in the courts to collect or “recover” penalties.115 The 1799
statute regulating customs duties collection, referred to by the 3M
court as the alternative possible ancestor of § 2462,116 provided that
“all penalties accruing by any breach of this act, shall be sued for, and
recovered with costs of suit . . . in any court competent to try the same.”117
All of the other statutes listed in the margin notes to the 1874 and
1878 versions of what is now § 2462, R.S. §§ 1047, also provided time
limits on suits or prosecutions in court to collect or “recover”
penalties.118
confirm that ‘fine’ was understood to include ‘forfeiture’ and vice versa”); see also
United States v. Maillard, 26 F. Cas. 1140, 1142 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1871) (No. 15,709)
(treating fines, penalties and forfeitures in antecedents of § 2462 as encompassing
only money and property); In re Landsberg, 14 F. Cas. 1065, 1067 (C.C.E.D. Mich.
1870) (No. 8,041) (holding that the term “penalty” in the 1839 Act version of § 2462
meant a “fixed pecuniary mulct incurred by the violation of some law”); Ex parte
Marquand, 16 F. Cas. 776 (C.C.D. Mass. 1815) (No. 9,100) (treating all fines,
penalties and forfeitures under the 1799 Customs Act as money or property that
could be received and distributed by a collector of customs duties); United States v.
Mann, 26 F. Cas. 1153, 1154 (C.C.D.N.H. 1812) (No. 15,718) (discussing the various
meanings given in different contexts to the words “penalty” and “forfeiture” and
observing that in one of the narrower senses, these words refer to pecuniary mulcts).
114. In 1839, penalty actions still retained their hybrid nature of civil procedural
means to recover criminal punishment, and penal statutes still most often provided
for qui tam actions by “common informers.” See Caminker, supra note 107, at 342 &
n.4 (noting that “as late as the turn of [the twentieth] century, the Supreme Court
recognized that the ‘right to recover the penalty or forfeiture granted by statute is
frequently given to the first common informer who brings the action, although he
has no interest in the matter whatever except as such informer’”) (quoting Marvin v.
Trout, 199 U.S. 212, 225 (1905)); Krent, supra note 109, at 297 (noting that qui tam
penalty actions “were long considered quasi-criminal”).
In Lees v. United States, 150 U.S. 476 (1893), the Court stated that “the recovery of a
penalty is a proceeding criminal in nature, yet . . . it may be enforced in a civil action,
and in the same manner that debts are recovered in the ordinary civil courts.” Id. at
479. As late as 1909, the Supreme Court noted that the debt action was an
alternative means of collecting a penalty, in addition to a “technically criminal”
proceeding initiated by indictment or information. See Hepner v. United States,
213 U.S. 103, 109 (1909) (cited in the Revisers’ Notes to 28 U.S.C. § 2461 as adopted
in the 1948 Act).
115. See JOHN M. GOULD & GEORGE F. TUCKER, NOTES ON THE REVISED STATUTES
347-51 (1889) (discussing the history of R.S. § 1047).
116. See 3M Co. v. Browner, 17 F.3d 1453, 1458 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
117. Act of Mar. 2, 1799, ch. 128, § 89, 1 Stat. 627, 695 (emphasis added).
118. See infra Appendix B (demonstrating that each of the earlier statutes on
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Moreover, there is no indication that any antecedent of § 2462
applied to any kind of administrative proceeding that might have
occurred prior to the initiation of a court action to recover the
penalty or forfeiture. Indeed, studies by respected academics
establish that well into the twentieth century the vast majority of
statutes that provided some administrative role in the assessment of
penalties restricted that role to an informal non-adjudicatory process
which was followed by a de novo determination of liability in district
court.119 Because Congress did not intend to change the meaning of
§ 2462 in 1948, the current version of § 2462 must be construed
consistently with its legislative history, which coincides with the plain
language of the 1948 Act, to apply only to proceedings in the courts
“for any penalty or forfeiture,” that is, proceedings to recover specific
sums and property.120
4.

The five-year period does not begin to run until the penalty or forfeiture
itself has accrued
The interpretation that § 2462 does not apply to administrative
agencies’ proceedings but does apply to federal court proceedings is
buttressed by the controlling language of the 1839 Act predecessor of
§ 2462, which stated, without reference to the occurrence of the
underlying offense, that the five-year limitation period began to run
“from the time when the penalty or forfeiture accrued.”121 Thus, a
specific penalty deemed to be due and payable, and collectible in a
debt action or libel proceeding in court, triggered the limitation
period.122 A specific or calculable penalty was a prerequisite to
which R.S. § 1047 was based pertained to actions in court to recover penalties).
119. As late as 1979, Professor Diver stated that under most statutes providing for
monetary penalties, the agency’s role was an informal one and that “civil penalties
are, by express provision or by implication, subject to ultimate collection in a civil
action to be brought in a United States district court.” See Diver, supra note 41, at
1446; see also Goldschmid, supra note 4, at 907-08 (finding that, as of 1971, the vast
majority of federal agencies did not have the power to adjudicate liability for and
impose monetary penalties, but used informal assessment procedures followed by de
novo adjudication in a court action unless the respondent paid voluntarily). It is
noteworthy that in discussing the administrative role in the civil penalty assessment
process neither of these comprehensive treatments even mentions § 2462 or any
other time limitation on the administrative assessment of civil money penalties.
120. See Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 418 (1987). As previously noted, a
prosecution for “any penalty or forfeiture” in the nineteenth century was a phrase
commonly understood to refer to actions and proceedings in court to recover
penalties composed of money and property. See supra note 113.
121. See Act of Feb. 28, 1839, ch. 36, § 4, 5 Stat. 322 (emphasis added).
122. “Accrue” means to become “due.” See BOUVIER’S LAW DICTIONARY 51 (1848).
An action “accrues” when the plaintiff has a right “to commence a suit thereon.” Id.;
see also BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 18 (1st ed. 1891) (a right of action “accrues” when it
“come[s] into force or existence”). A debt action could not “accrue” until there was
a specific or calculable sum that was due and payable; an in rem forfeiture proceeding
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bringing a debt action.123 As discussed earlier, it was generally
accepted before 1948 that an “action for penalties” or “an action . . .
to recover a penalty” could be brought as a debt action because it was
an action to collect “a sum certain . . . , or a sum which can readily be
reduced to a certainty.”124 As discussed more fully below, actions
before administrative agencies under most modern statutes are not of
this nature because no penalty “accrues” and no action can be
brought in court until after the agency has made its determination.125
Thus, administrative proceedings are fundamentally different than
the proceedings Congress clearly intended to limit when it enacted
the predecessors of § 2462, i.e., debt actions in court.126
The 1839 version of § 2462 chose “the time when the penalty or
forfeiture accrued” as the trigger date, rather than the date the
offense was committed.127 Pre-1839 versions of § 2462 had made a
distinction between the date of the offense and the date the fine or
forfeiture was “incurred.” Both the 1790 criminal statute128 and an
1804 statute concerning crimes under the revenue laws129
distinguished between when the offense occurred and when the fine,
penalty, or forfeiture was “incurr[ed].”130 Thus, these predecessor
statutes recognized that the date on which the violation of law
occurred and the date the penalty or forfeiture became actionable in
court could differ. The plain language of the 1839 Act version of
§ 2462 provided that the five-year limitation period was triggered
when a specific “penalty or forfeiture accrued,” that is, was deemed to
similarly could not be initiated until specific property was forfeitable.
123. See, e.g., Hepner v. United States, 213 U.S. 103, 106 (1908) (explaining that a
debt action is by its nature an action for a sum certain or a sum that may be
calculated).
124. See id.
125. See, e.g., United States Dep’t of Labor v. Old Ben Coal Co., 676 F.2d 259, 261
(7th Cir. 1982) (agreeing with previous courts that an action for a penalty did not
accrue until the agency made its decision and ruled that the penalty was owed).
126. Cf. id. (reasoning that if a penalty accrues upon violation and prior to the
administrative agency’s assessment, the assessment would be rendered superfluous).
127. See Act of Feb. 28, 1839, ch. 36, § 4, 5 Stat. 322.
128. See Act of Apr. 30, 1790, ch. 9, § 32, 1 Stat. 119.
129. See Act of Mar. 26, 1804, ch. 40, § 3, 2 Stat. 290-91; see also Appendix B
(discussing this statute in further detail).
130. Under the 1790 statute, any prosecution “for any offence, not capital” or “for
any fine or forfeiture under any penal statute” must be commenced within two years
“from the time of committing the offence, or incurring the fine or forfeiture.” See Act
of Apr. 30, 1790, ch. 9, § 32, 1 Stat. 119 (emphasis added). Under the 1804 statute,
any person . . . guilty of any crime arising under the revenue laws of the
United States, or incurring any fine or forfeiture by breaches of the said laws,
may be prosecuted, tried and punished, provided the indictment or
information be found at any time within five years after committing the
offence or incurring the fine or forfeiture
Act of Mar. 26, 1804, ch. 40, § 3, 2 Stat. 290-91 (emphasis added).
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be actionable in court, and Congress intended no change in meaning
when it revised the judicial code in 1948.131 Therefore, the current
wording of § 2462, which provides that the five-year limitation period
commences on “the date when the claim first accrued,” must refer to
the claim for an “accrued” penalty or forfeiture, not to the “claim” that
there has been a violation of a statute that may give rise to a
penalty.132
Prior to the twentieth century, courts may have deemed most
statutory penalties to accrue simultaneously with the violation.133 But
when the penalty or forfeiture was deemed to “accrue” depended on
the wording of the statute that created the forfeiture itself.134
131. See supra notes 80-82 and accompanying text.
132. See infra Part I.B.5 and cases cited therein; see also United States v. Serfilco
Ltd., No. 98-C-2490, 1998 WL 641367, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 11, 1998) (holding that
for purposes of § 2462 a claim for penalties under the Export Administration Act did
not accrue until the agency had a right to bring the action, which was after the
agency had assessed the penalties and the defendants had failed to pay them).
133. See, e.g., Adams, qui tam v. Woods, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 336, 340-41 (1805)
(holding that under the 1790 Act the action was barred because the offense was
committed more than two years before the action was commenced). The 1790 Act
interpreted in Adams provided that prosecution must be brought “within two years
from the time of committing the offence, or incurring the fine or forfeiture,” so the result in
Adams is not helpful in interpreting the 1839 Act’s trigger date of when the “penalty
or forfeiture accrued.” See id. (emphasis added). Interpreting the 1790 Act, the
Adams Court held the action was barred because “the offence was not committed
within two years previous to the institution of the suit” See id. at 340. There is no
discussion in the decision of whether the penalty might have been “incurr[ed]” on a
different date because that issue was not raised in the case. See id. at 336, 340
(discussing only when the offense occurred and when the suit was instituted).
134. Cf. United States v. 1,960 Bags of Coffee, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 398, 404-05
(1814) (holding, in a case not involving a statute of limitation, that because the
“wording of the act” provided that whenever prohibited articles were imported into
the country the articles “shall be forfeited,” the forfeiture “shall take place upon the
commission of the offence”); Pennington v. Coxe, 6 U.S. 33, 53 (1804) (holding that
“duties on refined sugars . . . had not then accrued” because the operative event under
the statute had net yet occurred) (emphasis added); Cf. Crown Coat Front Co. v.
United States, 386 U.S. 503, 517 (1967) (holding that there can be no single, allpurpose determination of when a cause of action first “accrues” and that accrual
must be determined in each case in the context of the wording, context and
purposes of the statute creating the action).
The 3M court misinterpreted three district court cases to support its conclusion
that under § 2462 the date of the violation is always the date the claim “accrues” and,
therefore, the date the statute of limitation begins to run. See 3M v. Browner, 17 F.3d
1453, 1462 (1994) (stating that “since then,” apparently referring to the three district
court decisions, the term “accrued” in § 2462 has meant that the five-year period
began in every instance when the violation occurred). A careful reading of the three
cases shows that they do not support the 3M court’s strong statement. In United States
v. Maillard, 26 F. Cas. 1140, 1143 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1871) (No. 15,709), the court ruled
that under a statute that provided the penalty “shall be forfeited” upon occurrence of
the violation the penalty accrued upon violation. Thus, the specific language of the
statute that created the penalty compelled the conclusion that the penalty accrued at
the time of the violation. See id. In In re Landsberg, 14 F. Cas. 1065, 1067 (C.C.E.D.
Mich. 1870) (No. 8,041), the court focused primarily on which of several possible
statutes of limitation applied; the court stated, without discussion, that the case was
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Congress used a simplistic “transitive” legislative style in early
statutes—identifying in great detail required or proscribed conduct
and setting a mandatory penalty or penalties for each infraction.135
These statutes often stated that upon the infraction the violator “shall
forfeit” a particular amount of money or that particular property
“shall be forfeited,” and under such provisions the penalty probably
“accrued”—became actionable in court—simultaneously with the
violation.136
Even in early statutes, however, some penalties did not accrue until
the occurrence of another event that necessarily, or almost
necessarily, took place after the violation. For example, in Parker v.
United States,137 a federal court held that under a statute that provided
as the penalty the forfeiture of a ship or double its value, the
forfeiture of the ship accrued immediately upon the occurrence of
the violation but the double value forfeiture “accrue[s] . . . whenever
the forfeiture of the property cannot be made effectual by seizure.”138
In the circumstances of that case, the court held that the double
value forfeiture accrued when the ship reached foreign waters and so
was no longer subject to seizure, and that the accrual of the double
value penalty extinguished any right to seize the ship itself.139
Furthermore, some statutes provided that a penalty arose not upon a
violation, but upon the discovery of certain facts in an inspection.140
barred because more than five years had “elapsed since the offence was committed
and the forfeiture accrued.” See id. United States v. Hatch, 26 F. Cas. 220, 224
(C.C.D.N.Y. 1824) (No. 15,325), is not apposite because it involved a “penalty” in the
sense of liquidated damages for failure to meet the conditions of a bond, which is a
contractual matter, rather than a penalty in the sense of a forfeiture for an infraction
of a penal statute. See id.
135. See Peter L. Strauss, Legislative Theory and the Rule of Law: Some Comments on
Rubin, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 427-30 (1989) (contrasting the “transitive” legislative style
used in an 1893 statute, which specified in detail “what technologies [the railroads]
were to employ” and “declared the sanctions that were to apply in the event of
failure,” with the “intransitive” style used in a 1966 statute on the same subject, which
gave authority to an agency within the Department of Commerce to make such
decisions); see also Diver, supra note 41, at 1438-39 (observing that historically early
penalties were fixed by statute).
136. See supra note 134 and accompanying text (discussing penalties and when the
statute of limitation begins to run).
137. 18 F. Cas. 1179 (C.C.D. Pa. 1809) (No. 10,751).
138. See id. at 1180. Parker was a case under the first embargo law, which
prohibited the sailing of any ship from a port of the United States to any foreign
port. See id. A violation consisted of a ship departing from a U.S. port without a
permit, with the intention of proceeding to a foreign port, or of departing from one
U.S. port to another without first giving bond to reland cargo within the United
States. See id. at 1179. It was not necessary to establish a violation that the ship
actually reach a foreign port and the court held that the forfeiture of the ship
accrued immediately upon its sailing for the foreign port. Id. at 1180.
139. See id.
140. See, e.g., Act of Apr. 20, 1818, ch. 79, § 22, 3 Stat. 438 (requiring that customs
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In any event, Congress gradually replaced the transitive legislative
style with the familiar modern style in which it does not set a specific
penalty amount (although it usually sets an upper limit per
violation), but rather delegates to an administrative agency or a court
both the authority to adjudicate liability for a penalty and the power
to determine the amount of the penalty.141 This shift in style,
associated with the development of the administrative state, was not
complete until the Supreme Court resolved lingering doubts about
congressional authority to delegate legislative power.142 In his 1979
government-wide study of the civil penalty process, Professor Diver
concluded that of 348 civil penalty statutes in effect at that time,
141 expressly gave an administrative agency the authority to “assess”
the penalty, while the other 207 statutes he deemed to provide for
“court-assessment” of penalties.143
Administrative “assessment” encompasses both agency adjudication
after trial-type proceedings subject to substantial evidence review in a
court of appeals, such as was provided under the statute at issue in
the 3M case,144 and less formal, even summary, agency action.145
collectors inspect “at least one package out of every invoice,” that if any package were
found to contain any article not described in the invoice “the whole package shall be
forfeited,” and that if the goods were consequently subject to additional duties then
“penalties shall be incurred”).
141. See Strauss, supra note 135, at 427-30. Professor Davis in his Administrative Law
Treatise also recognizes this shift in regulatory method that occurred gradually as
society became more complex and the sheer volume of regulation needed required
Congress to delegate more authority to administrative agencies. See 1 KENNETH CULP
DAVIS & RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 1.4, at 8-9, § 2.6, at 66
(3d ed. 1994) (stating that the size of the administrative state grew out of the needs
of an increasingly complex society and that Congress could not manage without
delegating considerable authority to administrative agencies.).
Another fundamental change in Congress’s legislative style in the post-nineteenth
century period has been that the use of qui tam provisions has been discontinued,
except under the False Claims Act. See Caminker, supra note 107, at 388 (tracing the
history of qui tam provisions). Virtually all qui tam statutes had been repealed or
become dormant by the mid-twentieth century. See id. at 342 n.5 (stating in 1989 that
“[m]ost early qui tam statutes have long been repealed; of those remaining, most lie
essentially dormant.”)
142. See DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 141, § 2.6, at 66 (citing and contrasting the
Supreme Court’s statements that endorsed the nondelegation doctrine in Field v.
Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 692 (1892) and United States v. Shreveport Grain & Elevator Co.,
287 U.S. 77, 85 (1932) with the Court’s statement in Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S.
361, 372 (1989)). The Court in Mistretta stated: “[O]ur jurisprudence has been
driven by a practical understanding that in our increasingly complex society, replete
with ever changing and more technical problems, Congress simply cannot do its job
absent an ability to delegate power under broad general directives.” Mistretta,
488 U.S. at 372.
143. See Diver, supra note 41, at 1440-41 (explaining that to assess a penalty means
to make an initial determination that a person has violated a law and then initiate a
formal claim on that individual for a statutorily mandated or permitted specific
amount of money).
144. See generally 3M Co. v. Browner, 17 F.3d 1453, 1457-62 (D.C. Cir. 1994)
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Under “agency-assessment” provisions, civil penalties cannot
reasonably be said to have “accrued” until after the agency has
“assessed” the penalty because until such time there is no sum certain
to be recovered in court.146 In other words, the informal or formal
administrative penalty assessment processes in modern statutes occur
before the triggering event that begins the five-year limitation period
in § 2462, that is, before the penalty “accrues” and is actionable in
court.147
Both Professor Diver’s 1979 study and Professor Goldschmid’s 1972
study observed that regardless of whether the agency’s assessment was
binding and subject only to substantial evidence review in a court of
appeals, or whether the agency’s assessment was tentative and subject
to de novo determination in court,148 ultimate enforcement or
collection had to occur in the federal courts.149 The reason is
apparent: agencies have no contempt power and cannot compel
payment, except in the rare situation where the agency has possession
of either money or property of the person liable for payment and
therefore can collect payment without any court involvement.150
(discussing the EPA’s assessment of civil penalties for violation of the TSCA); see also
Diver, supra note 41, at 1441-42 (construing an agency’s or court’s role in the
assessment of penalties).
145. In National Indep. Coal Operators’ Ass’n v. Kleppe, 433 U.S. 388 (1976), the
Supreme Court held that formal findings of fact are not required by the Secretary of
the Interior to “assess” a penalty for safety violations in mines under the Federal Coal
Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969. See id. at 398 (determining that using the
reports of trained and experienced inspectors who find violations provides sufficient
background to make an assessment); see also Action For Children’s Television v. FCC,
59 F.3d 1249, 1253-54 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (involving FCC practice of informal
assessment of monetary “forfeitures” for airing indecent materials).
146. See Diver, supra note 41, at 1442 n.39 (asserting that an agency’s role in
penalty assessment will at a minimum prevent judicial enforcement action from
beginning until the agency first assesses the penalty).
147. See id.
148. See id. at 1439 & n.25 (noting that with certain exceptions, civil penalties are
“subject to ultimate collection” in a civil action in district court, where a trial is had of
“contested factual issues not foreclosed by a previous binding judgment” such as
“[a]n adjudication of facts by an agency on the record of an evidentiary hearing”);
Goldschmid, supra note 4, at 899, 907, 936 (finding that the vast majority of federal
administrative agencies must be successful in a de novo proceeding in a federal
district court before a civil money penalty may be imposed); see also Kleppe, 423 U.S.
at 393 (stating that if a mine operator does not pay the penalty the statute requires
the Secretary of the Interior to petition the court to enforce the assessment and that
the court must determine the amount of the penalty in a de novo proceeding).
149. See Diver, supra note 41, at 1439 (explaining that, except for maritime
statutes, jurisdiction over civil penalties is found in the district court); Goldschmid,
supra note 4, at 944-45 (noting that when necessary ultimate collection of civil money
penalties “may be enforced” in federal district courts).
150. See Goldschmid, supra note 4, at 945 (mentioning the collection technique
available to the Immigration and Naturalization Service (“INS”), which can deny
clearance to a ship if any penalty imposed on it remains unpaid). The unusual type
of summary collection procedure granted to the INS, which completely avoids any
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Professor Goldschmid’s 1972 study concluded that at that time the
majority of statutes providing for monetary penalties gave the agency
only an informal role in penalty assessment and that, if voluntary
payment by the violator could not be negotiated, the agency was
required to prevail in a de novo court proceeding brought by the
Justice Department after referral by the agency, except where the
agency had independent litigating authority.151 Most often, however,
penalty assessments by these agencies were resolved through
voluntary payment152 without having to resort to Justice Department
referral.153 Both studies noted that the need to involve the Justice
Department could impede effective enforcement of regulatory
statutes because the Justice Department was overburdened and gave
low priority to penalty actions.154
The Goldschmid study observed that few statutes permitted
agencies to make binding determinations of liability for penalties.155
These agencies’ decisions were subject only to substantial evidence
review in the courts of appeals.156 The 1972 report advocated that
more agencies be given the power to impose civil penalties as an
alternative to more drastic sanctions, such as license revocation or
denials of contracts or grants, which were seen as an “economic death
sentence.”157 The 1972 report also recommended that additional
court involvement, was noted earlier, see supra note 23. Obviously, few agencies have
available this means of collecting penalties and, therefore, must resort to court
action if payment is not made voluntarily. See Goldschmid, supra note 4, at 945 n.15.
151. See Goldschmid, supra note 4, at 899, 919, 920 (describing how agencies
seldom bring actions in court because the agencies are able to obtain voluntary
payment of an agreed amount in over ninety percent of the cases).
152. See id. at 919-21 (finding that offenders usually volunteer to pay a negotiated
penalty and only a handful of cases reach the district court). These administrative
agencies would notify an alleged violator that the agency considered him to be liable
for a penalty in a certain amount. See id. at 919. Various informal procedures (e.g.,
letters, meetings, and hearings) were available through which the respondent could
contest his liability for and/or the amount of the penalty. See id. at 920. Most often,
the matter would be resolved through such means. See id.
153. See id. at 919-22 (noting that the majority of administrative agencies
“mitigate,” i.e., lower, the amount of penalties far below the statutory amount and
thereby obtain voluntary payment without requesting the Justice Department to
bring an action in district court).
154. See id. at 900 (suggesting that agencies are accepting inadequate settlements
because the Department of Justice is an obstacle to agency administrators’ efforts to
take their cases to federal court); Diver, supra note 41, at 1459 (referring to the
limitations on what administrative agencies can demand due to the need to convince
the Justice Department to prosecute penalty cases and the need to succeed in a trial
de novo in district court).
155. See Goldschmid, supra note 4, at 907-08 (finding that only four statutory
schemes allow for agency ability to determine liability).
156. See id.
157. See id. at 898, 908 (advocating for statutes to provide administrative agencies a
greater amount of control over penalties).
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agencies be given the authority to determine liability for penalties
subject only to limited review, rather than requiring that a de novo
determination of liability be made in court.158
The Diver study found that although the 1972 Goldschmid report’s
recommendations resulted in more penalty provisions and in several
more agencies acquiring the authority to adjudicate liability for
penalties in a formal trial-type hearing, in 1979, statutes of that kind
still accounted for only fourteen percent of penalty assessment
provisions.159 The remainder of the statutes still used the system of
informal, often unilateral, administrative assessments later followed
by a de novo court determination, if necessary.160
It is difficult to determine when statutes began to provide for
informal or formal administrative agency assessment of penalties
subsequent to the occurrence of the violation. A 1938 Second Circuit
Court of Appeals case suggests that such processes had begun by that
time.161 The date the court assumed the penalty “accrued” in that
case was not the date of the violation, but rather the date the agency
issued to the respondent a notice of violation and demand for
payment.162 Certainly, the informal agency assessment procedures,
found in the Diver and Goldschmid studies to be so common, had
become well established no later than the 1940s. The Attorney
158. See id. at 936-47. Professor Goldschmid’s 1972 report discusses in exhaustive
detail the possible consequences of, and impediments to, expanding the role of civil
monetary penalties in federal regulatory schemes, including giving agencies the
authority to determine liability for penalties. See id.. Yet, the study makes no
mention of any possibility that § 2462 might apply to administrative proceedings. See
id. at 919-23. Nor does Professor Goldschmid’s discussion of how agency assessment
processes worked at the time of the report mention a need to comply with § 2462.
See id. Thus, one can infer that at that time it was not widely believed that § 2462
applied to administrative proceedings to assess penalties.
159. See Diver, supra note 41, at 1445-46 (describing how the great majority of
administrative agencies provided for informal hearings and statements of reasons in
assessing penalties).
160. See id. at 1439 & n.23. Professor Diver’s report also makes no mention of
§ 2462 or any other time limitation applicable to these administrative proceedings,
but does mention § 2461 as authorizing a civil action to collect a penalty. See id.
161. See Lancashire Shipping Co. v. Durning, 98 F.2d 751, 753 (2d Cir. 1938)
(discussing the administrative action in relation to when the penalty accrued).
162. See id. at 752-53 (upholding a fine for failure of a ship’s master to detain on
board the ship and to deport Chinese crew members after notice given). The
“penalty accrued on March 12, 1931,” but this was not the date of the violation. See id.
at 753. Rather, this was the date of a subsequent notification of liability for the
penalty, as stated in an earlier decision based on the same events. See Lancashire
Shipping Co. v. Elting, 70 F.2d 699, 700 (2d Cir. 1934) (stating that on March 11,
1931, the police raided the ship and discovered that the ship’s master had violated
an earlier order to detain on board and to deport Chinese crew members). March
12, 1931 was the date of “a notice of liability for fine” under the immigration laws
that was served on the ship’s agent after the violation had been discovered. See id.; see
also infra Appendix C ¶ 6 (discussing further the two Lancashire Shipping cases).
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General’s Committee on Administrative Procedure (the “APA
Committee”) studied the practices of all administrative agencies in
existence in 1940 and 1941 in preparation for drafting the APA.163
The practices described by the APA Committee in civil penalty
assessments were informal procedures, subject to de novo review in
court.164 No mention is made of the pre-1948 version of § 2462 in any
of these materials, or anywhere else in the legislative history of the
APA.165 This lack of reference to § 2462’s predecessor, coupled with
the fact that the two studies conducted in the 1970s did not discuss
§ 2462 as relevant to administrative proceedings, suggests that for
many years § 2462 was believed to pertain only to proceedings in
court.166
5.

Five federal courts of appeals have held that under statutes providing for
agency assessment of a penalty, the five-year period in § 2462 begins
when the assessment has been made
Decisions of five different federal courts of appeals167 support the
conclusion that § 2462 applies only to actions in federal court for
accrued fines, penalties, and forfeitures and not to administrative
proceedings to determine or assess penalties.168 In all of these cases,

163. See supra notes 76 & 77 and accompanying text.
164. See, e.g., Monograph of the Attorney General’s Committee on Administrative Procedure,
S. DOC. NO. 10, at 45-46 (1st Sess. 1941) (describing the civil penalty assessment
process under the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938); Monograph of the Attorney General’s
Committee on Administrative Procedure, S. DOC. NO. 186, at 24-28 (3d Sess. 1940)
(describing the civil penalty assessment process of the Department of Commerce,
Bureau of Marine Inspection and Navigation). Neither description of the civil
penalty process mentions the predecessor of § 2462 or any time limitation on the
initiation of agency procedures.
165. See supra note 164 and accompanying text (finding no discussion of § 2462).
166. The EPA, the agency involved in the 3M case, was not the only agency that
had decided in a formal adjudication that § 2462 did not apply to the initiation of
administrative actions. For years prior to the Johnson decision, the SEC held the same
view. See, e.g., Thompson & McKinnon, No. 7-12769 (Aug. 11, 1952) (unpublished
memorandum order) (holding that § 2462 did not apply to administrative
proceedings); In re Baird & Co., 52 SEC Docket 25 (Sept. 6, 1966) (following
McKinnon holdings). A noted academic authority cited with approval the SEC’s
decision in McKinnon, stating that the holding that § 2462 did not apply to the
Commission’s administrative actions and that SEC administrative sanctions are not
penalties “seems sound.” See LOUIS LOSS, SECURITIES REGULATION 1174 n.10 (2d ed.
1961). The Commodity Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”) had ruled that
28 U.S.C. § 2462 did not apply to non-monetary sanctions imposed by that agency
and, without deciding the question, expressed doubt that § 2462 applied at all to
administrative proceedings. See In re Segal, CFTC No. 89-27, Comm. Fut. L. Rep.
¶ 25,162 (Nov. 5, 1991) (relying on an earlier CFTC opinion to the same effect, In re
Nelson Bunker Hunt, CFTC No. 85-12 (Nov. 6, 1987)).
167. Specifically, the First, Second, Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits.
168. See Capozzi v. United States, 980 F.2d 872, 874 (2d Cir. 1992) (rejecting the
argument that § 2462 should apply to administrative proceedings of the IRS); Lamb
v. United States, 977 F.2d 1296, 1297 (8th Cir. 1992) (holding that the lower court
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the courts construed the language of the 1948 Act version of § 2462,
providing that the five-year limitation is triggered when the “claim
first accrued,” and did not consider the controlling 1839 Act
language “from the time when the penalty or forfeiture accrued.”169
Yet, the decisions reached a result consistent with the 1839 Act
language—i.e., that an assessed penalty had to exist for the five-year
limitation period to begin to run.170 Because it is apparent that a
penalty can accrue only once, the above conclusion forecloses the
possibility that the five-year limitation period begins at the time of the
violation, before the agency has assessed the penalty.
In Capozzi v. United States,171 Lamb v. United States,172 and Mullikin v.
United States,173 the federal courts of appeals squarely held that § 2462
does not apply to the administrative assessment of a penalty, and
determined that the five-year limitation period is triggered when the
penalty is imposed, not when the violation occurs. In Capozzi, the
court considered the argument that § 2462 barred IRS “assessment”
of tax penalties later than five years after the violation that gave rise
to the tax liability.174 The court found that an administrative
assessment is not the equivalent of an action, suit, or proceeding.
The court held that it “is the collection of amounts owed, not the
assessment of them, that may be properly termed ‘enforcement’”
under § 2462 because “[n]o legal liability arises until the IRS assesses
the penalty. Therefore, there is nothing to enforce until after the
assessment is made.”175 Mullikin and Lamb likewise held that § 2462
erred by applying § 2462 to the administrative assessment of penalties under the
Internal Revenue Code); Mullikin v. United States, 952 F.2d 920, 928 (6th Cir. 1991)
(finding that the five-year statute of limitation of § 2462 did not apply to the
administrative assessment of tax penalties); United States v. Meyer, 808 F.2d 912, 914
(1st Cir. 1987) (holding that § 2462 cannot logically apply to the Commerce
Department’s administrative assessment of penalties under the Export
Administration Act); United States Dep’t of Labor v. Old Ben Coal Co., 676 F.2d 259,
261 (7th Cir. 1982) (construing the statute’s language and holding that if § 2462
applied, the claim did not “accrue” until the agency’s decision had been made).
169. See, e.g., Meyer, 808 F.2d at 914 (finding that unless there is a penalty to
enforce, a claim for enforcement of an administrative penalty cannot possibly
accrue); Old Ben, 676 F.2d at 261 (interpreting § 2462’s language to mean accrual
begins when the agency has finally ruled on the claim).
170. See, e.g., Lamb, 977 F.2d at 1296-97 (holding that § 2462 did not apply to the
administrative assessment of tax penalties because, inter alia, Congress did not
expressly so provide); Meyer, 808 F.2d at 915 (reiterating that the agency’s assessment
triggers the five-year statute of limitation).
171. 980 F.2d 872, 875 (2d Cir. 1992).
172. 977 F.2d 1296, 1297 (8th Cir. 1992).
173. 952 F.2d 920, 925 (6th Cir. 1991).
174. See Capozzi, 980 F.2d at 874-75.
175. See id. The 3M court dismissed the holding in Capozzi on the ground that the
Capozzi court failed to consider that the word “enforcement” had been added to the
statute in 1948; the 3M court reasoned that if it accepted the Capozzi court’s view of
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did not bar the assessment of tax penalties by the agency and that
such penalties could be assessed at any time.176 Moreover, all three
decisions found that Congress had provided a different limitation
period to apply to a court action to collect the penalties at issue once
penalties were assessed.177
In United States v. Meyer178 and Department of Labor v. Old Ben Coal
Co.,179 the courts considered situations in which the administrative
proceedings that assessed penalties had commenced less than five
years after the violations.180 In each case, the penalties were not paid
voluntarily, collection actions were brought more than five years after
the violations, and the defendants contended that § 2462 barred the
court proceedings.181 In Old Ben, the court first held that § 2462 did
not apply to the district court proceeding because liability had been

“enforcement,” then § 2462 “would not apply even to federal court actions to
determine penalties.” 3M Co. v. Browner, 17 F.3d 1453, 1459 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
Moreover, the 3M court found that the assessment of tax penalties was materially
different from penalty assessments under other statutes because the IRS assessment
process was not a formal proceeding. See id. at 1459 n.11. The reasoning of the 3M
court is flawed. As demonstrated earlier, supra Part I.B.4, the 3M court failed to
consider that the 1839 Act version measured the five-year limitation period from
“when the penalty or forfeiture accrued,” which implies that the penalty must exist
and be due and owing in order for the claim to “accrue.” See id. at 1462.
Furthermore, holding that § 2462 applies only to actions for previously assessed
penalties does not necessarily mean that § 2462 would not apply to any federal court
action to determine liability for penalties. See id. at 1459. As discussed in Part III of
this Article, § 2462 would apply to such actions if they were like debt actions, that is,
if they sought penalties that had been assessed by an agency or if the statute provided
no agency role and the penalties were fixed by statute. Finally, if § 2462 applied to
administrative proceedings, there would be no basis for limiting it to formal ones, so
the Capozzi decision and others holding that § 2462 does not apply to administrative
assessment of tax penalties may not be distinguished on that basis. The APA, which
had recently been enacted when the 1948 Act was adopted, see Part I.B.3.a, defined
“agency proceeding” to include “any agency process defined” in other subsections as
rulemaking, adjudication or licensing proceedings. See 5 U.S.C. § 551(12) (1994).
Furthermore, the APA includes both “formal and informal proceedings” within the
category of adjudication. See ADMINISTRATIVE SOURCEBOOK, supra note 76, at 3
(noting that the APA provides for both formal and informal adjudication by federal
agencies and that “informal adjudication” is “by far the most prevalent form of
governmental action”).
176. See Mullikin, 952 F.2d at 929 (finding that the district court erred by applying
§ 2462 to the administrative assessment of penalties); Lamb, 977 F.2d at 1297 (noting
the lack of any congressionally expressed limitation period).
177. None of these three cases was concerned with the procedures of distraint or
distress under which penalties could be assessed and collected without any court
involvement.
178. 808 F.2d 912 (1st Cir. 1987).
179. 676 F.2d 259 (7th Cir. 1982).
180. See Meyer, 808 F.2d at 913 (stating that the violations occurred in 1978 and the
administrative proceeding was initiated in 1981); Old Ben, 676 F.2d at 260 (stating
that the violations had occurred in 1973 and the administrative proceeding was
commenced in 1974).
181. See Meyer, 808 F.2d at 913; Old Ben, 676 F.2d. at 260.
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determined administratively.182 In an alternative holding, however,
the court concluded that if § 2462 applied to the proceeding the fiveyear period was triggered by the administrative decision imposing the
penalty, not by the violation.183
In Meyer, the court noted in dicta that the government had
stipulated that § 2462 applied to the initiation of the underlying
administrative proceeding (to impose penalties on the respondent
under the Export Administration Act for furnishing boycott
information to Saudi Arabia) and conceded that the administrative
proceeding would have been barred if it had not been brought within
five years of the occurrence of the regulatory violations.184 The court
expressed doubt about the government’s concession, stating that “the
analytical underpinnings of this interpretation seem somewhat
wobbly.”185 The court noted, however, that the issue did not need to
be resolved because the administrative proceeding had been initiated
within five years of the violation.186 The Meyer court then analyzed the
plain language of § 2462 and concluded that: (1) a claim to
“enforce” an administrative penalty cannot be brought until there is a
penalty and “‘a suit may be maintained thereon’”187 and (2) that the
five-year limitation period was triggered by the administrative
imposition of the penalty.188
182. The court proceeding was a petition filed by the Department of Labor under
a provision of the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969 “for
enforcement” of an administrative order assessing Old Ben Coal Company $4200 in
penalties for violations of the Act. See Old Ben, 676 F.2d at 260 (explaining the
background of the proceedings). The court held that § 2462 did not apply at all to
the proceedings because the agency’s petition was in the nature of a collection
action. See id. at 261 (believing that the only issue in the district court was the
amount of the penalty and therefore, that § 2462 did not apply).
183. See id. at 261 (concluding that even if § 2462 were applicable, the district
court was still in error because the statute of limitation cannot commence until the
agency has the right to bring an action and that a claim has not accrued until the
administrative proceeding is over, the penalty is assessed, and the violator has not
paid within the time prescribed). Because the administrative proceeding had been
brought less than five years after the violations, the Old Ben court had no reason to
consider specifically whether § 2462 applied to the initiation of the administrative
proceeding in which the penalties had been assessed.
184. See Meyer, 808 F.2d at 914.
185. Id.
186. See id. The government’s stipulation in Meyer regarding § 2462 is not binding
on the government in other cases and should not preclude a government agency
from litigating the issue in another case. See supra note 20 and accompanying text
(citing cases standing for the proposition that the government is not estopped from
making in subsequent cases arguments it failed to raise or conceded away in earlier
ones).
187. See Meyer, 808 F.2d at 914 (quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 19 (5th ed.
1979)).
188. See id. at 915 (reasoning that it would be illogical for a claim to accrue prior
to the time a penalty could be enforced, meaning collected in a court action).
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In making this determination, the Meyer court considered and
rejected189 the reasoning behind the contrary holding of the Fifth
Circuit in United States v. Core Laboratories, Inc.190 In Core, the court
held that § 2462 barred the government’s action in district court to
enforce a civil penalty, previously imposed administratively under the
Export Administration Act, which the defendant had refused to
pay.191 The administrative proceeding had commenced a little over a
year after the statutory violations.192 The Fifth Circuit barred the
court action to compel payment because the action was commenced
more than five years after the violations had occurred.193 In other
words, Core required that the agency discover the violations, initiate
an administrative action, complete deliberation, issue an
administrative decision, and bring suit in court to collect any penalties—all
within five years from the date of the offense.194 The Meyer court
concluded that the reasoning in Core was unpersuasive and “created a
wretched sort of anomaly” in which the statute of limitation could
expire before the right to sue arose.195 The Meyer court also relied on
the Supreme Court’s decision in Crown Coat Front Co. v. United
States,196 which held that a claim subject to mandatory administrative
proceedings before court action could be initiated did not accrue
until the conclusion of the administrative proceedings.197
Accordingly, the Meyer court concluded that the Crown Coat opinion,
by analogy, supported its holding that the claim under § 2462 first
would accrue when the administrative decision assessing the penalties
was final and the penalties were actionable in court.198
189. See id. at 914-22 (discussing the legislative history of § 2462 and various cases
upon which the court relied to reach its determination).
190. 759 F.2d 480 (5th Cir. 1985).
191. See id. at 483 (holding that the statute of limitation had run out before the
government attempted to enforce its penalty in court).
192. See id. at 481 (noting that the administrative proceedings began 13 months
after the last violation).
193. See id. at 483.
194. See id. (reasoning that to do otherwise would give the government too much
control). The Core court misread cases that it relied on in arguing that the date of
the violation was the date when the claim first accrued. See Meyer, 808 U.S. at 913
(finding that the relevant case law regarding § 2462 led to a result directly contrary
to that reached by the Core court). None of the cases cited by the Core court made
the holdings the Core court attributed to them; at most, some of those cases
mentioned in dicta the assumption that § 2462 began to run on the date of the
violation, but most did not even do that. See infra Appendix C (discussing cases cited
by the Core court to support its holding that under § 2462 the date of the violation
was the date the “claim first accrued”).
195. See Meyer, 808 U.S. at 917.
196. 386 U.S. 503 (1967).
197. See id. at 522 (holding that the right to bring a civil action accrued after a
final ruling from the administrative board).
198. See Meyer, 808 F.2d at 918-19.
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It is apparent that a penalty or forfeiture cannot accrue twice—
once when the violation of law occurs and again when the penalty is
imposed or assessed. Both the Meyer and Old Ben cases concluded
that where the substantive statute entrusts to an administrative agency
the assessment of the penalty, § 2462’s limitation period is triggered
by the later event—the imposition of the penalty—and not by the
violation of the substantive statute.199 That conclusion compels the
inference that § 2462 does not apply to administrative proceedings.
Those proceedings occur prior to the agency’s decision assessing a
penalty, which is the event the Meyer and Old Ben courts hold to be
the triggering event that begins the running of the limitation period.200
In addition to the five circuit court decisions discussed above and
two subsequent district court opinions that have followed the
reasoning of the Meyer court,201 another district court, in an earlier
case, reasoned independently that § 2462 did not apply to an
administrative proceeding to assess a penalty, but that the limitation
period might apply to an action in court to collect a penalty. In The
A/S Glittre v. Dill,202 the Southern District of New York affirmed a
Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, which held that an
administrative proceeding to assess a statutory penalty, commenced
over six years after the underlying violation, was not barred by
§ 2462.203 The BIA distinguished between a suit to collect a fine and a
formal finding that a fine should be imposed.204 The Glittre court
agreed with the BIA holding, but stated that a suit by the government
in court to collect the penalty “may, however, be barred by the
running of the applicable statute of limitations contained in
28 U.S.C. § 2462.”205
Thus, the 3M holding that an administrative proceeding in which a
penalty or forfeiture may be imposed is subject to § 2462, and must
be brought within five years of the date of the statutory violation, is
199. See id. at 914 (opining that the five-year limitation period began when the
agency assessed a penalty); United States Dep’t of Labor v. Old Ben Coal Co.,
676 F.2d 259, 261 (7th Cir. 1982) (same).
200. Two district courts have followed the reasoning in Meyer. See United States v.
McIntyre, 779 F. Supp. 119, 122 (S.D. Iowa 1991) (involving a suit by the United
States to collect civil money penalties from bank official who violated FDIC order);
United States v. McCune, 763 F. Supp. 916, 918 (S.D. Ohio 1989) (involving a suit by
the United States to recover civil money penalties for violation of Surface Mining
Control and Reclamation Act).
201. See supra note 200.
202. 152 F. Supp. 934 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
203. See id. at 940 (holding that the statute creating the penalty at issue did not
require that the agency assess the penalty within a time limit).
204. See id. at 937.
205. See id. at 940 (emphasis added).
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not well supported. A significant body of case law in the federal
courts strongly supports the conclusion that § 2462 does not apply to
administrative proceedings—the same conclusion that is supported
by the plain language of § 2462 and by its legislative and historic
context.206
C. There Would be No Anomaly In Interpreting § 2462 to Apply to Court
Proceedings That Assess and/or Determine Liability For Penalties But Not to
Administrative Proceedings That Do So
Courts have recognized that when Congress chooses to create a
statutory scheme in which liability for violations is determined in
administrative proceedings the rights of the accused and the
procedures used may differ from those applicable to determinations
made in court. In Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health
Review Commission,207 the Supreme Court held that there was no right
to a jury trial in an administrative proceeding in which liability for a
civil monetary penalty was determined, despite the Court’s
assumption that if Congress assigned the same liability-determining
function to a court, the right to jury trial would attach.208
The Court reasoned that when Congress creates “new statutory
‘public rights,’” it may assign the fact-finding function and initial
adjudication of liability for monetary penalties to an administrative
forum, where a jury trial is not available.209 Similarly, the Court has
held that hearsay evidence, generally not admissible in court
proceedings, is admissible in proceedings before administrative
agencies.210 These holdings are consistent with the interpretation that
§ 2462 does not apply to the initiation of administrative proceedings
to determine liability for penalties and penalty amounts, even if it
206. See supra Parts I.B.2-4.
207. 430 U.S. 442 (1977).
208. See id. at 455. Later, in Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412 (1987), the Court
declared the right to a jury trial in court proceedings to determine liability for a civil
monetary penalty. See id. at 425.
209. See Atlas Roofing, 430 U.S. at 455. This was true, the Court stated, at least
under schemes that provided for some oversight by the courts. See id. at 455 n.13
(declining to rule on whether Congress may provide for an agency to adjudicate
rights without any court involvement at any stage). The statutory scheme at issue in
Atlas Roofing provided that the administrative determination was subject to
substantial evidence review in a court of appeals. See id. Furthermore, although not
noted by the Court, judicial involvement was required before actual collection of the
penalty could occur—that is, similar to the statute involved in the 3M case, the
statute at issue in Atlas Roofing provided that to collect the penalty amount after it was
no longer subject to review, the Secretary of Labor must bring a civil action in federal
court to reduce the penalty to a court judgment and enforce payment. See id. at 447.
210. See Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 402 (1971) (holding that hearsay may
constitute substantial evidence in a social security disability claim hearing).
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applies to all court proceedings making similar determinations.
As discussed in Part III of this Article, however, the plain language,
history, and context of § 2462 strongly suggest that it does not apply
to all court proceedings in which a civil monetary penalty is sought.
Rather, § 2462 should apply only to those court proceedings of the
kind that existed when the 1839 Act version of § 2462 was adopted,
i.e., proceedings in the nature of a debt action or forfeiture
proceeding to collect a penalty deemed to be due and payable.
II. THE 3M AND JOHNSON DECISIONS WERE DECIDED INCORRECTLY
A. The 3M Decision is Wrong
In 3M, the D.C. Circuit reviewed a decision by the EPA Chief
Judicial Officer to affirm the decision of an administrative law judge
(“ALJ”), who had previously determined that § 2462 did not apply to
the administrative proceeding to assess a penalty.212 Before the circuit
court, the EPA chose to abandon this argument and declined to
defend that aspect of the ALJ’s decision.213 The court, presented only
with the petitioner’s arguments against the agency decision, reversed
the EPA and held that § 2462 applied to administrative
proceedings.214 The court’s reasoning and conclusion, however, are
erroneous.
211

1.

The court erroneously places the burden on the government to demonstrate
that the five-year time limitation does not apply to administrative
proceedings
In deciding that § 2462 applied to administrative proceedings, the
3M court failed to consider the important principle that government
suits are not time barred when brought to protect the public interest,
unless Congress specifically provided for such a time limitation.215
Rather than require an affirmative showing that Congress clearly
intended § 2462 to apply to administrative proceedings, the court
211. 17 F.3d 1453 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
212. See id. at 1455. The ALJ relied primarily on the fact that § 2462 appears in
Title 28 of the Code, which concerns the judiciary. See id. at 1456. The ALJ did not
consider the argument made in this Article, see supra Part I.A-B, based on the fact
that § 2462 was enacted as part of a statute designed to revise and reenact code
provisions concerning the courts and the judiciary, nor did the ALJ rely on the
history and context of § 2462 that is developed in this Article.
213. See 3M, 17 F.3d at 1457 (noting that the EPA chose not to argue in support of
the ALJ’s decision regarding § 2462’s inapplicability to administrative proceedings).
214. See id. (rejecting a court-agency dichotomy in applying § 2462).
215. See supra notes 33-47 and accompanying text (discussing principle that a
statute of limitation applies to the government only if Congress expressly so
provides).
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took the opposite approach and questioned whether there were
reasons why Congress would not have intended for the five-year
limitation to apply to administrative proceedings.216
The court concluded that it could see no reason not to apply the
five-year limitation to administrative proceedings. The court referred
to “the reasons why we have statutes of limitations,” identifying those
reasons as the inevitable loss of evidence, memories, and witnesses
over time, and a defendant’s asserted right to “be secure in his
reasonable expectation that the slate has been wiped clean” after
sufficient passage of time.217 The court concluded that these reasons
for imposing a time limitation applied equally to administrative and
court proceedings.218 The 3M court failed, however, to recognize that
courts have articulated these reasons for statutes of limitation
primarily in cases concerning private litigants and that, nevertheless,
the Supreme Court has continued to follow the rule that no time
limitation applies to the government when it acts in its sovereign
capacity, unless Congress clearly imposed a limitation.219 As the
Supreme Court noted in Costello v. United States,220 a proceeding to
revoke the naturalization of an individual based on events twentyseven years earlier, the lapse of time made the government’s burden
more difficult and did not violate the respondent’s rights absent an
affirmative showing of prejudice.221
2.

The court misconstrues Supreme Court law regarding statutes of
limitation on government actions in the public interest
Although the 3M court failed to consider the principle that there
must be clear intent to bind the government to a time limitation, the
court did mention the related rule that statutes of limitation that
apply to the government must strictly be construed in its favor.222 The
court brushed this rule aside, however, in favor of what it discerned
to be “another Supreme Court maxim, older still, a maxim
specifically relating to actions for penalties and one pointing in quite
216. See 3M, 17 F.3d at 1456 (stating, with respect to the question of whether the
limitation period applies to administrative proceedings, “[w]e wonder why not”).
217. See id. at 1457.
218. See id.
219. See supra notes 33-47 and accompanying text.
220. 365 U.S. 265 (1961); see also supra notes 38-43 and accompanying text.
221. See Costello, 365 U.S. at 283 (“[A]ny harm from the lapse of time was to the
Government’s case. . . . We cannot say, moreover, that the delay denied the
petitioner fundamental fairness.”).
222. See 3M, 17 F.3d at 1457 (citing Badaracco v. Commissioner, 464 U.S. 386, 391
(1984)). For example, in Badaracco, the Court interpreted a tax statute as allowing
the government to prosecute a taxpayer for fraud at any time. See Badaracco, 464 U.S.
at 396; see also supra note 44 and accompanying text.
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the opposite direction.”223 The court then quoted out of context the
following sentence from Adams, qui tam v. Woods:224 “In a country
where not even treason can be prosecuted, after a lapse of three
years, it could scarcely be supposed, that an individual would remain
for ever liable to a pecuniary forfeiture.”225
The 3M decision fails to explain what the court believed the
Supreme Court meant by the quoted sentence from Adams—a
sentence that in Adams is not accompanied by any explanation or
citation of authority.226 The 3M court’s reliance on the statement
suggests that the court assumed that the Supreme Court had
established a sweeping presumption that some time limitation must
apply to any action or proceeding that might result in penalties or
forfeitures. That cannot be what the Supreme Court meant by its
statement in Adams, however, because the long-established rule was
just the opposite. As discussed at the outset of the Article,227 the
common law “fixed no time as to the bringing of actions,”228 and time
limitation periods were set in statutes that did not apply to the
government unless that result was clearly intended.229 This principle
was established long before the 1805 decision in Adams,230 and no
exception to the general principle existed for actions for penalties.231
There never was any common law principle mandating a time
limitation on the collection of a fine, penalty, or forfeiture, any more
than there was a principle requiring a time limitation to initiate an
indictment for treason. Accordingly, the 3M court’s apparent
interpretation of the quoted sentence in Adams is inconsistent with
settled law.232
223. 3M, 17 F.3d at 1457.
224. 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 336, 342 (1805) (holding that the statute of limitation in
the 1790 ancestor of § 2462 applied to a debt action by a private individual to recover
monetary penalties imposed under a statute prohibiting slave trading).
225. 3M, 17 F.3d at 1457 (citing Adams, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) at 342).
226. See Adams, 6 U.S. at 342.
227. See supra notes 36-43 and accompanying text.
228. See supra notes 34-37 and accompanying text.
229. See supra notes 33-37 and accompanying text (noting that at common law the
king was never included in statutes of limitation “unless expressly named”).
230. See supra notes 33-36 and accompanying text (discussing English common law
prior to American independence).
231. See supra notes 33-36, 41 and accompanying text.
232. The Supreme Court has quoted from that particular passage in Adams in only
five opinions. Three of the cases involved suits by private individuals for damages
under federal statutes that created their right to sue but did not set time limitations
on those suits. The Court quotes the Adams language in these three cases essentially
to bolster its conclusion that no federal policy will be violated by applying to those
private damage claims either a state limitation period or a limitation period from
another federal statute. See Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assoc., Inc.,
483 U.S. 143, 156 (1987) (applying the Clayton Act limitation period to a civil suit
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The quoted sentence comes at the end of Chief Justice Marshall’s
opinion in Adams and, read in context, cannot reasonably be said to
have the meaning the 3M court seems to have ascribed to it. Adams
involved a debt action brought to collect a $2,000 penalty specified by
statute as being forfeited by a person who engaged in the slave
trade.233 The only issues in the case were whether the two-year time
limitation period in the 1790 Act version of § 2462, which concededly
barred a proceeding to collect the penalty if initiated by indictment
or information, also barred a debt action for the same penalty and, if
so, whether the 1790 Act applied to statutory penalties enacted after
that date.234
Earlier in the opinion, the Adams court had reasoned that debt
actions for penalties must be time limited by the 1790 Act because if
they were not, then the Act’s time limitation would be a virtual
nullity. The Court stated:
Almost every fine or forfeiture under a penal statute, may be
recovered by an action of debt as well as by information; and to
declare that the information was barred while the action of debt
was left without limitation, would be to attribute a capriciousness
on this subject to the legislature, which could not be accounted

under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”)); Wilson v.
Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 271 (1985) (applying the state tort limitation period to a
42 U.S.C. § 1983 damages claim); Campbell v. City of Haverill, 155 U.S. 610, 616-17
(1895) (applying the state tort limitation period to a patent infringement suit). The
other two cases in which the Supreme Court has relied on the passage from Adams
quoted by the 3M court are pre-1948 criminal contempt prosecutions in which the
Court decided the issue of whether the three-year time limitation period for noncapital criminal prosecutions, then found in R.S. § 1044, applied. The Court quotes
the language from Adams in the course of refuting the government’s argument that
the prosecutions, both commenced more than three years after the conduct, were
not really criminal in nature and, therefore, were not barred by R.S. § 1044. See
Pendergast v. United States, 317 U.S. 412, 418 (1943); Gompers v. United States,
233 U.S. 604, 612-13 (1914).
It is worth noting that both Chief Justice Rehnquist and Associate Justice Scalia
have indicated in dissenting opinions their awareness that the language in Adams
quoted by the 3M court either is not applicable to the United States in its sovereign
capacity or that the language does not have the broad meaning the 3M court
attributes to it. See Agency Holding Corp., 483 U.S. at 170 n.5 (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(noting that the quoted language in Adams was relied on in the 1805 case only “as a
reason why [the Court] should interpret an arguably ambiguous [statute of
limitation] to apply to the claim at issue”); Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. EEOC, 432 U.S.
355, 375-76 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting Adams to support the
argument that in “any case not involving the United States in its sovereign capacity” a
time limitation period should apply).
233. See Adams, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) at 336. Perhaps because a private party brought
the suit in Adams, the Supreme Court did not discuss the principle of nullum tempus
occurrit regi (“time does not run against the king”). See generally supra notes 33-47 and
accompanying text.
234. See Adams, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) at 340.
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235

for[.]

The Court also decided, before making the statement quoted by the
3M court, that the 1790 Act applied not only to forfeitures in statutes
already existing in 1790, but also to those created afterward, stating
that “the words of the [1790] [A]ct of Congress plainly apply to all
fines and forfeitures under any penal act, whenever that act might
pass.”236
In context, the Supreme Court’s final statement,237 the sentence
quoted in 3M,238 seems to be no more than a reference to the
fundamental principle discussed in Part I.B.1, i.e., the rule that a
statute must be interpreted as a whole. The Court appears to be
pointing out the incongruity that would result if the Court were to
interpret the 1790 Act to permit debt actions to collect penalties to
be brought at any time, when the statute clearly limited prosecutions
for the serious crime of treason to three years after the offense.239
The 1790 Act set forth the limitation periods for all federal criminal
prosecutions in a single section, including a three-year time
limitation on prosecutions for “treason or other capital offence”
(except murder and forgery) and a two-year time limitation on
prosecutions for “any offence, not capital” or “for any fine or
forfeiture under any penal statute.”240 The Court’s observation with
respect to treason makes sense only as a reference to the need to
interpret the statute to be internally consistent. Because the serious
crime of treason could not be prosecuted after three years, “it could
scarcely be supposed” that under the same section of the same statute
a defendant would “remain for ever liable” for a pecuniary penalty, a
sanction imposed for a much less serious crime than treason.241
Further, the Court’s statement about the limitation period for
prosecutions for treason seems to be an aside, after the Court has
already resolved the two issues present in the Adams case.242 It should
235. Id. at 341.
236. See id. at 342.
237. See id. (discussing the statute of limitation for treason).
238. The sentence from Adams quoted by the 3M court is: “In a country where not
even treason can be prosecuted, after a lapse of three years, it could scarcely be
supposed, that an individual would remain for ever liable to a pecuniary forfeiture.”
3M Co. v. Browner, 17 F.3d 1454, 1457 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (quoting Adams, 6 U.S. (2
Cranch) at 342, miscited as 341).
239. See id.
240. See Act of Apr. 30, 1790, ch. 10, § 32, 1 Stat. 119.
241. See Adams, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) at 342.
242. See id. (noting that the two issues were whether the limitation applied to debt
actions as well as to criminal prosecutions and whether it applied to penalties
enacted after the 1790 Act). One is tempted to speculate that perhaps the Court’s
statement in Adams was intended to express dismay at the fact that the statute set
such a short time limitation, only three years, on prosecutions for treason.
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be noted that Congress later abolished the time limitation on
indictments for treason, and a defendant now, in the words of the
Adams opinion, “remain[s] for ever liable” for that crime.243 Thus,
under current law, deciding that actions for penalties could be
brought without time limitation would no longer result in the
inconsistency in statutory interpretation that concerned the Supreme
Court in Adams in 1805.
3.

The court construes § 2462 in isolation and relies on unpersuasive
authorities
In its analysis of whether § 2462 applies to administrative
proceedings, the 3M court also violated the cardinal principle of
statutory construction—to interpret the statute as a whole, in the
context of both history and other relevant statutes. Instead, the court
interpreted the words “action or proceeding” in isolation and
reached the obvious conclusion that an administrative proceeding is
a “proceeding.”244 Although that is true, it begs the relevant
question—are administrative proceedings the type of proceedings to
which Congress referred in § 2462? As demonstrated earlier in this
Article, when the plain language of § 2462 is read in context, the
word “proceeding” in that section clearly means a court
proceeding,245 such as a libel proceeding in admiralty.
In addition to relying on the literal meaning of “proceeding,” out
of context, the 3M court relied on other authorities to support its
holding that § 2462 applies to administrative proceedings, none of
which are persuasive. First, the court relied on the government’s
stipulation in Meyer that § 2462 applied to the initiation of the
administrative proceeding.246 As discussed earlier, however, the
government’s stipulation in Meyer is neither binding nor persuasive.247
The 3M court then relied on three cases that it believed “assumed,
243. See 18 U.S.C. § 3281 (1994) (allowing indictments for capital offenses without
any time limitation); 18 U.S.C. § 2381 (1994) (providing that treason is punishable
by death).
244. See 3M, 17 F.3d at 1457 (“[W]e have held, an administrative proceeding . . . is
an action, suit, or proceeding.”) (citations omitted).
245. See supra Part I.B.2 (arguing that the statute by its terms applies to judicial
proceedings and that nothing in the statute suggests that Congress meant anything
other than court proceedings).
246. See 3M, 17 F.3d at 1455-56 (noting that in Meyer the government had “agreed”
that § 2462 required that the administrative proceeding be commenced within five
years of the offense).
247. See supra Part I.B.5 (observing that the Meyer court found the government’s
stipulation to be based on “wobbly” analysis and that the stipulation concerned an
issue not before the court because the administrative proceeding had been
commenced less than five years after the offense, and arguing that, in any event, the
stipulation is not binding on the government in other cases).
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without discussion, that § 2462 covers administrative penalty
proceedings.”248 In fact, only two of the cases made this assumption
and, because it was merely an assumption, they are no more
persuasive than the government concession in Meyer.249 The third
case actually came to the opposite conclusion, holding that an
administrative proceeding to assess a penalty was not subject to
§ 2462.250
The 3M court further buttressed its assertion that § 2462 applied to
administrative proceedings with two 1965 congressional committee
reports on unrelated legislation that also assumed without discussion
that § 2462 applied to administrative as well as judicial proceedings.251
Even if these congressional committees had actually considered the
issue, their views should have little, if any, value. The Supreme Court
often cautions that “the views of a subsequent Congress form a
hazardous basis for inferring the intent of an earlier one.”252
248. 3M, 17 F.3d at 1456 (citing Williams v. United States Dep’t of Transp.,
781 F.2d 1573, 1578 n.8 (11th Cir. 1986); H.P. Lambert Co. v. Secretary of the
Treasury, 354 F.2d 819, 822 (1st Cir. 1965); The A/S Glittre v. Dill, 152 F. Supp. 934,
940 (S.D.N.Y. 1957)).
249. In Williams, the court, in rejecting the claim that laches barred a Coast Guard
administrative action for a monetary penalty where notice of the charges was issued
four months after the violation, merely commented that four months was “well
within the five-year statute of limitations.” See Williams, 781 F.2d at 1578 n.8. H.P.
Lambert was later overruled, as discussed below, and relied on obviously flawed
reasoning. The case involved a petition for review of a decision by the Secretary of
the Treasury to revoke the petitioner’s customhouse broker’s license. See H.P.
Lambert, 354 F.2d at 822. The substantive statute expressly provided that the agency
could “at any time, for good and sufficient reasons, serve notice in writing upon any
customhouse broker . . . to show cause why said license [should] not be revoked[.]”
Id. (emphasis added) (quoting 19 U.S.C. § 1641 (current version at 19 U.S.C.
§ 1641(d) (1994 & Supp. 1998)). Yet, the court held that § 2462 applied and barred
the administrative proceeding because it was commenced more than five years after
most of the relevant events. See id. (“[T]he general policy of a statute of limitations is
so deeply ingrained in our legal system that a period of limitation made generally
applicable to such proceedings, such as § 2462, is not to be avoided unless that
purpose is made manifestly clear.”). Lambert was later implicitly overruled when the
Supreme Court held that the term “at any time” in another statute meant that no
statute of limitation applied. See United States v. Badaracco, 464 U.S. 386, 396
(1984) (holding that the IRS’s authority to assess a tax “at any time” meant that no
statute of limitation was intended under the Act).
250. See Glittre, 152 F. Supp. at 940; see also supra notes 202-05 and accompanying
text (discussing the Glittre case).
251. See 3M, 17 F.3d at 1456 (noting that the committee reports (cited, criticized,
and rejected by the Meyer court) concerned “unrelated legislation” and “assumed”
that § 2462 is applicable to administrative as well as judicial proceedings).
252. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 114 (1989) (quoting
United States v. Price, 361 U.S. 304, 313 (1960)); see also California Div. of Labor
Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Const., 519 U.S. 316, 332 n.8 (1997) (same);
O’Gilvie v. United States, 519 U.S. 79, 90 (1996) (same); United States v. Estate of
Romani, 523 U.S. 517, 536 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“[T]he will of a later
Congress that a law enacted by an earlier Congress should bear a particular meaning
is of no effect whatever.”).
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Unsupported assumptions of a subsequent Congress are obviously
even less useful in discerning congressional intent.
4.

The 3M court mistakenly rejects the government’s argument that § 2462
applies only to actions for the “enforcement” of a penalty
The 3M decision also rejected the government’s contention that
§ 2462 applied only to actions for the “enforcement” of a penalty and
not to those brought to assess a penalty.253 Both the court and the
parties treated this contention as a different question than the “courtagency dichotomy”254 the court had already rejected. But in the
context of the 3M case it was actually the same question. If the EPA
was correct that “‘enforcement’ connotes an action to collect a
penalty already imposed”255 that, in effect, would mean § 2462 would
not apply to administrative proceedings because those proceedings
“assess” penalties, either formally or informally, and are a preliminary
step necessary before an action to “enforce” or collect the penalty
may be brought.256 Administrative agencies generally do not have the
power to “collect” a penalty or otherwise compel compliance with
their orders without court action.257 For this reason, the Federal
Rules of Appellate Procedure provide for petitions for “enforcement”
of agency orders, meaning proceedings to obtain court judgments
embodying the orders,258 and most statutes delegating subpoena
power to administrative agencies enable the agencies to enlist court
assistance to compel witnesses to testify and to produce documents
through “subpoena enforcement” proceedings.259 Moreover, the
There are situations, unlike the one here, where a subsequent Congress in
amending the very statutory scheme at issue has stated its intent that a certain meaning be
given to a provision. In such circumstances, Congress’s subsequent statement may be
given considerable weight by a court in interpreting the statute. See Bufferd v. CIR,
506 U.S. 523, 530 n.10 (1993) (noting that “while the views of Congress engaged in
the amendment of existing law are ‘entitled to significant weight,’” in that case a
Senate Report was of little value in determining legislative intent because
circumstances indicated that the Report may have been colored by the views of the
Tax Court) (citing Seatrain Shipbuilding Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., 444 U.S. 572, 596
(1980)).
253. See 3M, 17 F.3d at 1458-59 (stating that the EPA’s reading must be rejected
because “[n]o one could have construed § 2462’s immediate predecessor to mean
what the EPA urges”).
254. See id. at 1457 (opining that it is unclear whether the EPA’s Chief Judicial
Officer relied on the court-agency dichotomy in his decision and dismissing it as an
issue because the EPA failed to raise any argument in support of it).
255. Id.
256. See supra Part I.B.4-5.
257. See supra note 23 (discussing the rare exceptions where the government may
determine liability and collect penalties in summary proceedings).
258. See FED. R. APP. P. 15(a)-(b).
259. See, e.g., ICC v. Brimson, 154 U.S. 447, 489 (1894) (holding that courts
possess constitutional authority to enforce agency subpoenas); see also, e.g., Shasta
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Supreme Court has referred to an agency-assessed penalty under one
statute as being “enforceable only [in] a subsequent judicial
proceeding”—clearly using the adjectival form of “enforce” to refer
to the function of obtaining a court judgment incorporating the
administrative order.260
To the extent the question of whether § 2462 applies only to
“enforcement” actions is distinct from the question of whether it
applies to administrative proceedings, the 3M court’s reasoning is
flawed. The court construed the word “enforcement” in isolation
and without regard to the meaning of the version of § 2462 enacted
in 1839, although later in the opinion the court acknowledges the
1839 Act language as controlling.261 In interpreting the word
“enforcement,” the court merely concluded cryptically, without
adequately considering the 1839 Act language, that “[n]o one could
have construed § 2462’s immediate predecessor to mean what EPA
urges”—i.e., that § 2462’s limitation period applied only to actions to
collect or “enforce” in a court action a penalty that had been
assessed.262
Although the 3M court stated that “no one could have construed”
the statute to apply solely to actions to collect or enforce penalties,
this view is contrary to both the plain text of the 1839 Act and the
history of the term “action for a penalty.”263 The only kind of action
Congress could have had in mind when it enacted the 1839 version of
§ 2462 was an action in debt to recover a statutorily prescribed
monetary forfeiture or a proceeding to recover a forfeiture of
property—the kinds of court proceedings to recover penalties that
existed in 1839, as discussed earlier in this Article.264 The cause of
action that existed in 1839 was one to recover or collect a sum
deemed to be due and owing or forfeited property—an “accrued”
penalty.265 Such an action could be brought only in court; its purpose
Minerals & Chem. Co. v. SEC, 328 F.2d 285, 286 (10th Cir. 1964) (same).
260. See National Indep. Coal Operators’ Ass’n v. Kleppe, 423 U.S. 388, 390 (1976)
(noting that after administrative assessment of the penalty, “the penalty [was]
enforceable only by way of a subsequent judicial proceeding in which the operator is
entitled to a trial de novo as to the amount of the penalty”) (emphasis added).
261. See 3M Co. v. Browner, 17 F.3d 1453, 1458-59, 1462 (D.C. Cir. 1994)
(concluding that “in light of the legal meaning of the word ‘accrued’ in 1839, . . . we
hold that an action, suit, or proceeding to assess or impose a civil penalty must be
commenced within five years of the date of the violation giving rise to the penalty”).
262. See id. at 1458.
263. See supra Part I.B.1-.5 (explaining that the plain language of the 1948 Act, of
which § 2462 is a part, the legislative history of the Act, and historic use of the phrase
“suit for a penalty” or “action for a penalty” all support the interpretation that § 2462
applies only to court actions to collect existing penalties and forfeitures).
264. See supra Part I.B.3-4.
265. See supra Part I.B.4, notes 122-26, 148-54 and accompanying text.
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was to reduce the debt to a court judgment or to formally condone
the seizure of forfeited property.266
The 3M court failed to consider that the word “enforcement” is
used widely in the law and has different meanings in different
contexts. “Enforcement” is used to refer to actions brought by the
prosecutorial branch of an administrative agency before the agency’s
adjudicatory body.267 However, the fact that “enforcement” is
sometimes used in that sense does not mean that in the context of
§ 2462 this is what the word means. A civil proceeding to reduce to a
court judgment a penalty set by statute is a proceeding for
“enforcement” of a penalty in a different sense—the sense of
compelling compliance, as the Supreme Court has used the term.268
The meaning of the word “enforcement” in the current version of
§ 2462 must be consistent with the context and history of the
provision, particularly the 1839 Act language, because Congress did
not intend to change the meaning of the provision when it inserted
the word “enforcement” in the 1948 Act version.269
A proceeding to reduce a penalty to a court judgment is the kind
of “suit or prosecution” that the 1839 Act intended to limit because,
as demonstrated earlier in this Article,270 that is what “suit or
prosecution . . . for [a] penalty or forfeiture” meant in 1839.
Therefore, contrary to the 3M court’s holding, the word
“enforcement” in current § 2462 should be construed consistently
with that meaning—that is, to refer to actions brought to reduce to a
court judgment a penalty of a specific amount or specific property. A
specific penalty would include one set by statute (as was common
before the twentieth century) and one determined after an
administrative assessment, either formal or informal (as Congress has
provided in most modern statutes).
The 3M court also believed that “§ 2462’s application to cases in
which the court first adjudicates liability and then sets the penalty or
fine is unquestioned” and cited numerous cases to support this
statement.271 The cited cases, however, do not support the court’s
assertion, and none considered the plain language and history of

266. See supra Part I.B.4, notes 122-26 and accompanying text.
267. See 3M, 17 F.3d at 1459 (citing case that referred to a TSCA administrative
proceeding as an “enforcement action”).
268. See supra note 260 and accompanying text.
269. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
270. See supra notes 83-132 and accompanying text.
271. See 3M, 17 F.3d at 1459 & n.12 (citing numerous circuit and district court
cases that assertedly support of this proposition).
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§ 2462 discussed and evaluated in this Article.272
Only three of the cases cited by the 3M court construed the pre1948 Act language, before Congress changed the “phraseology” in
what is now § 2462.273 Contrary to the belief of the 3M court, United
States v. Maillard274 was not a case where liability was first determined
and the court then “assessed” a penalty. Rather, Maillard involved an
action to reduce to a court judgment a forfeiture specified by
statute.275 Maillard held that the 1839 Act version of § 2462 applied to
a suit to recover the value of certain merchandise under § 66 of the
1799 customs law,276 which provided that if goods were entered on an
invoice that did not reflect their actual cost, “all such goods, wares, or
merchandise, or the value thereof . . . shall be forfeited.”277 Unlike
the provision at issue in 3M, this statute represents the type of fixed
penalty that “accrued” upon the violation and to which Congress
clearly intended the predecessor of § 2462 to apply.278 In Maillard,
the specified penalty could be sued for in court as soon as the
violation occurred.279
Carter v. New Orleans & N.E.R. Co.,280 interpreting R.S. § 1047 (the
1839 version of § 2462, as revised in 1874), was not a “case[] in which
the court first adjudicates liability and then sets the penalty or fine.”
Carter held only that if the suit at issue were one for a penalty then the
federal limitation period in R.S. § 1047 would apply, rather than the
one-year limitation period that the defendant argued barred the
suit.281
272. Contrary to the court’s interpretation, the cited cases are generally not cases
involving a determination of liability followed by a discretionary court assessment of a
penalty. See id. at 1459 n.12. Not one of the cited cases supports the court’s assertion
that § 2462 applies to administrative proceedings. There is no discussion in any of
the cases of the plain text or history of § 2462, which is essential to an accurate
understanding of the statute.
273. See United States v. Maillard, 26 F. Cas. 1140 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1871) (No.
15,709); Carter v. New Orleans & N.E.R. Co., 143 F. 99 (5th Cir. 1906); United States
v. Smith, Kline, & French Co., 184 F. 532 (E.D. Pa. 1911).
274. 26 F. Cas. 1140 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1871) (No. 15,709).
275. See id. at 1141 (stating that the government sought to recover the value of
merchandise it alleged had been forfeited, as specified in the statute, by the
defendants as the consequence of their violations of the customs law).
276. See Act of Mar. 2, 1799, ch. 22, § 66, 1 Stat. 627, 677 (1799); see also Appendix
B.
277. Maillard, 26 F. Cas. at 1141 (quoting the 1799 customs statute, cited supra
note 276).
278. See supra note 48.
279. See Maillard, 26 F. Cas. at 1141. There is no indication in Maillard whether a
dispute occurred about the value of the goods. It is possible that the value was easily
determined by an inspection or other method that called for little or no exercise of
discretion by the court.
280. 143 F. 99 (5th Cir. 1906).
281. The question before the court in Carter was whether a suit for damages by a
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United States v. Smith, Kline & French Co.282 involved a “suit in
assumpsit” to recover the sum of $1,800 specified in a statute as a
special tax on persons engaged in “rectifying, purifying, and refining
distilled spirits.”283 The court stated, without analysis, that R.S. § 1047
barred recovery “beyond five years from the date of the institution of
the suit,” a conclusion that seems questionable because the sum at
issue was a tax, not a penalty.284
The remaining cases cited by the 3M court are equally
unsupportive of its position that § 2462 “unquestionably” applies to
cases brought in court to determine liability for a penalty and to
assess the penalty. This issue simply was never considered by the
cited authorities. Both United States v. Walsh285 and Sierra Club v.
Chevron U.S.A., Inc.286 are cases in which a defendant sought to evade
liability by asserting that a time limitation period shorter than the fiveyear limitation period provided in § 2462 applied.287 If § 2462
applied, the actions were timely. In this context, both courts held
that § 2462 applied, but neither Walsh nor Sierra Club recognized or
discussed the long history and relevant context of § 2462.288
United States v. Central Soya, Inc.289 was a case in which the lower
court had held that the government’s action was barred by the threeyear time limitation on actions based on common law negligence
principles contained in 28 U.S.C. § 2415(b).290 The Central Soya court
partially disagreed with the lower court’s decision, holding that to the
extent the government sought the pecuniary penalties specified in
§ 411 of the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, the suit was not barred
under the longer time limitation period of § 2462.291 The Rivers and
private plaintiff against a common carrier under a statute requiring common carriers
to charge the same rates for “like and contemporaneous” services was barred by a
one-year state limitation period on an “action for a penalty.” See id. at 100. The
court did not decide whether the suit was one for damages—which it clearly seems to
have been, from the language of the substantive statute violated—but ruled that if
the suit were one for a penalty, then the longer federal limitation period applied
rather than the one-year state limitation. See id. at 102.
282. 184 F. 532 (E.D. Pa. 1911).
283. See id. at 532-33.
284. See id. at 534 (discussing the fact that the government sought to recover a
special tax on the distillation of alcohol for the preparation of medicinal products).
285. 8 F.3d 659 (9th Cir. 1993).
286. 834 F.2d 1517 (9th Cir. 1987).
287. See Walsh, 8 F.3d at 662 (evaluating the argument that a three-year statute of
limitation applied); Sierra Club, 834 F.2d at 1518 (same).
288. See Walsh, 8 F.3d at 662 (concluding that § 2462 applied without analysis of its
history or context); Sierra Club, 834 F.2d at 1520-23 (same).
289. 697 F.2d 165, 166 (7th Cir. 1982).
290. See id. (stating that “[t]he district court concluded that United States’ entire
action was time-barred under 28 U.S.C. § 2415(b)”).
291. See id. at 168 (citing Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, 33 U.S.C. § 412 (1994)).
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Harbors Act stated a range of penalties between $500 and $2,500,
rather than a specific amount, as did most eighteenth and
nineteenth-century statutes. In all other respects, however, the Rivers
and Harbors Act is very similar to the “transitive” type of penal statute
with which Congress was familiar in 1839, and to which the 1839
version of § 2462 was intended to apply.292 The statute is less similar
to modern statutory schemes, which authorize a civil suit based on
the violation, rather than on a debt for a specific penalty, and leave
determination of the penalty amount largely to the discretion of the
court.293
United States v. Ancorp National Services, Inc.294 involved an action
brought under the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) Act295 to
recover civil penalties for violations of a prior FTC cease and desist
order. The court assumed, without discussion, that § 2462 barred
penalties for violations that occurred more than five years before the
suit was brought.296 The other cases cited by the 3M court are all
district court or Court of Claims decisions that either contain no
discussion of the history and context of § 2462, or merely refer to
§ 2462 in dicta.297
292. See supra Part I.B.3 (expanding upon the purpose and effects of the 1839 Act
provision).
293. See infra Part III. The Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899 has been amended and
now provides for fines of up to $25,000 per day for the obstruction of navigable
waterways. See 33 U.S.C. § 411 (1994).
294. 516 F.2d 198 (2d Cir. 1975).
295. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(l) (1970).
296. See Ancorp Nat’l Servs., 516 F.2d at 201 n.5 (stating that “recovery for violations
based on payments allegedly received prior to December 31, 1965 is barred by the
five-year statute of limitations applicable to civil penalty actions”).
297. Several of these remaining decisions cited by the 3M court apply § 2462
rather than a shorter time limitation period and find the actions timely; others bar
recovery of only some of the penalties sought, so the wrongdoer is not absolved of all
sanctions; still others simply assume that § 2462 applies; and, finally, some involve
mandatory, unilaterally imposed statutory penalties recoverable in court actions,
actions of the type Congress intended to limit. See, e.g., Erie Basin Metal Prod., Inc. v.
United States, 150 F. Supp. 561, 564 (Ct. Cl. 1957) (holding that § 2462 barred the
government’s counterclaim for double damages under the Contract Settlement Act);
FTC v. Bonnie & Co. Fashions, Inc., No. 90-4454 (HLS), 1992 WL 314007, at *8 n.8
(D.N.J. Sept. 22, 1992) (stating that the action was timely if § 2462 applied, and then
holding that it applied, rather than a shorter time limitation period urged by
defendant); United States v. Island Park, 791 F. Supp. 354, 367-68 (E.D.N.Y. 1992)
(holding that § 2462 barred imposition of monetary penalty, but not injunctive relief
and declaratory judgment, in action brought under the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C.
3614(a), where facts showed the government had long been aware of violations but
failed to take action); United States v. C. & R. Trucking, 537 F. Supp. 1080, 1083
(N.D. W. Va. 1982) (holding that an action to assess monetary penalty under the
Clean Water Act was timely under § 2462); FTC v. Lukens Steel Co., 454 F. Supp.
1182, 1185 n.2 (D.D.C. 1978) (assuming without discussion that § 2462 barred
recovery of civil penalties prescribed in the FTC Act for defendant’s alleged
violations of prior FTC order that occurred more than five years earlier); United
States v. Fraser, 156 F. Supp. 144, 147-49 (D. Mont. 1957) (holding that under one
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5.

The court errs in holding that the five-year time limitation period in
§ 2462 is triggered by the violation, regardless of the government’s
knowledge
The third and final error in the 3M decision is the holding that the
five-year time limitation period is triggered by the violation of law
that gave rise to the imposition of a penalty, irrespective of whether
the government knew of the violation—and even if the violator had
taken steps to conceal the conduct.298 In this respect, the court
viewed the 1839 Act version of the statue as controlling,299 but then
failed to consider that under the 1839 version it was the accrual of the
penalty or forfeiture that triggered the five-year period, not the
violation. The 3M court relied on the holding in United States v. Core
Laboratories Inc.,300 as well as cases cited in Core, for the proposition
that in interpreting § 2462 the date of violation has long been
accepted “without question as the date when the claim first
accrued.”301 The reasoning of Core, however, is unpersuasive and
leads to the anomaly that an agency would have only one five-year
period from the date of violation to initiate an administrative
proceeding, complete all review proceedings, and bring a collection
proceeding in court.302 Furthermore, as demonstrated in Appendix
C, infra, the majority of the cases that the Core court relied on either
fail to support its conclusion or were wrongly decided. Finally, the
3M court also inexplicably failed to recognize the well-established
“discovery rule,” under which a cause of action does not accrue until
the plaintiff discovers, or reasonably should have discovered, the facts
count of nine-count complaint, § 2462 barred recovery of statutory $1 per head
penalty for grazing cattle on Indian lands, prescribed in 25 U.S.C. § 179, but
permitting recovery of the same penalty under counts two through five of the
complaint), aff’d, 261 F.2d 282 (9th Cir. 1958) (not discussing § 2462); United States
v. Covollo, 136 F. Supp. 107, 108-09 n.2 (E.D. Pa. 1955) (holding that action under
Surplus Property Act was timely under § 2462). It should be noted with regard to the
last case cited, the Covollo case, that in Rex Trailer Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 148,
(1956), the Supreme Court held that § 2462 does not apply to actions under the
Surplus Property Act because the Act provides for liquidated damages, not penalties.
298. See 3M Co. v. Browner, 17 F.3d 1453, 1460-63 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (analyzing the
meaning of § 2462’s language “unless commenced within five years from the date
when the claim first accrued”).
299. See id. at 1458.
300. 759 F.2d 480, 483 (5th Cir. 1985); see supra note 68 and accompanying text;
see also Appendix C (discussing cases relied on in Core).
301. 3M, 17 F.3d at 1462 (adopting the Fifth Circuit’s view that precedent “clearly
demonstrates” that under § 2462 the date of the underlying violation is the date
upon which the statute of limitation begins to run).
302. See supra notes 124-26 and accompanying text (discussing the Meyer court’s
analysis of the faulty logic of the Core decision). This result would give the
respondent a strong incentive to draw out the administrative process in hopes of
running out the limitation period for bringing the court action, which is an
unreasonable result Congress could not have intended.
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that form the basis for the action.303
B. The Johnson Decision Is Wrong in Applying § 2462 to the Suspension of
a Professional License
Even if § 2462 did apply to the initiation of administrative
proceedings, Johnson v. SEC304 was mistaken in its conclusion that in
§ 2462 the word “penalty” refers to non-monetary sanctions or
remedies such as a professional license suspension.305 It is true that
the meaning of the word “penalty” in appropriate contexts may
include any “sanction imposed by the government for unlawful or
proscribed conduct which goes beyond remedying the damage
caused to the harmed party.”306 As demonstrated in Parts I.B.2 and 3,
however, it is clear that the word “penalty,” as used in § 2462, has a
narrower meaning, namely, an amount of money imposed as a
forfeiture for a violation of a statute.307 This narrower meaning is the
one used by Blackstone to refer to penalties recoverable in debt
actions.308 This narrow definition of “penalty” is also the last of three
given in the 1891 First Edition of Black’s Law Dictionary: “The term
[penalty] also denotes money recoverable by virtue of a statute
imposing a payment by way of punishment.”309
303. See Bailey v. Glover, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 342, 348 (1874) (holding that the
statute of limitation in fraud cases does not begin to run until the discovery of the
fraud); accord Exploration Co. v. United States, 247 U.S. 436, 449 (1918) (applying
this “discovery rule” to “suits to vacate and annul patents”); Delaware State College v.
Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 262 (1980) (holding that an employee’s discrimination claim
accrued when the employer established its official position “and made that position
apparent” to the employee); United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 120-21 n.7
(1979) (adopting the “discovery rule” for Federal Tort Claims Act cases); Connors v.
Hallmark & Son Coal Co., 935 F.2d 336, 342 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (R.B. Ginsburg, J.)
(noting consensus among the courts of appeals that the “discovery rule is the general
accrual rule in federal courts” and “is to be applied in all federal question cases ‘in
the absence of a contrary directive from Congress’s”) (quoting Cada v. Baxter
Healthcare Corp., 920 F.2d 446, 450 (7th Cir. 1990)); see also Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind,
Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350, 363 (1991) (referring to the
“venerable principle” of the discovery rule).
304. 87 F.3d 484 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
305. See id. at 492 (finding the suspension and censure of a securities industry
supervisor under the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 to be a “penalty” within
the meaning of § 2462 because it was penal in nature in that the SEC’s action was a
form of punishment that exceeded compensating customers for their actual loss).
306. Id.
307. See supra notes 67, 96, 113 and accompanying text; infra note 390.
308. See 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 160 (1768) (discussing the history
of debt actions for penalties under English common law).
309. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 884 (1st ed. 1891). The first definition given for
“penalty” is “[t]he sum of money which the obligor of a bond undertakes to pay . . .
[if he fails] to perform . . . the terms imposed on him by the conditions of the bond.”
Id. at 883. The second definition is more general: “a punishment imposed by statute
as the consequence . . . of a certain specified offense.” Id. Black’s notes under the
second definition that “[t]he terms ‘fine,’ ‘forfeiture,’ and ‘penalty’ are often used
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As demonstrated below, three Supreme Court decisions relied on
by the Johnson court to support its conclusion that in § 2462 the word
“penalty” has a broader meaning, encompassing, among other things,
a professional license suspension, actually do not support that view.
In fact, all three cases, in their discussions of the concept of “penal”
statutes, indirectly support the conclusion that “penalty,” as used in
§ 2462, means money recoverable as punishment for a statutory
violation. The three cases considered only whether the money
sought by the plaintiffs in each case constituted damages or,
alternatively, “penalties.” All three cases were decided before the
1938 landmark case of Helvering v. Mitchell,310 which first recognized
the concept of a “civil” penalty. Before Mitchell, the terms “penalty”
and “penal” were synonymous with “criminal,” even though most
penalties could be collected through civil procedural means.311 The
distinction made in all three cases cited in the Johnson opinion is
simply the distinction between damages, a civil remedy that
compensates a private party for an individual wrong, and a criminal
“penalty” that punishes for a wrong against the public. This
distinction is not useful in determining what constitutes a “civil
penalty” under § 2462, because by definition the term includes only
non-criminal sanctions.
In Huntington v. Attrill,312 the first of the three cases on which the
Johnson court relied, the Supreme Court considered whether a
judgment rendered by a New York court under a New York statute
“making the officers of a corporation, who sign and record a false
certificate of the amount of its capital stock, liable for all its debts,”
was enforceable in Maryland under the Full Faith and Credit
Clause.313 The resolution of this question depended on whether the
statute’s purpose was to punish an offense against the public justice
of the state (making it a “penal statute”) or to protect creditors of the
corporation.314 If the statute was “penal,” Maryland would not be
obliged to enforce the New York judgment because “[t]he courts of
loosely, and even confusedly . . . .” Id.
310. 303 U.S. 391, 399, 404 (1938) (holding that a money penalty imposed by
statute could be remedial and civil, and that this type of penalty could be sought in
addition to criminal penalties without violating double jeopardy principles).
311. See, e.g., Lees v. United States, 150 U.S. 476, 480 (1893) (holding that though
an action to recover a penalty for importing aliens to perform labor is “civil in form,
[it] is unquestionably criminal in its nature, and in such a case a defendant cannot
be compelled to be a witness against himself”).
312. 146 U.S. 657 (1892).
313. See id. at 666 (stating that the Court has jurisdiction to consider the issue of
Full Faith and Credit); see also U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (establishing Full Faith and
Credit obligations).
314. See Huntington, 146 U.S. at 668.

2000]

STATUTORY MISINTERPRETATION

717

no country [may] execute the penal laws of another.”315 The Court
observed that “[i]n interpreting this maxim, there is danger of being
misled by the different shades of meaning allowed to the word
‘penal’ in our language.”316 The Court continued:
[T]he words “penal” and “penalty” have been used in various
senses. Strictly and primarily, they denote punishment, whether
corporal or pecuniary, imposed and enforced by the State for a
crime or offense against its laws. . . . But they are also commonly
used as including any extraordinary liability to which the law
subjects a wrongdoer in favor of the person wronged, not limited to
the damages suffered [for example, punitive damages]. They are
so elastic in meaning as even to be familiarly applied to cases of
private contracts, wholly independent of statutes, as when we speak
317
of the “penal sum” or “penalty” of a bond.

The Court decided that the statute was not penal,318 but rather that
it provided protection for creditors of the corporation. Thus, the
judgment was one for damages and it was enforceable in other
states.319 Because the more general definition of “penalty,” meaning
some form of punishment, sufficed to resolve the issue in Huntington
and because the then-existing version of § 2462 was not involved, the
Court had no occasion to consider what the word “penalty” meant in
the context of § 2462. The Court’s observation that the word
“penalty” has many meanings in different contexts indirectly supports
the argument that its meaning in § 2462 is not the broad, general
definition used to resolve Huntington, and on which the 3M court
relied, but rather the narrow meaning of a sum of money forfeited
under a penal statute, a meaning that was well known in the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries when the statute was first
enacted.
The Supreme Court’s decision in Chattanooga Foundry & Pipe Works
v. City of Atlanta320 applied the same broad definition of “penal”
adopted in Huntington. Chattanooga involved the pre-1948 version of
315. Id. at 666 (quoting Chief Justice Marshall in The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.)
66, 123 (1825)). It was a well-settled principle that neither the federal courts nor the
courts of other states would enforce the “penal laws” of a state, including
“prosecutions and sentences for crimes” and “all suits in favor of the state for the
recovery of pecuniary penalties for any violation of statutes . . . and to all judgments
for such penalties.” Id. at 670-71.
316. Id. at 666.
317. See id. at 666-67 (citations omitted); see also supra note 309.
318. See id. at 688 (finding that the statute was not penal and, therefore,
recognizable under Full Faith and Credit).
319. See id. (holding that other states may recognize judgment of damages).
320. 203 U.S. 390, 397 (1906) (stating that it is undisputed in light of Huntington
that the meaning of “penalty” in R.S. § 1047 does not include damages).
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§ 2462 and held that the statute of limitation did not apply to a claim
for damages under a federal antitrust statute.321 Again, the broad,
general definition of “penal” sufficed because the substantive statute
provided for damages322 and damages are not a penalty even under
the broad definition. It was unnecessary for the Court to consider
the crucial issue in the Johnson case: whether “penalty or forfeiture”
in the pre-1948 version of § 2462 was limited to money and
property.323
The third case cited in Johnson to support its interpretation of
“penalty” was Meeker v. Lehigh Valley R.R. Co.,324 which held that the
five-year statute of limitation in the pre-1948 version of § 2462 was
inapplicable to a lawsuit commenced to collect money the defendant
owed the plaintiff under an “order of reparation” issued by the
Interstate Commerce Commission (“ICC”).325 The Court’s analysis
was that the statute’s use of the words “penalty or forfeiture” referred
to something “imposed in a punitive way for an infraction of a public
law, and did not include a liability imposed solely for the purpose of
redressing a private injury.”326 Because the reparation order at issue
was one to compensate a private party for excessive rail rates he had
paid, it redressed a private injury and was not penal. In Meeker, just as
in the other two cases, the general definition of penalty was sufficient
to rule out the payment at issue as a form of “penalty” so there was no
need to examine the term more closely. The definition used, i.e.,
“something imposed in a punitive way,” is not inconsistent with the
narrower definition used by Blackstone and in the third definition of
“penalty” in the 1891 edition of Black’s Law Dictionary, in which the
“something” punitive is restricted to money.327
The Johnson court did not consider the effect of the later-decided
Helvering v. Mitchell,328 on the interpretation of “penalty” articulated in
321. See id.
322. See id. at 396-97 (stating that Congress has the power to create an action for
damages).
323. See id. at 397 (dismissing the argument that damages were penalties in the
present case because that issue had been decided in Huntington).
324. 236 U.S. 412 (1915).
325. See id. at 419. The ICC issued an order requiring the defendant to pay
reparations for having charged the plaintiff excessive and unreasonable rates for rail
shipment of coal. See id. The Meeker Court cited Chattanooga as the basis for § 2642’s
inapplicability. See id. at 423.
326. Id. at 423.
327. See 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 160 (1768) (a “penal statute[]”
was one that inflicted a forfeiture for an offense, which penalty could be collected in
a debt action); BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 884 (1st ed. 1891) (giving as one of three
definitions of “penalty”: “money recoverable by virtue of a statute imposing a
payment by way of punishment”).
328. 303 U.S. 391 (1938).
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Huntington, Chattanooga, and Meeker. Helvering essentially made the
distinction relied upon in Huntington, Chattanooga, and Meeker useless
in interpreting § 2462. The Court in Helvering held that a fifty
percent addition to a tax was not intended as punishment329 and that,
therefore, the sanction was not criminal, but rather a civil sanction of
remedial character.330 As a result, the case was not barred by double
jeopardy principles, even though the defendant had previously been
acquitted of criminal charges based on the same conduct.331 In
Helvering, the Court essentially created the concept of the “civil
penalty,” because no case up to then had recognized such a concept,
and all earlier cases had considered monetary penalties recovered in
civil proceedings to be criminal punishments.332
The Helvering Court also discussed other “remedial sanctions” it
deemed to be nonpunitive, one of which was “revocation of a
privilege voluntarily granted,” including “disbarment.”333 Other
“remedial sanctions” the Court referred to were “[f]orfeiture of
goods or their value and the payment of fixed or variable sums of
money.”334 The Court regarded these sanctions as not essentially
criminal in nature because they were enforceable by civil procedural
means.335 Under this analysis, no sanction imposed in a civil
proceeding would constitute a “penalty,” yet pursuant to the 1948
Act, § 2462 applies to “civil” penalties.336 Because the Helvering
analysis would make the words “civil penalty” in § 2462 meaningless,
some other analysis must be used to determine within the universe of
civil sanctions which ones are “penalties” within the meaning of
§ 2462. The earlier discussion in this Article based on the plain
language of the 1948 Act, construed as a whole and in its historic
context, provides an analysis that makes sense—§ 2462 applies only to
“penalties” in the sense of civil forfeitures of money and property.337
329. See id. at 401.
330. See id. at 402 (“That Congress provided a distinctly civil procedure for the
collection of the additional 50 per centum indicates clearly that it intended a civil,
not criminal, sanction.”).
331. See id. at 404.
332. See, e.g., Lees v. United States, 150 U.S. 476, 479 (1893) (“[T]he recovery of a
penalty is a proceeding criminal in nature, yet . . . it may be enforced in a civil
proceeding.”).
333. See Helvering, 303 U.S. at 399 (noting that revocation of a privilege is
characteristically free of the punitive criminal element).
334. Id. at 400 (explaining that these sanctions have been enforceable in civil
proceedings since 1789).
335. See id. (observing that such sanctions have been upheld despite the
contentions of their criminal nature).
336. See 28 U.S.C. § 2462, as adopted in 1948, 62 Stat. 974 (referring to “civil”
fines, penalties, and forfeitures).
337. See supra Part I.B.2-3.
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III. SECTION 2462 SHOULD BE APPLIED ONLY TO THE KIND OF COURT
ACTIONS CONGRESS INTENDED TO LIMIT IN 1839
Parts I and II of this Article have established that the limitation
period in § 2462 applies to court proceedings, not to administrative
ones, and only to proceedings involving civil monetary penalties and
forfeitures of property.338 It does not necessarily follow that § 2462
applies to every court action alleging a violation of a federal statute in
which the remedy (or one of the remedies) sought is a civil monetary
penalty, as several courts have assumed without considering the
context and history of § 2462 developed in this Article.339 As
discussed in Part I.A., the limitation period should be applied only to
court actions Congress “clearly” intended to limit when it adopted
the 1839 version of the statute. Court proceedings that do not meet
that test should not be limited by § 2462.
As demonstrated in Part I.B., in 1839, suits and actions “for
penalties and forfeitures” were debt actions, namely, actions in court
to collect sums prescribed by statute as sanctions for statutory
infractions (or proceedings to collect sanctions consisting of
property).340 Usually, private parties, who stood to benefit by
receiving part or all of the sums recovered, could bring the actions,
which made the suits vehicles for private gain in addition to means
for vindicating public purposes.341 These were the kinds of court
actions Congress clearly intended to limit when it first adopted the
statute now codified as 28 U.S.C. § 2462. In 1839, Congress could not
have intended to apply the limitation to actions under modern
statutes, many of which are fundamentally different in nature.
Modern regulatory statutes usually authorize civil actions based on
the fact of a violation rather than on the existence of a collectible,
“accrued” penalty and often authorize the court to order injunctive
338. See supra notes 66, 67, 69, 96, 113 and accompanying text; infra note 390.
339. See, e.g., United States v. Telluride, 146 F.3d 1241, 1245 (10th Cir. 1998)
(holding based on government’s concession that § 2462 applied to government
action under the Clean Water Act insofar as the suit sought monetary penalties, but
not insofar as it sought injunctive relief, stating without discussion that “[s]ection
2462 clearly applies to ‘action[s], suit[s], or proceeding[s] for the enforcement of
any civil fine, penalty, forfeiture, pecuniary or otherwise’” (modifications in original,
quoting 1948 Act language of § 2462); United States v. Banks, 115 F.3d 916, 918-19
(11th Cir. 1997) (holding, without analysis, essentially the same as Telluride case), cert.
denied, 522 U.S. 1075, reh’g denied, 523 U.S. 1041 (1998); FEC v. Williams, 104 F.3d
237, 239-40 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that § 2462 barred government action under
the Federal Election Campaign Act, both the civil penalties sought and injunctive
relief), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1015 (1997).
340. See supra notes 66, 67, 69, 96, 113 and accompanying text; infra note 390.
341. See supra note 109 (discussing “bounty” aspect of qui tam actions, which give
informer a portion or all of statute’s penalty).
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relief in addition to or instead of monetary penalties.342 Further,
modern statutes typically give courts discretion, even if only monetary
penalties are authorized, to set the amount of a penalty (perhaps
within statutory limits), so that no “penalty” can be said to exist until
the court’s decision imposes one.343
The limitation of § 2462 should not be applied to court actions
brought under federal statutes that authorize actions based on the
existence of a statutory violation, rather than the existence of an
“accrued” penalty, because Congress did not, and could not have,
intended to limit these kinds of actions when it adopted the 1839
statute.344 The limitation of § 2462 should be applied only to court
actions that are similar to the debt actions Congress intended to
limit. This would include actions to collect payment of penalties
previously assessed by agencies and actions to collect penalties set by
statute (under the few remaining provisions of that nature). As
discussed below in this Part, to apply § 2462 to regulatory actions
under complex modern statutory schemes, each of which is based on
important public policies (and in which Congress has not specifically
provided a time limit on bringing actions)345 would conflict not only
with the general principle that time limits do not apply to the
government unless expressly provided,346 but also, as discussed below,
with the public policies Congress sought to further in the regulatory
statutes.
When considering whether § 2462 applies to an action in court
brought under a modern regulatory statute, courts should carefully
consider whether the action is similar to the nineteenth-century
proceedings Congress intended to limit and if it is not the limitation
should not be applied. Courts should also consider the purposes and
policies Congress sought to further in the statutory scheme under
which the action is brought, and the extent to which application of
342. See, e.g., The Federal Election Campaign Act, 2 U.S.C. § 437g(a)(6)(A)-(B)
(1994) (authorizing the Federal Election Commission, based on violations of the Act,
“to institute a civil action in court for relief, including a permanent or temporary
injunction, restraining order, or any other appropriate order (including an order for
a civil penalty [not to exceed specified amounts] . . .”)); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 7413(b) (1994) (authorizing the Administrator of the EPA to “commence a civil
action” against an alleged violator “for a permanent or temporary injunction, or to
assess and recover a civil penalty of not more than $25,000 per day for each violation,
or both . . .”).
343. See infra note 359 and accompanying text.
344. See supra notes 121-206 and accompanying text.
345. As stated supra note 30, the question of the applicability of § 2462 arises only
in the context of regulatory schemes for which Congress has not provided a specific
limitation period.
346. See supra Part I.A.
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§ 2462 to the action may frustrate Congress’s intent to impose
consequences on violators of the statute.347 It is beyond the scope of
this Article to consider all the federal statutory schemes that
authorize civil actions to be brought in court seeking the imposition
of monetary penalties for infractions of their substantive provisions
and the extent to which § 2462 should apply to those actions. This
Part, however, considers an example of a statutory scheme—the
federal securities laws348—under which the application of § 2462 to
civil actions in court would produce peculiar results, possibly
frustrating Congress’s purposes in enacting the securities laws. A
strong argument, outlined below, can be made that under the
securities laws no time limitation applies to the initiation of civil
actions except those provided in the statutory scheme itself.
As originally enacted, the securities statutes provided no time
limitation on the initiation of any civil action by the SEC.349 The
primary remedies available to the Commission prior to 1990 were
forms of injunctive relief: injunctions350 and disgorgement351 of illegal
proceeds.352 Under two amendments enacted in 1984 and 1988,
347. Cf. Crown Coat Front Co. v. United States, 386 U.S. 503, 517 (1967)
(instructing that the courts should not attempt to “define for all purposes when a
cause of action first accrues” and that “[s]uch words are to be interpreted in the light
of the general purposes of the [particular] statutes and of its other provisions, and
with due regard to those practical ends which are to be served” by the statute)
(quotations and citations omitted).
348. For purposes of this Article, the term “federal securities laws” means the four
principal statutes administered by the Securities and Exchange Commission, which
include: the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77mm (1994 & Supp. IV 1998);
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78mm (1994 & Supp. IV 1998);
the Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-80a-64 (1994 & Supp. IV
1998); and the Investment Advisors Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-80b-18a (1994 &
Supp. IV 1998).
349. See generally Christopher R. Dollase, Comment, The Appeal of Rind: Limitations
of Actions in Securities and Exchange Commission Civil Enforcement Actions, 49 BUS. LAW.
1793, 1794 (1994) (noting that as originally enacted the securities laws contained no
time limitation on a civil action by the SEC).
350. The four main statutes administered by the SEC specifically authorize the
Commission to seek injunctions against future violations. See, e.g., Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(1) (1994) (stating under section 21(d)(1)
that the Commission has discretion to seek permanent or temporary injunctive
relief).
351. Although not specifically authorized in the securities laws, SEC v. Texas Gulf
Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 863 (2d Cir. 1968), held that district courts have the
discretionary power to order disgorgement of illegally obtained proceeds. Since
then, the courts have almost routinely ordered such relief in Commission cases. See,
e.g., SEC v. Commonwealth Chem. Sec., Inc., 574 F.2d 90, 102 (2d Cir. 1978) (stating
that the purpose of disgorgement is to prevent unjust enrichment).
352. The only civil penalty provision in any of the four main securities statutes as
originally enacted was section 32(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78ff(b) (1994), which discusses the failure to file information, documents, or
reports. This provision sets a $100 per day penalty for failure to file required
information, stating, “[s]uch forfeiture, which shall be in lieu of any criminal
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Congress gave the Commission the authority to seek to have the
courts impose civil penalties only in insider trading cases.353 Unlike
any other provision of the securities laws, these amendments set a
five-year limitation period on actions seeking those penalties,354 but
also expressly stated that the time limitation period “shall not be
construed to bar or limit in any manner any action by the
Commission or the Attorney General under any other provision of
this title.”355
In 1990, Congress further amended the securities laws by enacting
the Securities Enforcement Remedies and Penny Stock Reform Act
(“Remedies Act”).356 The Remedies Act authorizes the Commission
to seek the imposition of civil money penalties for violations of the
securities laws and to impose civil penalties in administrative
proceedings against regulated entities and persons.357 In adopting
the Remedies Act, Congress did not set any time limitation on such
actions, nor did Congress comment on whether a limitation period
should apply.
Congress designed the Remedies Act to enhance the Commission’s
ability to deter unlawful conduct and maintain public confidence in
the nation’s securities markets by “increasing the financial
consequences of securities law violations.”358 In a civil action under
the Remedies Act, the court determines the amount of the penalty by

penalty . . . shall be payable to the Treasury of the United States and shall be
recoverable in a civil suit in the name of the United States.” Id. As of 1990, only one
case had ever been brought under this section. See Laby & Callcott supra note 32, at
7 (citing United States v. Mercantile Properties, Inc., SEC Litig., Release No. 360
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 27, 1946)).
353. Congress enacted the Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 376,
98 Stat. 1264 (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.) (“ITSA”), which gave the
Commission authority to seek civil penalties in insider trading cases. In 1988,
Congress strengthened the penalties available for insider trading when it enacted the
Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-704,
102 Stat. 4677 (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.) (“ITSFEA”).
354. When it enacted ITSFEA, Congress provided the five-year limitation period
on the imposition of the civil penalties without any explanation. See Dollase, supra
note 349, at 1796 (stating that the legislative history of ITSFEA is silent on the issue).
This provision was carried over from the earlier ITSA, which had included such a
time limitation. See id. at 1796-97. Bar groups lobbied for the imposition of a
limitation period in ITSA. See id. at 1797. The Commission took no position as to
whether a time limitation should be imposed, but observed that “unlike most
securities laws violations, ‘insider trading is discovered, if at all, soon after it occurs.’”
Id. (quoting from Letter from John S.R. Shad, SEC Chairman, to Congressman
Timothy E. Wirth (June 29, 1983)).
355. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78uA(d)(5) (1994).
356. Pub. L. No. 101-429, 104 Stat. 931 (1990) (codified in scattered sections of
15 U.S.C.).
357. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78u(d)(3), 78u-2.
358. S. REP. NO. 101-337, at 1-10 (1990).
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considering “the facts and circumstances” of each case.359 The
penalties provided by the Remedies Act may be imposed in addition
to any injunctive remedy, such as disgorgement.360 Although the
Remedies Act literally authorizes the Commission to bring a separate
civil action seeking only civil penalties—independent of an injunctive
action based on the same violation361—as a practical matter, the
Commission brings a single suit seeking all the relief it believes
appropriate in a case.362 The suit seeks any combination of
injunctions, disgorgement, and civil penalties.363
The Commission has long taken the position that no statute of
limitation applies to its injunctive actions, a position of which
Congress is aware.364 There can be no question that Commission
enforcement actions serve the public interest and therefore are
entitled to the presumption against the application of any limitation
period without clear congressional intent.365 Several courts have
rejected arguments attempting to apply statutes of limitation to
Commission injunctive actions. For example, in SEC v. Rind,366 the
Ninth Circuit rejected the argument that either of two statutes of
limitation should apply to Commission actions seeking injunctive
relief:367 the time limitation that applies to private securities fraud
suits368 or 28 U.S.C. § 2415(b), which applies to tort claims by the
359. See Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77t(d)(2)(A) (1994); Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(3)(B)(i) (1994).
360. See Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77t(d)(3)(C) (1994) (stating that
money penalty is not exclusive remedy and that the Commission may in addition
seek all other authorized remedies); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C.
78u(d)(3)(C)(iii) (1994) (same).
361. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(3)(A).
362. See, e.g., SEC v. Caserta, 75 F. Supp. 2d 79, 83 (E.D.N.Y. 1999) (stating that in
“this action” the SEC seeks injunctions, disgorgement, and civil penalties).
363. See id. It seems likely that were the Commission to attempt to bring separate
actions based on the same violations, one seeking civil penalties and another seeking
injunctive relief, a district court would require consolidation of the two. See FED. R.
CIV. P. 42(a) (providing for consolidation of “actions involving a common question
of law or fact”).
364. The Commission submitted comments to Congress on ITSA that stated: “as
proposed [ITSA], like the Securities Exchange Act, contains no statute of limitation
applicable to Commission actions.” See Dollase, supra note 349, at 1797 & n.30
(quoting Letter from John S.R. Shad, SEC Chairman, to Congressman Timothy E.
Wirth (June 29, 1983)).
365. See, e.g., SEC v. Rind, 991 F.2d 1486, 1491 (9th Cir. 1993) (stating that
Commission enforcement action ensures public rights and advances public
interests); SEC v. Lorin, 869 F. Supp. 1117 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (holding that the
Commission enforcement action seeking disgorgement serves public interests).
366. 991 F.2d 1486 (9th Cir. 1993).
367. See id. at 1492 (stating that to impose any statute of limitation on the
Commission would frustrate its duty to implement national policies).
368. See, e.g., Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350,
362 (1991) (holding that private plaintiffs must bring actions under the securities
laws within one year of learning of the violation and, in any event, no later than three

2000]

STATUTORY MISINTERPRETATION

725

federal government.369 In SEC v. Lorin,370 the District Court for the
Southern District of New York rejected the argument that § 2462
applied to Commission actions seeking injunctive relief.371 Even the
D.C. Circuit, in Johnson v. SEC,372 stated that § 2462 would not bar an
action seeking disgorgement,373 which is a form of injunctive relief.374
Application of § 2462 to an SEC action brought more than five
years after the violations occurred, seeking both injunctive relief and
money penalties, would lead to an anomaly. As shown below, either
the purposes of a statute of limitation would not be accomplished or,
under the reasoning of the Ninth Circuit in FEC v. Williams,375 all
enforcement of the statute would be precluded without the required
“clear” indication that Congress intended the limit to apply.
Limiting the civil penalties, but not the whole action, would not
accomplish the asserted purposes of a statute of limitation. As the 3M
court noted, when a statute of limitation is provided it is out of
concern that “after the passage of time ‘evidence has been lost,
memories have faded, and witnesses have disappeared.’”376 These
concerns would be allayed only if the entire proceeding were barred.
If one form of relief could be sought without regard to the time limit,
the defendant would be subjected to a trial to determine whether he
committed the alleged violations despite concerns about the passage
of time. If one form of relief may be sought, there is no reason
identified by the 3M court that would justify barring other forms of
relief. Time-barring only some relief simply does not address the
concerns the 3M court identified. The result of time-barring only
monetary penalties, but allowing a suit to proceed seeking only
injunctions and disgorgement, would be to frustrate Congress’s
purpose in enacting the Remedies Act, i.e., to provide more flexibility
and stiffer consequences in appropriate cases of securities law
violations.
If, on the other hand, the approach used in Williams were
years after the violation regardless of their knowledge).
369. See 28 U.S.C. § 2415(b) (1994) (providing a three-year statute of limitation
for an action brought by the United States or an agency “founded upon a tort”).
370. 869 F. Supp. 1117 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
371. See id. at 1122 (holding § 2462 inapplicable).
372. 87 F.3d 484 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
373. See id. at 491 (stating that § 2462 does not apply to restitution or
disgorgement actions as they are remedial and aimed at restoring the status quo).
374. See SEC v. Huffman, 996 F.2d 800, 802 (5th Cir. 1993) (holding that
disgorgement is a form of injunction in the public interest).
375. 104 F.3d 237, 240 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that if the legal remedy is barred
then so is the equitable remedy).
376. See 3M Co. v. Browner, 17 F.3d 1453, 1457 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (quoting R.R.
Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency, 321 U.S. 342, 349 (1944)).
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adopted—barring equitable relief as well as penalties under the
asserted rule that “‘equity will withhold its relief . . . where the
applicable statute of limitations would bar the concurrent legal
remedy,’”377—then the SEC injunctive actions that the courts have
uniformly held not to be subject to any time limitation would be
limited simply because money penalties were also sought. This would
leave the public without any remedy against even the most egregious
perpetrators of securities fraud, without any indication that Congress
intended such a result. It should be noted that the controlling 1839
Act language was adopted 100 years before the merger of law and
equity.378 In 1839, Congress could not have envisioned actions
seeking both equitable and legal relief and could not have “clearly”
intended that § 2462 apply to such actions.
In addition, application of § 2462 to an SEC action seeking a civil
penalty would not be consistent with the controlling language of the
1839 Act because the civil penalty itself cannot reasonably be deemed
to “accrue” until the court determines liability and decides whether
and how much of a civil penalty to impose, within the statutory
limits.379 Moreover, the venue provision of 28 U.S.C. § 1395, which
provides in part that a proceeding for the “recovery of a pecuniary
fine, penalty or forfeiture may be prosecuted in the district where it
accrues,”380 could not sensibly be applied to a Commission action
seeking penalties. There would be no “accrued” penalty on which to
base venue. In sum, a Commission civil action, even one seeking the
imposition of monetary penalties, is not analogous to an eighteenthcentury debt action for a sum certain and, therefore, § 2462 should
not apply.381
Congress has provided time limitation periods on certain
Commission actions. Its failure to so provide for injunctive and civil
penalty actions (except those seeking penalties for insider trading),
despite the Commission’s expressed view that no time limitation
applies to actions seeking injunctive relief, at the least does not
provide the necessary “clear,” affirmative indication that Congress
377. See Williams, 104 F.3d at 240 (relying on and quoting Cope v. Anderson,
331 U.S. 461, 464 (1947)).
378. See Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 119 S. Ct. 2295, 2314 (1999) (noting that the
merger of law and equity occurred in 1938).
379. See supra note 359 and accompanying text (explaining that a court has
discretion within wide parameters to determine amount of penalties).
380. 28 U.S.C. § 1395 (1994).
381. In the context of the federal securities laws, the language of § 2462 makes
sense only as applied to a civil action brought to collect an administratively assessed
monetary penalty and to the single provision that provides for a $100 per day
forfeiture. See supra note 352.
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intended Commission actions to be limited. In fact, a strong
argument can be made that Congress’s silence in the face of its
knowledge of the Commission’s longstanding position that no time
limitation applies to Commission actions denotes congressional
approval of that position.382 When Congress first amended the
securities laws to permit courts to impose civil penalties in insider
trading cases, it provided a five-year time limitation on suits for such
penalties, but provided none in the 1990 Remedies Act.383 This fact
weighs against imposing a time limitation. The legislative history of
both the 1988 and 1990 amending acts (ITSFEA and the Remedies
Act) is silent as to Congress’s intent, and Congress’s actions could be
interpreted in several ways. These amendments cannot be said to
manifest “clearly” an intent that the five-year time limitation in § 2462
apply to SEC actions, either to those seeking only civil penalties or to
those seeking both penalties and injunctive relief.
Although § 2462 should not apply to court proceedings brought by
the SEC based on statutory violations and seeking authorized relief,
there may be some statutory schemes under which the limitation
would apply to court actions to determine liability for penalties
because the penalties are specified by statute and may be considered
to “accrue” prior to court determination of liability.384 Consistent
382. See Dollase, supra note 349, at 1811 (arguing that Congress’s failure to adopt
as part of the Remedies Act a uniform limitation period applicable to all Commission
actions, in light of Congress’s awareness at the time of the Commission’s and the
courts’ view that Commission actions were not time-limited, indicates that Congress
did not intend for any limitation period to apply except as specifically provided in
ITSA and ITSFEA).
383. See Securities Enforcement and Penny Stock Reform Act of 1990, Pub. L. No.
101-42, 104 Stat. 931 (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.) (lacking a statute of
limitation provision).
384. The Supreme Court’s decision in Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412 (1987), is
not inconsistent with the analysis in Part III of this Article and does not require that
all court actions seeking the imposition of penalties be treated alike. In Tull, the
Court rejected the government’s argument that the right to a jury trial should attach
only to cases seeking statutorily specified, nondiscretionary penalties because that
was the kind of penalties that existed in the eighteenth century, to which the courts
refer to determine whether the right to a jury trial attaches. See id. at 420. The Court
held in Tull that there is a right to a jury trial on the issue of liability in any court
action seeking penalties, fixed or discretionary, but no right to a jury trial on the
amount of the penalty. See id. at 427 (holding that the Seventh Amendment does not
require a jury trial to determine the amount of civil penalties). The Court’s refusal,
however, to distinguish between fixed and discretionary penalty cases for Seventh
Amendment purposes does not mean that no such distinction should be made in
determining the applicability of § 2462. First, the consequences of requiring a jury
trial and of imposing a statute of limitation are markedly different. Requiring a jury
trial may be inconvenient for the government, but it does not bar the imposition of
penalties altogether. Second, in Seventh Amendment analysis, there is no
requirement of clear, affirmative congressional intent that a right to jury trial apply
under a modern statute. The Court determines whether the action is analogous to
one for which eighteenth century law provided jury trial and, if it is, then the right to
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with the Supreme Court’s admonition in Crown Coat Front Co. v.
United States,385 that each statute must be evaluated in light of its
language, context, purpose, and history to determine when a claim
under it “accrues,”386 each statutory scheme to which § 2462 arguably
applies must be analyzed in light of its language, context, purpose,
and history to determine whether Congress clearly intended actions
created by that statute to be so limited.
CONCLUSION
Section 2462 appears to impose a time limitation on actions
brought by the government in the public interest, so any ambiguity
regarding its application to a specific government action must be
resolved against its application.387 Section 2462 is part of a statute
concerning the federal courts and the judiciary.388 There is no
indication in the statute that Congress intended it to apply to
administrative proceedings. Furthermore, § 2462’s predecessor was
adopted at a time when statutes regulating conduct in the public
interest commonly prescribed the forfeiture of a specific sum of
money or specific property, which could be recovered in court in a
civil action for debt or a forfeiture proceeding. It was these actions
and proceedings that Congress “clearly” intended to limit in 1839
when it adopted the provision and specified that the five-year period
ran from when the “penalty or forfeiture accrued.”389
Congress intended no change when it made the revisions in
language in 1948, and § 2462 should be applied only to actions and
proceedings analogous to those Congress intended to limit in 1839,
namely, those brought in court to recover an “accrued” penalty or
jury trial attaches. But for a time limitation to apply to an action by the government
in its sovereign capacity, there must be clear intent on the part of Congress. Thus, it
is consistent to conclude that a jury trial is required in all court cases in which
liability for a monetary penalty is to be determined, but that Congress’s clear intent
to apply § 2462 to bar actions for penalties after five years may be discerned only as
to actions for penalties previously fixed by statute or assessed by agencies.
385. 386 U.S. 503 (1967).
386. See id. at 517 (emphasizing the importance of context when considering in a
specific case when a statutorily created cause of action “accrues”).
387. See supra Part I (explaining plain language, context, and history of statute of
limitation on actions for fines, penalties, and forfeitures).
388. See supra Part I.B.2; notes 51-75 and accompanying text. Title 28, as enacted
in the 1948 Act, governs the judiciary and federal judicial procedure, including the
organization of the federal courts, the Department of Justice, federal court
employees and officers, the federal courts’ jurisdiction and venue, as well as
procedure for particular federal court proceedings. See 28 U.S.C. as enacted in 1948,
62 Stat. 869-985.
389. See supra Part I.B (arguing that plain language, context, and history support
the conclusion that § 2462 applies only to court proceedings seeking existing,
accrued penalties consisting of money and property).

2000]

STATUTORY MISINTERPRETATION

729

forfeiture. Court actions to collect monetary penalties set by
administrative agencies after informal or formal assessment
procedures are among the proceedings that fit that description.
There may be some other court actions to determine liability for
specific nondiscretionary penalties to which § 2462 also would apply.
Civil actions brought under modern regulatory statutes based on
statutory infractions which seek the discretionary imposition of civil
monetary penalties or other sanctions are not analogous to the
actions for “accrued” penalties that Congress intended to limit. The
current version of § 2462 should not apply to such actions.
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APPENDIX A
28 U.S.C. § 2462 (1994)
“Except as otherwise provided by Act of Congress, an action, suit or
proceeding for the enforcement of any civil fine, penalty, or
forfeiture, pecuniary or otherwise, shall not be entertained unless
commenced within five years from the date when the claim first
accrued if, within the same period, the offender or the property is
found within the United States in order that proper service may be
made thereon.”
R.S. § 1047 (1874)
“No suit or prosecution for any penalty or forfeiture, pecuniary or
otherwise, accruing under the laws of the United States, shall be
maintained, except in cases where it is otherwise specially provided,
unless the same is commenced within five years from the time when
the penalty or forfeiture accrued: Provided, That the person of the
offender, or the property liable for such penalty or forfeiture, shall,
within the same period, be found within the United States; so that the
proper process therefor may be instituted and served against such
person or property.”
Act of Feb. 28, 1839, ch. 36, § 4, 5 Stat. 322
“And be it further enacted, That no suit or prosecution shall be
maintained, for any penalty or forfeiture, pecuniary or otherwise,
accruing under the laws of the United States, unless the same suit or
prosecution shall be commenced within five years from the time
when the penalty or forfeiture accrued: Provided, The person of the
offender or the property liable for such penalty or forfeiture shall,
within the same period, be found within the United States; so that the
proper process may be instituted and served against such person or
property therefor.”

2000]

STATUTORY MISINTERPRETATION

731

APPENDIX B
1. Section 89 of the Act of March 2, 1799, provided for the
appointment of customs officers who would determine unilaterally
the value of goods brought into the country, on which duties
(specified in detail by Congress) must be paid. See Act of Mar. 2,
1799, ch. 22, § 89, 1 Stat. 627, 695-96. The 1799 Act also prescribed,
as the consequence for each of various infractions of the law,
forfeitures of money, forfeitures of goods, and/or imprisonment. See
Act of Mar. 2, 1799, § 84 (requiring forfeiture of goods for false
entry); Act of Mar. 2, 1799, § 69 (requiring forfeiture and payment of
double the value of concealed goods); Act of Mar. 2, 1799, § 82
(requiring imprisonment for those convicted of re-landing export
goods). The 1799 Act provided that the penalties prescribed for the
violation of its substantive provisions be sued for and recovered in
court:
[A]ll penalties accruing by any breach of this act, shall be sued for,
and recovered with costs of suit, in the name of the United States of
America, in any court competent to try the same; . . . [a]nd provided,
that no action or prosecution shall be maintained in any case
under this act, unless the same shall have been commenced within
three years next after the penalty or forfeiture was incurred.

Act of Mar. 2, 1799, § 89 (emphasis added).390
2. The Act of Mar. 26, 1804, ch. 40, § 1-2, 2 Stat. 290, provided,
first, that persons who committed certain acts on the high seas be
punished by death. Section 3 dealt with crimes, fines and forfeitures
under the revenue laws stating:
[A]ny person or persons guilty of any crime arising under the
revenue laws of the United States, or incurring any fine or forfeiture
by breaches of the said laws, may be prosecuted, tried and punished,
provided the indictment or information be found at any time within five
years after committing the offence or incurring the fine or forfeiture, any law
or provision to the contrary notwithstanding.

Act of Mar. 26, 1804, § 3 (emphasis added). The 1804 statute does
390. Reading the statute as a whole, it is apparent that the three-year time
limitation period applied only to actions to collect forfeitures of money and
property. The 1799 Act further provides that “all fines, penalties and forfeitures,
recovered by virtue of this act (and not otherwise appropriated) shall, after deducting
all proper costs and charges, be disposed of as follows . . .” Act of Mar. 2, 1799, § 91
(emphasis added). The 1799 Act then specifies that one “moiety” of such fines,
penalties, and forfeitures is to be allocated to the United States, and the other half
divided between the customs officials and, if applicable, the informant who provided
information leading to recovery of the penalties. See id. Obviously, such a division
could occur only with respect to penalties consisting of money and property.
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not specify that it was only in federal courts that persons who had
incurred a fine or forfeiture under the revenue laws could be
prosecuted and punished. However, the Judiciary Act of 1789 gave
the federal district courts “exclusive original cognizance . . . of all
suits for penalties and forfeitures incurred, under the laws of the
United States.” Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 73, 76-77.
3. Two statutes passed on April 20, 1818, both provided for
penalties and forfeitures to be recovered through suits brought in the
federal courts. One of the two, the Act of Apr. 20, 1818, ch. 91, § 1, 3
Stat. 450, amended an 1808 statute that prohibited slave trading. The
1818 amendments to the 1808 Slave Trading Act specified that for
particular violations of the Act, violators were subject to
imprisonment and to forfeiture of specified sums of money and/or
specific property. See Act of Apr. 20, 1818, ch. 91, §§ 2-3, 3 Stat. 451
(requiring forfeiture of “tackle, apparel, furniture, and lading” and
imprisonment up to seven years). The money and property forfeited
was to be divided between the United States and the “person or
persons who shall sue for said forfeiture . . . .” See id. § 3, Stat. at 451.
The reference to this slave trading statute in the margin notes to R.S.
§1047, the version of § 2462 included in the Revised Statutes of 1874
and 1878, was probably an error, however.391 The margin notes to the
April 20, 1818 Slave Trading Act list several statutes. None of those
statutes is among those acknowledged to be ancestors of R.S. § 1047,
which indicates that the two did not have common origins.392
A different statute enacted on April 20, 1818, is more likely the one
meant to be referred to in the margin notes to R.S. § 1047. See Act of
Apr. 20, 1818, ch. 72, § 20, 3 Stat. 433, “An Act Supplementary to” the
1799 customs law discussed above; see also United States v. Platt,
27 F. Cas. 546, 547 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1840) (No. 16,054a) (listing this
second 1818 Act as one that had amended the 1799 customs law).
The 1818 customs act amended the requirements and procedures for
importing goods into the country, including the procedures for
verifying the value of goods, on which depended the amount of
duties to be paid. See Act of Apr. 20, 1818, ch. 72, § 11, 3 Stat. at 436
(authorizing collectors of goods to appraise their value).
The statute provided penalties for various infractions (see, e.g., § 10,
3 Stat. 436 (stating that any merchant who refused to perform an
appraisal he had been properly appointed to make was “subject to a
fine of not more than fifty dollars”)). The 1818 statute further
391. As discussed in supra note 82, the Revised Statutes contained errors.
392. See Act of Apr. 20, 1818, ch. 91, § 1, 3 Stat. 450.
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provided that:
[a]ll penalties and forfeitures incurred by force of the act, shall be
sued for, recovered, distributed, and accounted for, in the manner
prescribed by the [1799] act . . . and may be mitigated or remitted,
in the manner prescribed by [a 1797 statute permitting persons to
bring suit in court to seek remission or mitigation of any penalty or
forfeiture].

Id. § 25, 3 Stat. at 438 (emphasis added). As discussed supra
Appendix B ¶ 1, the 1799 Act prescribed that “all penalties accruing”
by operation of that act be “sued for, and recovered . . . in any court
competent to try the same . . . .” Act of Mar. 2, 1799, ch. 22, § 89,
1 Stat. 627 at 695 (emphasis added).
4. In 1823, the 1799 law on customs duties was further amended
but still required that, if not paid voluntarily, penalties and forfeitures
were to be sued for in court. See Act of Mar. 1, 1823, ch. 21, § 35,
3 Stat. 729, 739. The provisions regarding “appraisement” of goods
by government-appointed appraisers were changed to allow owners
dissatisfied with the government appraisers’ opinion to hire two
private appraisers who, with the two government-appointed
appraisers, would perform a second appraisal of the goods and report
this to the customs collector. See id. § 18, 3 Stat. at 736. If the owner
was dissatisfied with the second appraisal, the statute provided that he
could refer the case to the Secretary of the Treasury, who would then
decide the value of the goods. See id. This provision did not change
the fact that if penalties or forfeitures due under the act were not
paid voluntarily, they were to be recovered in a suit in court. See id.
§ 35, 3 Stat. at 739 (providing that penalties and forfeitures “incurred
by force of this act, shall be sued for, recovered, distributed, and accounted
for, in the manner prescribed by [the 1799 act]”—that is, by suit in
court) (emphasis added). Plainly, the statute referred to suits
brought in court and, just as plainly, to sums of money that could be
recovered in an action for debt, or property recoverable in a libel
proceeding. See id.
5. In 1863, Congress enacted a provision to clarify whether actions
to recover penalties and forfeitures under the customs and other
related laws must be brought within the five-year time limitation
period of the 1804 law, the three-year period of the 1799 law, or the
five-year period provided in the 1839 statute. See Act of Mar. 3, 1863,
ch. 76, § 14, 12 Stat. 737, 741-42; see also United States v. Maillard,
26 F. Cas. 1140, 1141-42 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1871) (No. 15,709) (opining
that the 1863 Act was intended to eliminate confusion regarding the
statute of limitation); In re Landsberg, 14 F. Cas. 1065, 1066-67
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(C.C.E.D. Mich. 1870) (No. 8,041) (same). Although this statute was
enacted after the 1839 Act adoption of what has become § 2462,
because it was designed to clarify the scope of the 1839 statute, it
provides useful context for interpreting § 2462.
The final section of the 1863 Act repealed those portions of the
1799 and 1804 statutes that set limitation periods on bringing “any
action or proceeding for the recovery of any fine, penalty, or
forfeiture” incurred for violating a customs law. See Act of Mar. 3,
1863, § 14, 12 Stat. at 742. Other sections of the 1863 Act amended
the 1823 statute regarding the collection of customs duties (see supra
Appendix B ¶ 4) to ensure that duties were levied on the true value
of goods imported, and provided for fines or imprisonment “at the
discretion of the court” of those who engaged in conduct designed to
thwart that purpose. See id. §§ 3, 4, 6, 8, 12 Stat. at 739-40. The
reference to the court in this and other sections of the 1863 law make
it clear that, just as in the earlier laws discussed above, “any action or
proceeding” to recover penalties incurred by violation of the new law
referred to proceedings in court.
6. The Act of July 25, 1868, amended the 1790 criminal act (see
supra notes 97-102 and accompanying text) to provide a five-year
statute of limitation on the prosecution of capital crimes, the same
period that had been adopted in 1804 for crimes, penalties and
forfeitures under the revenue laws. Compare Act of July 25, 1868, ch.
236, § 1, 15 Stat. 183, with Act of Mar. 26, 1804, ch. 40, § 3, 2 Stat. 290,
290-91. The 1868 Act stated that no one could prosecute a person for
a capital crime unless a grand jury indicted the person within five
years of committing the crime. See Act of July 25, 1868, § 1, 15 Stat. at
183. It is not clear what relevance this statute has to R.S. § 1047, but
it is listed in the margin notes to the Revised Statutes.
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APPENDIX C
1. Smith v. United States, 143 F.2d 228 (9th Cir. 1944), was a civil suit
initiated in 1941 to collect a judgment for a criminal fine imposed on
the defendant in 1924. The court ruled that the government could
“sue upon such a judgment as upon a money judgment obtained in a
civil action,” and rejected the claim that § 2462 barred the action,
commenting that “[i]t has always been assumed that there is no time
limitation for the enforcement of a judgment, whether of fine or
imprisonment, rendered upon conviction for a crime.” Id. at 229. In
dicta, the court stated that § 2462 required that “prosecutions [for a
fine or forfeiture] must be commenced by indictment, information,
or suit” within five years of the violation. Id.
2. United States v. Athlone Industries, Inc., 746 F.2d 977, 982 n.1
(3d Cir. 1984), declined to decide “when the statute [§ 2462] begins
to run” in the context of an action to assess a civil penalty under the
Consumer Product Safety Act. See id. The court remanded the case
to the district court both to interpret the requirements of the
substantive statute allegedly violated and to develop a factual record.
See id. at 986.
3. Western Pacific Fisheries, Inc. v. SS President Grant, 730 F.2d 1280
(9th Cir. 1984), was an action to recover damages arising out of a
collision at sea between two ships. The defendant company argued
that the plaintiffs had no standing to sue because their ship had been
involved in drug dealing and was therefore subject to forfeiture to the
government. In rejecting this argument, the court noted that the
government had not initiated forfeiture proceedings and referred in
passing to the statute of limitation the court assumed would apply to
such a proceeding, 28 U.S.C. § 2462. See id. at 1287.
4. United States v. Ancorp National Services, Inc., 516 F.2d 198 (2d Cir.
1975), was an action under § 5(l) of the Federal Trade Commission
Act, to recover civil penalties for violations of a prior FTC cease and
desist order. The court assumed, without discussion, that § 2462
barred penalties for violations that had occurred more than five years
before the suit was brought. See id. at 201 n.5; see also supra note 294296 and accompanying text.
5. United States v. Witherspoon, 211 F.2d 858 (6th Cir. 1954), was an
action under the Surplus Property Act to recover liquidated damages
for fraudulently obtaining property. The court held that § 2462
barred the claim, assuming without discussion that the five-year
period began when the violations occurred. See id. at 860-61.
Witherspoon was overruled when the Supreme Court later held that
§ 2462 did not apply to Surplus Property Act proceedings because the
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Act provides for liquidated damages, not a penalty. See Rex Trailer Co.
v. United States, 350 U.S. 148, 151 (1956).
6. Lancashire Shipping Co. v. Durning, 98 F.2d 751, 753 (2d Cir.
1938) (Lancashire II), did not accept the date of the underlying
violation as the date the five-year period begins under § 2462, but
rather supports the argument that it begins when the penalty is
assessed. The underlying violation was the failure of a ship’s master
to comply with a notice to detain on board the ship, and to deport,
Chinese crew members. See id. at 751-52. The “penalty accrued on
March 12, 1931,” but this was not the date of the violation; it was the
date of a subsequent notification of liability for the penalty. See id. at
753. This is made clear in an earlier Second Circuit decision based
on the same events. See Lancashire Shipping Co. v. Elting, 70 F.2d 699
(2d Cir. 1934) (Lancashire I). In Lancashire I, the date of the notice to
detain the Chinese crew, the violation of which gave rise to the
penalty, is not stated, but circumstances referred to by the court
demonstrated that it was some time after January 1931, when the ship
arrived in New York, and before March 11, 1931, when police raided
the ship and discovered that the violation had occurred. See id. at
700. March 12, 1931, was the date of “a notice of liability for fine”
under the immigration laws that was later served on the ship’s agent.
See id. Thus, Lancashire II assumed that the five-year period began not
on the date of the violation, but rather when the defendant was first
notified of liability for the fine. Further, the court did not hold that
the version of § 2462 then in effect even applied. See id. at 753. The
court said that “if” the time limitation applied to a subsequent
administrative action against the ship’s master personally for the
same penalty, the government had acted timely by serving him with a
notice of liability within five years of the date the “penalty accrued.”
See id.
7. Durning v. McDonnell, 86 F.2d 91, 92-93 (2d Cir. 1936), also did
not “accept” the date of the violation as the date when the five-year
period in the precursor of § 2462 began to run; the court had no
reason to comment on that issue. The case was an action on a bond
given to obtain clearance of a ship; without the posting of the bond,
the ship would have been held in port pending determination of the
ship’s agents’ liability for fines under the immigration laws. See id.
The promise of the bond was that the surety would “pay penalties for
which the [ship’s] agents” were later determined to be liable. See id.
at 92. The decision recounts as background that the immigration
violations occurred some time in 1927 and the fines were “imposed
early in 1928.” Id. The action on the bond was commenced more
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than five years later, and the court held that the version of § 2462
then in effect was inapplicable and did not bar the suit, which was not
an action on the statutory liability of the agents for the fines. See id. at
93.
8. The Ng Ka By Cases, 24 F.2d 772 (9th Cir. 1928), were actions for
forfeiture of alcoholic beverages brought less than five years after the
goods were seized by the government under the National Prohibition
Act. The court rejected the claimant’s contention that the actions
were barred by either laches or a three-year statute of limitation he
claimed was applicable, stating that “if any limitation is applicable, we
think it is the five-year period prescribed by [R.S. § 1047].” Id. at 774
(emphasis added). The court had no need to, and did not, decide
that the five-year period in R.S. § 1047 began to run on the date of
the violation.
9. All the other cases cited by the court in Core to support its
holding that the five-year period in § 2462 begins on the date of the
underlying violation are district court cases, three of which have
already been discussed. See supra note 295 (discussing United States v.
C. & R. Trucking Co., FTC v. Lukens Steel Co., and United States v.
Fraser). The other district court cases cited in Core do not support
that court’s conclusion, but rather demonstrate that the courts have
often recognized that when a claim for penalties “accrued” for § 2462
purposes depends on interpretation of the underlying statute
establishing the penalty or forfeiture. See United States v. Advance
Mach. Co., 547 F. Supp. 1085, 1089-91 (D. Minn. 1982) (holding that
§ 2462 did not bar an action for penalties under the Consumer
Product Safety Act against a manufacturer of a defective machine that
caused injuries, even though the violations occurred more than five
years before the action was filed; under the Consumer Product Safety
Act, the court held, the five-year period did not begin to run until the
manufacturer “has actual knowledge that the Commission is
adequately informed” of injury complaints); United States v. Firestone
Tire & Rubber Co., 518 F. Supp. 1021, 1038-40 (N.D. Ohio 1981)
(holding that the conduct at issue did not violate the Gold Reserve
Act of 1934 and that even if it did the defendant could not be held
responsible; only peripherally did the Firestone Tire court assume,
without discussion, that § 2462 barred the government’s reliance on
some of the alleged violations, see 518 F. Supp. at 1036-37); United
States v. Appling, 239 F. Supp. 185, 194-95 (S.D. Tex. 1965) (holding
that under the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938 notice of excess
rice production must be given in time for producers to avoid
penalties; notice given too late to provide this opportunity precluded
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imposition of penalties); United States v. Wilson, 133 F. Supp. 882, 883
(N.D. Cal. 1955) (finding it unnecessary to determine whether § 2462
applied to a claim under the Surplus Property Act because the action
was timely even if § 2462 applied); United States v. One Dark Bay Horse,
130 F. 240, 241-42 (D. Vt. 1904) (holding that a condemnation
proceeding to confirm forfeiture of a horse imported without paying
duties was untimely under the predecessor of § 2462 because under
the customs statute the in rem forfeiture “was absolute and
complete . . . immediately upon the importation in avoidance of the
customs office”).

